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Foreign Minister Malile Pays Visit to PRC

Arrives in Beijing 22 Jan

AU2201213691 Tirana ATA in English 1905 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Tirana, January 22 (ATA)—The Albanian official delegation headed by the minister of foreign affairs of the PSR [People's Socialist Republic] of Albania, Reis Malile, left for Beijing at the invitation of the foreign minister of the PR of China. The delegation is composed of the chairman of the Committee of Technique and Science, Ajet Ylli; the deputy minister of foreign trade, Kostandin Hoxha, and others. Present at the airport to see off the delegation was the minister of construction, Ismail Ahmeti; the secretary general of the Council of Ministers, Fatos Nano; and others.

Present to see off the delegation was also the ambassadress of the PR of China in Tirana, Gu Maoxuan.

On January 22 the delegation of the PSR of Albania, headed by the minister of foreign affairs, Reis Malile, arrived in China.

At the international airport of Beijing, he was welcomed by the foreign minister of China, Qian Qichen and other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Present was also the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the PSR of Albania in Beijing, Justin Papajorgji.

The Albanian delegation will conduct talks with the foreign minister and with other senior Chinese personalities regarding the further development and broadening of the friendly relations and cooperation between Albania and China in the political, economic, technical, scientific fields, etc.

Confers With Li Peng

AU2301210691 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] PRC Prime Minister Li Peng received today Albanian Foreign Affairs Minister Reis Malile, and held a friendly conversation with him. Reis Malile conveyed to Prime Minister Li Peng the greetings of President Ramiz Alia and Adil Carcani, chairman of the Council of Ministers. He also delivered to the Chinese prime minister a message from the Albanian prime minister. The message, among other things, invites the Chinese prime minister to visit Albania.

Prime Minister Li Peng expressed his thanks for the message and said he accepted with pleasure the invitation to pay an official and friendly visit to Albania, which he will do at a suitable time. On this occasion, he asked for his warm greetings to be conveyed to President Ramiz Alia and Prime Minister Adil Carcani. He expressed the conviction that Sino-Albanian relations, which are developing well, will gain new impetus in the future. He went to say that he viewed them with optimism. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng spoke about the fast development of China, which has taken important steps forward in recent years. Speaking about foreign relations, Prime Minister Li Peng said that China pursues an independent policy and bases its relations with other states, large and small, on equality and mutual respect.

At the meeting, Foreign Minister Reis Malile pointed out that the Albanian people cherish feelings of respect for the Chinese people, their centuries-old history, and their rich traditions and culture, and that the Albanian Government favors the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

Meets With Qian Qichen

AU2301211191 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Talks began in Beijing today between the delegation of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania led by Foreign Minister Reis Malile and the delegation of the PRC led by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

The talks commented on the positive trend of friendly relations of cooperation between the two countries, especially in recent years, in political contacts, trade, economic exchanges, etc. Both sides expressed the desire of the two governments to carry relations forward and to carry out cooperation in all fields of mutual interest.

Foreign Minister Reis Malile, after stressing that the PRC plays an important role for peace in Asia and the world, informed the Chinese foreign minister about the measures and reforms undertaken in the process of democratization in Albania and the establishment of political pluralism. He also spoke about our country's foreign policy and Balkan and European processes, to which Albania is increasingly trying to contribute. Foreign Minister Reis Malile invited his Chinese counterpart to visit Albania, an invitation which was accepted with pleasure.

For his part, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen spoke about the stabilized situation in China, particularly the achievements of recent years. He also stressed the good prospects for economic development offered to China by programs of (?special) ties. The Chinese minister especially expressed his appreciation for his meeting with President Ramiz Alia in New York, at which they discussed the further development of friendly relations between the two countries. The Chinese minister later pointed out that, in the spirit of the reforms undertaken by the Albanian state, China is prepared to cooperate with Albania in political and economic fields, and that it will shortly give Albania credit. The Chinese minister also expressed his appreciation for the policy of good-neighborliness pursued by Albania and its contribution to Balkan cooperation.

The ministers also focused on events in the Middle East. Both sides expressed concern at the dangerous situation created in the Gulf region and the necessity of Iraq's withdrawing from Kuwait and respecting Kuwait's

freedom and independence. They stressed the need to solve the conflict in peaceful ways.

Government Views Strikes, Declares 'Border Zones'

AU2101155891

[Editorial Report] Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian at 1410 GMT on 21 January carries a five-minute live or recorded interview with Council of Ministers' press spokesman Genc Kondi, and a three-minute Sokol Perihati report on a bus drivers' strike in Tirana.

Kondi states: "Today's meeting of the Council of Ministers considered the exceptional situation in the economy and certain work stoppages in Korce, Durres, and Tirana, stressing that measures have been taken to put an end to these activities in certain sectors, and for them to be coped with in another way, such as with the use of the Army." "The government stressed that all demands for wage increases exceed its economic resources, and cannot be met." The meeting is reported as "stressing that the state has the right to protect itself from anarchist excesses." On the subject of "illegal crossings of the southern Albanian-Greek border," Kondi states: "On the basis of a proposal, a decision was made to declare areas in the south border zones, obliging people entering them to obtain a permit. Permits to enter these districts will only issued by the state organs in the districts where citizens live."

Sokol Perihati states that "the urban bus service was interrupted in Tirana this morning, which caused great concern in all work and production centers." Perihati interviews workers in various enterprises, who express their "indignation" at the inconvenience.

Greece Returns Citizens to Border Authorities

AU2101212691 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 2100 GMT 21 Jan 91

["ATA Report"]

[Text] Asked about the situation on the southern border, the spokesman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs explained that on 21 January 1991 the Greek border authorities handed over 1,150 Albanian citizens who had crossed the border illegally at the Kakavije, Qafebote, (?Kapajeto), and [place name indistinct] border posts. The Greek border authorities also told our border authorities that in the next few days they will speed up the return of other persons who have crossed the border illegally.

Foreigners Reminded of Need for Entry Visas

AU1801212491 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Unattributed "ATA Report"]

[Text] There have been many people recently arriving at our border points and seeking to enter Albania without obtaining an Albanian visa beforehand. In this connection, we met a spokesman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who said to us:

We inform foreign citizens and our Albanian brothers, to avoid misunderstandings, that they should present their documents to our diplomatic and consular representatives to obtain entry visas, or should use the opportunity of arriving with organized tourist groups. Visas may be obtained at the border only when they have been approved beforehand. Persons permitted to come by car must return by the same car, as recorded in their passports, because cases have been noticed in which cars have been left or sold here, which is contrary to the laws of our country and the legal principles of all countries in the world.

PDSh Forms Branch in Peshkopi; Rally Held

AU2001194491 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 20 Jan 91

[Text] At 1100 today, the Democratic Party [PDSh] held a rally in Avni Rushiti Square in the center of Peshkopi on the occasion of the creation of its branch in Diber District.

The rally was opened by [name indistinct], chairman of the Initiating Commission of the Diber Branch of the PDSh. In his speech, (?Safet Zylani), the PDSh's branch chairman, said that the democratic processes now intensifying as part of political pluralism in our country first demand moderation, culture, and tolerance, to put the interests of the homeland before everything else, and to cultivate what will bring us more happiness and a better future.

The lecturer Bardhyl Reso spoke in the name of the Initiating Commission for the creation of the PDSh, and dwelt on the PDSh's program for agricultural development.

The following slogans were shouted at the rally: Freedom, democracy; We, like all Europe, love Albania; Long live President Ramiz Alia.

Democratic Front Comments on 'Grave' Situation

AU1801212291 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] On 18 January 1991, the Presidium of the General Council of the Democratic Front of Albania met under its chairman, Comrade Adil Carcani. It discussed the political and economic situation that has arisen in the country. The Presidium assessed the situation as grave and fraught with serious dangers to democratic processes, the unity of the nation, and the destiny of the homeland. The present time of major political, economic, and social transformations calls for everyone's commitment to work, wisdom, and tolerance, not to allow tensions and conflicts to lead to destabilization.

The Presidium of the General Council of the Democratic Front fully supports the agreement reached among representatives of the political parties and social organizations. It sees it as an expression of democratic culture

and a real road toward solving in a spirit of dialogue the problems that face our country and people today.

The Democratic Front, like other political and social bodies, is fully committed to concretely acting on the conditions of the agreement, and is confident that all its members will express their sense of responsibility for carrying out this agreement with work and wisdom, putting the lofty interests of the homeland before everything else. The Presidium also heard a report on the progress of the campaign for the People's Assembly elections. Assessing positively the work so far of the Front's organizations at the base and in districts, it dwelt on the tasks ahead until the polling day of 31 March. The aim of the Democratic Front will be for the people to go to the polls in solid ranks and to give their votes for the most dedicated candidates.

Decree Outlines Strike Rules, Regulations

AU2201213191 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 22 Jan 91

["Decree on the Right to Strike"]

[Text] On the basis of Article 78 of the Constitution and on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania decrees:

Article 1

Working people have the right to strike and to temporarily stop work in pursuit of their economic and social demands, and may exercise this right according to the regulations laid down in this decree.

Participation in strikes is voluntary. No one may be compelled to take part in a strike against his will.

All forms of pressure or other kinds of coercion preventing working people from expressing their will to take part in a strike or not are forbidden.

Article 2

Professional organizations or representatives authorized by the working collective have the right to organize and declare a strike. A strike may only be declared when a majority of working people have voted for it. Strikes may be organized at the level of an enterprise, production units, or their subdivisions.

Article 3

A strike is only allowed in pursuit of improvements to working or living conditions, for the defense of labor, problems of labor remuneration, social security, and other rights connected with employment, but always on the basis of the labor contract undertaken by the professional organizations and the employer.

Article 4

The strike organizers must notify the employer at least 15 days in advance, defining the demands of the strike, its length, place, and the numbers taking part. A strike declared for the first time may not last longer than one working day. Working people may declare warning strikes of no longer than one hour without advance notice.

Article 5

It is forbidden to create obstacles or difficulties for working people who do not join a strike and who wish to continue work.

Article 6

A strike is not allowed, or may be stopped when it has begun:
a) when a natural disaster has occurred on the territory of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.
b) during the conduct of procedures for a settlement at a national or local level.
c) on public holidays and two days before and after them.
ch) [fourth letter of Albanian alphabet] in sectors where a work stoppage endangers people's lives and health, or where serious consequences for the defense of the country and production could result.
d) for the purposes of meeting the demands of individual working people.
Dh) [sixth letter of Albanian alphabet] when they are accompanied by criminal acts.

Article 7

In sectors working to meet the people's essential needs, such the supply of bread and vital items of daily consumption, water, and electricity, public transportation, the health service, civil defense, the judicial administration, the post office, telecommunications, radio, television, education, social security, and the customs, strikes are only allowed when the continued fulfillment of the aforementioned needs has been guaranteed.

Article 8

A strike may not begin until every effort has been made to solve disagreements through conciliation. An arbitration commission will be created for this purpose, composed of representatives of the professional organizations or working people and representatives of the enterprise's management. The number of members of the commission and the procedure for their talks will be decided by agreement among the parties concerned. The talks may not last longer than 10 days. By agreement among the parties concerned, the talks may continue beyond this limit. The decisions of the arbitration commission are to be taken by a majority of votes.

Article 9

[Words indistinct] After submitting a request to the court, the strike is suspended and working people resume work. The court decides the settlement of the dispute, assigning

responsibility to the respective parties, the acts they must perform, and, when financial responsibility is involved, deciding who must pay compensation. When the employer bears responsibility for the strike, he is obliged to pay the working people their wages for the period of the work stoppage. In the opposite case, the working people receive no wages. The court's decision is final.

Article 10

Strikes in contravention of this decree are not allowed, and when they begin, they are forbidden by the employer, who takes measures to ensure a continuation of work, and has the right to annul the employment contracts of working people who do not resume work within three days, and, where necessary, to enforce measures holding them materially responsible. The decision to annul employment contracts is final. When serious consequences involving criminal acts result from a strike, the culprits are legally responsible.

Article 11

For violations of the regulations laid down in Article 1, Paragraph 3, and in Article 5 of this decree, culprits are punished with reeducation through labor or up to three months' imprisonment.

Article 12

This decree comes into effect immediately.

Tirana, 22 January 1991. Decree No. 7,458. For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, [signed] Ramiz Alia, president; Sihat Tozaj, secretary.

Decree Protects National Monuments, Statues, Flag

AU2201211791 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Decree on Respect and Protection for Monuments Associated With National History and State Emblems]

[Text] With the aim of preventing all acts which offend national feelings and are in opposition to the people's unity and their traditions and moral principles, and with the aim of protecting from acts of violence and vandalism monuments of historical personalities and everything associated with their names, on the basis of Article 78 of the Constitution, the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania decrees:

1. Monuments, busts, and memorials of all kinds dedicated to illustrious figures from the history and culture of our people, such as the national hero Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeu; great patriots of the national renaissance such as the Frasheri brothers; distinguished fighters for independence such as Ismail Qemali; noted figures of the struggle for democracy such as Fan Noli; the leader of the National Liberation War and the founder of the new Albanian state, Enver Hoxha; and other distinguished personalities in the centuries-old history of our people are inviolable monuments and are protected under the law by the state.

2. Memorials, plaques, [word indistinct], and the graves of martyrs who fell for freedom and independence, wherever they may be are protected under the law, as are the national flag, the coat of arms, and other emblems of the Republic.

3. Any act whose purpose is to damage, destroy, or alter these aforementioned objects, and any call or act that degrades such personalities is punishable by between six months' and three years' imprisonment.

4. When the aforementioned acts are carried out by organized groups of persons or are accompanied by acts of violence or violations of public order, the level of punishment is doubled for the organizers of these groups and those carrying out the acts.

5. Managers of enterprises and institutions at the center and the base should lay down internal rules for the siting, preservation, maintenance, and removal of portable symbols dedicated to figures and personalities of national history.

6. Accusations relating to the criminal acts described in this act are to be sent to directly to the court for judgment, because acts have been committed under Article 127 of the Code of Penal Procedure.

7. This decree comes into effect immediately.

Tirana, 22 January 1991. Decree No. 7,459. For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, [signed] Ramiz Alia, president; Sihat Tozaj, secretary.

Comparison—Carcani Gives Republic Day Speech

AU1701151291

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian of 11 January carries on pages 1-2 a 4,000-word item entitled "Speech by Comrade Adil Carcani," chairman of the Council of Ministers, at a meeting in Tirana marking the 45th anniversary of the Albanian republic on 10 January. This has been compared with the Tirana Domestic Albanian version published in the 11 January East Europe DAILY REPORT, pages 1-5, revealing the following variations:

Page three, column two, first full paragraph, last sentence, through second full paragraph, sentence one reads: ...for the people.

It is a well-known fact that, under the influence of natural factors, but also because of many economic and organizational shortcomings connected with the old management mechanism, there have been major disturbances in recent years in the market.... (supplying indistinct passage and rephrasing.)

Prime Minister Presents Reorganization Plan

AU2301180191 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1345 GMT 23 Jan 91

["Government Program Declaration" read by Prime Minister Dimtur Popov at Grand National Assembly session in Sofia—live]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Chairman, esteemed deputy chairmen of the Grand National Assembly, esteemed ladies and gentlemen of the National Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria submits the following declaration on upcoming activities to you and to all Bulgarian people:

A peaceful and sensible revolution is taking place in Bulgaria. The election of a national government based on an agreement between the political forces represented in parliament on guaranteeing a peaceful transition to a democratic society is the greatest achievement of the revolution after the Grand National Assembly elections.

The agreement maps out the most important goals and tasks of the government and the methods for their achievement within the limits set by the political compromise, by the country's laws, and the Constitution.

From the time the government entered office, it has been working constantly and with great intensity. Our work is devoted to the cause of freedom and to the people's benefit. The government is trying to pursue the changing of the system from a totalitarian to a democratic one. It is our objective to halt the further intensification of the general crisis, which is disastrous for our country, and to create prerequisites for gradually overcoming it, within the shortest time possible, so that our efforts may be useful for the people and for those who will rule country after us.

Our work is facilitated by a fortunate circumstance, namely that the goals that we are striving for are widely supported. The fact that our goals fully coincide with the general trends of change in the world is also fortunate. The most important objective of our government is to restore the socioeconomic potential of the Bulgarian citizen. Everything depends on the question whether our citizens will be free to implement their abilities, whether they will assume the responsibility for their own fate, and whether they can hope for a better life. This possibility and hope are the basic prerequisites for the Bulgarian citizens' activities and success in life. These prerequisites also determine the success of our nation and state as a whole. The nation is our greatest potential. In the past this potential was not effectively used as a driving force in our economy and public life. We wish to create conditions that are likely to stimulate the people's initiative and to permit them to fully expand their efficiency, creative talents, and industriousness.

Although possessing the necessary knowledge and skills, in the past Bulgarian citizens were deprived of the necessary legal conditions that provide a real opportunity for independent activities. The government will try to give such people a chance so, despite the current difficulties, self-imposed restrictions, and sacrifices, they are able to work more effectively in the state and cooperative enterprises and in the companies, firms, and agricultural farms which they will create themselves, so they can have their own property and earn their own incomes.

Private property and labor are the basic prerequisites of personal and social stability. The radical changes in the economic sector will result in the replacement of the present system by a new one in which the market economy will prevail; in which private, cooperative, mixed, and state-owned property will exist side by side.

Privatization, as the basic core of the reform, should begin promptly; it should be accelerated and widely expanded, by ensuring an increasing share of private property and initiative.

One of the most important objectives of our work is to become a country whose citizens are accumulating wealth on the basis of their capabilities, qualifications, and spirit of enterprise, and not to strive for levelling, which always produces general poverty.

This is the real guarantee for our future as a modern and democratic country.

Let us examine our tasks related to the changes in the state structures, to dismantling the totalitarian system, and to the democratization of our social system.

In opposition to the former centralized administration of the totalitarian state, we shall strive to establish a simplified, economical, and efficient European type of system of state administration, which should be both a regulator and partner in the social organism.

The change in the state administration will be one of the most important elements of the reform.

The government is planning to complete its draft project on restructuring the state administration by the end of February 1991. We envisage closing down several executive power establishments and considerably reducing the expenditures for the state apparatus, for our missions abroad, for the Army, for the security services, and so forth, to the limit of the country's essential needs.

We are proposing to accomplish the decentralization of power in the upcoming months by ensuring the economic and administrative autonomy of the state-owned departments, organizations, and enterprises through changes in the territorial- adminsitrative organization and through establishing new local government services.

The present local government services—namely the people's councils—will be eliminated. New local government services will be established on the basis of self-government to replace them. The new services will not be subject to any political force whatsoever and will

totally differ from the old ones regarding their structure, competences, and democratic nature.

A new system of the state structure will be established—municipalities, okoliyas, and oblasts—whose parallel and vertical links will be totally different in their essence, which also applies to relations with the central administrative organizations.

It is evident that this question must be resolved on the basis of the laws that you are expected to adopt.

In accordance with the deadlines set by the political forces' agreement, the Grand National Assembly is expected to adopt a package of four laws in February 1991. These laws should make the aforementioned legal changes possible. The following laws are envisaged in this respect:

A law on the local government services and on their self-government that should determine the structure and essence of these services.

A law on the country's new territorial organization that should establish the foundations of the government structure, determine the number of municipalities, okoliyas, and oblasts, and possibly also the [word indistinct] areas.

A law on elections for local government services that should determine the mechanisms and principles on the basis of which the forthcoming local government elections should be organized and implemented.

A law on amending certain articles of the Constitution related to the state structure, without which the adoption and application of the aforementioned law would be impossible.

The preparation and implementation of the parliamentary elections is a task of crucial importance for the government.

For this purpose we need a new election law likely to guarantee the adoption of a new system and new mechanisms for the elections that should be in accordance with the most democratic election systems and with our real needs.

The forthcoming parliamentary elections should be organized by the legitimate local authorities, by those self-government services that will be elected at the first local elections.

These authorities and services should observe all constitutional and legal requirements [words indistinct].

Let us examine the question of judicial power:

In the first place, it is required promptly to establish legal foundations and real prerequisites for the organization and establishment of the judicial system as the third power in the country, next to the legislative and executive powers. This is the basis for the consolidation of a democratic and law-governed state. The executive power has become uncontrollable in many respects today. The collective and individual actions of the central departmental and executive services are almost entirely beyond any efficient judicial control. The authority of the judicial institutions is underestimated and, in some respects, it has become impersonal.

[Words indistinct] This was convenient for the totalitarian system, but it is inadmissible for the law-governed state in which the law should prevail.

The government intends to submit a bill on a new organization of the judicial system under which this system should be independent from the legislative and the executive power, and which should guarantee that the actions and decisions of the executive power should comply with the law.

The judicial power should be guaranteed its own budget that should not depend on the budget of the executive power.

Administrative courts or administrative bodies [kolegyi] attached to the court should be established to exert effective control on the legality of collective and individual administrative acts. It is necessary to restore [word indistinct] legal action by establishing administrative courts of justice. The supreme administrative court will be the last authority that should deal with assessing the correct application of the laws, with interpretation of the law, and (?should be relieved of inappropriate activities).

The majority of legal institutions are outdated. The State Arbitration should be subject to the jurisdiction of the court where all disputes on economic affairs should be taken over by the economic courts of justice and [words indistinct].

Naturally, it is necessary to preserve the possibility for the further existence of voluntary arbitration institutions.

It is, last, but not least, required to establish a constitutional court, which is especially important for our country today. This court should determine whether the laws passed by the National Assembly are in accordance with the Constitution, or whether they are in contradiction with it. Naturally, the court will not be authorized to repeal any laws, provided that they are in accordance with the Constitution, because the Grand National Assembly remains the supreme service of the people's power, however, the constitutional court will be authorized to prevent their application. Along with the implementation of its functions, the court will provide a guarantee for protecting the minority in parliament against possible illegal actions of the majority.

The old concept according to which the parliament was entitled to decide whether the laws are in accordance with the Constitution, or not, is evidently outdated. It was very convenient for a dictator who subjected even the National Assembly to his will, but it is totally inappropriate for a democratic state which is based on the law and on the Constitution.

A system of electing judges should be introduced to guarantee their true independence. They should not be treated as normal civil servants, but as members of the relevant magistrate [words indistinct].

One of the government's most important tasks is to guarantee the country's security and inviolability within its borders, to protect the country's independence and sovereignty. In this respect we are guided by the Constitution and by the laws, by the Helsinki documents, and by the 1990 Paris Agreement.

The government shall provide guarantees for the country's independence and sovereignty especially within the framework and structures of the European security and cooperation system.

To guarantee that the laws should be observed by everyone, measures against illegal trade and (?economic) crime will be adopted. More effective and strict actions shall be adopted against any actions likely to create social tension and conflicts based on racial, ethnic, or religious issues. Measures shall also be adopted against all actions likely to affect the Bulgarian people's unity and the integrity of the state irrespective of the forms under which they are conducted.

The government will strive to establish normative and administrative conditions likely to guarantee that all citizens have the opportunity for enjoying all human rights and freedoms and that all their legitimate interests will be protected.

Any actions aimed at restricting such rights and freedoms, or creating a situation of constraint, threat, or danger in exercising them shall be prevented.

The government devotes particular attention to the reform in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system. By the end of February 1991 we shall adopt the new structure of this ministry.

To replace the presently acting structures of the People's Militia and the National Security Forces, a system of relatively autonomous services and units will be established on a Constitutional basis, in accordance with the present democratic system.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs will be relieved of inappropriate functions and activities to guarantee a real division of powers in our country.

The main investigation department and the legal investigation services will be removed from the ministry to be integrated with the law dispensing system. The two major intelligence services—namely intelligence and counter-intelligence—will be reorganized. The same applies to the operational defense police functions endowed with administrative executive competences. [words indistinct]

The regional police forces in our country will be granted administrative, legal, and financial independence. The staff and personnel of the executive services will be formed on the basis of professional qualifications.

In February-March 1991 we will propose the establishment of law-based specialized institutions in this sector in connection with the reorganization of the special security services.

In accordance with the political forces' agreement, the government shall adopt measures for dealing with the activities of the former State Security services. These measures shall contribute to establishing the truth and detecting the responsibility for certain crimes and offenses against the laws committed in the period of the totalitarian regime.

The renewed Ministry of Internal Affairs will intensify the struggle against crime, drug traffic, and other forms of criminal activities in cooperation with the relevant international security services.

We are convinced that this is a crucial question related to national confidence and to the restoration of Bulgaria's image in the world.

In the area of foreign policy, the government will create the image of a new and democratic Bulgaria. It will conduct the pragmatic policy of a multiparty parliamentary state, fully coordinated with the real possibilities and national interests of the country, and based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect. It will also be based on an effective system of bilateral and multilateral guarantees for the security of the Republic of Bulgaria. We shall be guided in our activity by universal and humane values, legal norms, moral rules, international agreements, the principles of the UN Charter, and naturally, by the decisions of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria.

The process of democratization in our country will naturally prompt Bulgaria to develop closer relations with the centers of world democracy and economy. Our multi-directional orientation will be a basic characteristic of our policy. We shall support the UN efforts to assert justice and the norms of international law in various parts of the world. Bulgaria's attitude to the events in the Persian Gulf is a confirmation of this policy.

The government will follow [several words indistinct]. We shall actively participate in further developing the all-European process and aim at Bulgaria's integration in the European political, historical, cultural, and other processes. We shall expand and enrich our relations with the neighboring countries with a view to creating a more favorable atmosphere in the Balkan Peninsula. We shall do everything possible so our country's relations with the USSR and the United States obtain new contents in accordance with our national interests.

We shall review our relations with other countries on the basis of the new international order and the modern requirements of a market economy. Together with the

USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania, we shall (?confer) on dissolving the Warsaw Pact as a military-political organization, [several indistinct words]. We shall continue our participation in the talks for creating new structures and mechanisms of cooperation with the East European countries. We shall devote great attention to the economic aspects of our foreign policy activity, which have exceptional importance in leading the country out of the grave economic and financial situation, and in its worthy participation in the modern life and structures. Special efforts are necessary for increasing the country's authority in international relations and for its acceptance as a reliable partner, which inspires security and confidence.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, people's representatives:

The Grand National Assembly and every Bulgarian citizen must know what the present economic situation of the country is. We have received a very grave inheritance. I shall not dwell on the causes, because they are well-known. In 1990 our production amounted to 70.3 billion leva, which represents a decrease of 8.5 billion leva or 10.7 percent in comparison to the previous year. This was caused by the shortage of raw and other materials, violating production and technological relations, and limiting the markets for some spheres of our production. The decrease in monthly production in comparison to the relevant months of the previous year, which began in December 1989, continued until the end of December 1990. If the last monthly decrease for 1990 was 744 million leva, in December 1990 it reached (?1.101) billion leva.

The production volume in the basic material spheres decreased, such as industry, construction, and transportation. Undoubtedly, our economy regressed, and this regress can be measured in years. It is paradoxical that the retail trade has reached 20,700 billion leva, i.e., 1,700 billion leva more than the previous year. This is a result first of all of the increased prices for goods, and the increased sale of more expensive goods. Some 225 out of 295 monitored domestic indicative goods, [indistinct passage]

The price of certain goods increased two, three, and even more times. This explains very well the acceleration of the inflation process [words indistinct]

The production of eggs, meat, milk and [word indistinct] decreased about three percent. [several words indistinct] The shortage of those goods in the market is more than obvious. In this sphere one could also speak of overstocking or about anticipating higher prices for those goods. This is a consequence of delaying the measures on improving economy.

We face clear problems in the sphere of social care. We ended the year with about 70,000 registered unemployed people. When we begin the economic reform and restructure our national economy during the current year, the number of unemployed will reach 250,000-300,000, or eight percent of those currently employed in our economy. [words indistinct] This is a very serious problem, which will affect many families and all social strata.

The number of pensioners sharply increases. Now they are about 26 percent of our population. In this sphere our country is one of world leaders. In July 1990 there were more than 600,000 pensioners on the basis of their age and years of service. The great number of pensioners and the measures to increase the minimum pension, updating them, and subjecting them to indexation, as well as various children benefits increased our expenditures [several words indistinct]. Thus in practice we exhausted all social security reserves.

The various difficulties of the state and the population significantly increased the number of people who need social aid and care. In 1990 they were about 1.8 million people, or almost 20 percent of the population. The economic crisis and unemployment will increase this percentage to 25 percent, and this will increase even more the budget expenditures for defending the socially weak, elderly, and ill people, as well as people with income below the social minimum.

The internal state debt of the Republic of Bulgaria is even more alarming. According to data of the Ministry of Finance the [words indistinct] amounts to nine billion leva. The debts guaranteed by the state, and which belong to the category of state credits, amount to five billion leva. The amount needed for paying those debts must come from the spheres of power supply, metallurgy, and construction. The anticipated increase of the debt also is alarming. It is expected that it will increase 3.6 billion. Just the direct debts will increase three billion leva.

The state budget revenue for 1990 amounts to 15.2 billion leva, the expenditures—18.2 billion leva. Thus in 1990 we had a deficit of about three billion leva.

The general amount of subsidies in 1990 amounted to 6.3 billion leva, i.e., about 34.5 percent of the state budget expenditures. Thus our internal debt will reach 17.3 billion leva. To this we must add the debt of the state budget to the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, which amounts to 3.7 billion leva.

According to data of the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, Bulgaria's foreign debt in convertible foreign currency by 30 November 1990 amounted to $11 billion. The total capital of this sum amounts to $10.7 billion, and the unpaid interest—almost $600 million.

On 29 March 1990, when our foreign currency reserves reached an unprecedented low level—$200 million—Bulgaria's Foreign Trade Bank stopped payments on our foreign debt. The moratorium negatively affected the access of the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank and other trade banks to the capital markets, and indeed sharply curbed the country's foreign trade exchange.

Stopping the influx of new finances from the Western creditors, the disintegration of CEMA, and the Persian Gulf crisis, extremely exacerbated the country's payment ability. Briefly, such is the unhappy and grave situation that the government will try to resolve. This is an extremely unfavorable starting position.

Let us examine the economic policy. The basic point of the government's economic policy is to stabilize the economy and create the legal basic mechanisms that will guarantee the irreversible character of the process of changing the economic system. The government's activities will stem from the agreement of the political forces, the agreement with the IMF, and the agreement of preserving social peace, signed by the trade unions and the employers. Those three agreements prompt several steps, a significant part of which have already been systemized. They are being implemented on the basis of a special timetable, adopted by the Council of Ministers. Each stage of this timetable requires a program of measures in the spheres of fiscal and monetary policy, credits and revenues, foreign trade policy, social security, the labor market, privatization, demonopolization, and modernization of the state sector. Those packages of measures are worked out by working groups of the relevant departments and the tripartite commission of the government, the trade unions, and the employers.

The activity of the government during its mandate can be summarized by the following packages of measures: At the beginning of February the government will complete its program, which will be submitted to the IMF. The program will pursue the following basic goals:

1. Restoring the balance of our economy through drastically reducing domestic demand, investments, personal income, and consumption.

2. Introducing market mechanisms, accompanied by the necessary structural changes in economy.

3. Normalizing foreign trade relations and restoring confidence in the country's paying ability.

There are several special tasks that spring from the governmental program for this year. Among them—stopping the further decrease of production, a task that will implemented during the first half of the year, and creating prerequisites for production increase during the second half of the year.

After an initial sharp but necessary correction of the prices, the level of inflation will rapidly decrease as a result of the simultaneous [word indistinct] of the prices. The country's budget deficit must be eliminated.

The main characteristic of the Bulgarian program, which sets it apart from analogous programs of other East European countries is the fact that it begins under exceptionally unfavorable domestic and international conditions. The time that was wasted last year, contributed very much to this situation.

At the beginning, our country will not have the necessary foreign financial support. Because of this, as well as because of the lack of foreign currency reserves, the huge foreign debt, the lack of normal foreign trade relations, and the transition toward payments in freely convertible currency with supplier and partners from CEMA, the government cannot utilize one of the most powerful and traditional instruments, namely, a fixed foreign currency rate, as a means of freezing the prices. This means that the government must conduct a strict budgetary policy, maintain higher interest rates, and limit the revenues to a greater degree than countries that have foreign financial aid.

Only by the middle of the first three month period will it probably be possible to ensure such aid from the IMF, as well as by defreezing other potential financial sources, such as the World and European Banks, monetary programs of the [word indistinct], and state and private bank credits. Signing the agreement with the IMF will be a sign of restoring confidence in Bulgaria. Receiving aid in all cases will depend on financial evaluation of implementing various economic indexes, incorporated in the program. The aforementioned initial conditions determine the logic of the actions, which the government already implements.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen and people's representatives: the Government signed an agreement on preserving social peace with the trade unions and the employers. This agreement has a crucial importance for the reform's success. The mechanism of resolving the basic problems on the basis of a timetable provides chances of maintaining social stability during the first half of the year.

The election of a new leadership of the Bulgarian People's Bank marked the beginning of its reorganization, something that will strengthen it as an independent and authoritative institution. Significant structural changes are implemented in the economic ministries and departments. Their policy and activity are subjugated to the needs of the reform. The companies were reorganized. State interference took place by managing the transformation of state property.

Let me turn to the monetary-financial policy, prices, revenues, and the social sphere. The government will conduct a restrictive monetary-financial policy, which will limit credits for unprofitable production and will exercise an anti-inflationary influence over the economy. The government adopted a decree on fixing the basic interest rate and other interest rates on credits, and a draft law on regulating old debts of the citizens and enterprises. This is the first step toward normalizing the monetary market. Thus the government in fact marked the beginning of radical changes in economic system. The government is preparing a decree on liberalizing prices and on the social protection of the population. It envisages simultaneously establishing a new minimum wage with the price increase, which will be in a ratio of 0.7 to the social minimum; a basic consumer basket of

about 700 goods at current [prices] will be established. We will introduce a system of adapting wages to changes in the cost of living, which will include an average compensation of about 70 percent of the cost of living increase. By the end of January 1991 we will create a system of regulating wage funding. The system will be activated by June, when we will advance toward negotiating wages on the basis of new collective labor contracts. By the end of January 1991 we will adopt a system on updating the pensions, monthly children benefits, compensations, aid for temporary disability and unemployment, and social aid, in accordance with the cost of living increase. At the same time we shall prepare a package of documents on the minimum social protection of the population. The measures' volume, character, and essence related to the population's social protection, were agreed upon with the trade unions and the employers.

We continue the clarification of all issues related to this package of measures. The working groups are continuing their activity. This activity is coordinated with the negotiations conducted with the IMF. Changes in the Labor Code and other normative acts will be proposed. We will accelerate work on organizing the activity of institutions and the labor market. The activity related to retraining part of labor will be intensified. Regional and branch agreements with the trade unions and the employers will be made. This will render the process of cuts in production and administration less painful. Together with the Union of Employers, we will prepare a program on creating new jobs and compensating for the consequences of cuts and unemployment.

By the beginning of February the government will present the state budget for 1991 and hopes that the Grand National Assembly will adopt it. The budget envisages the implementation of a radical reform.

Let me turn to measures in the foreign economic sphere. In February-March the government will propose the introduction of a normative order for the foreign currency regime. This will mean the establishment of an interbank currency market and the introduction of a floating exchange rate. The trade banks will obtain the possibility [several words indistinct]. The Central Bank will introduce a system of monitoring and controlling the foreign currency market. In the same period the government will regulate the right of the enterprises to contract for and purchase foreign currency from the trade banks for the import of goods and services. The revenue in foreign currency will be registered by the National Bank, however, without officially determining [word indistinct] of the currency provided for import.

In March we will introduce new conditions of foreign currency restriction and control, and the restrictions for citizens as [word indistinct] will decrease.

The government signed a trade agreement with the USSR. In this context by the end of January we will have a mechanism on joint payments related to this agreement.

By amending Decree No. 56 on Economic Activity we will liberalize the conditions of internal economic activity and foreign participation in the economic activity of the country.

The government will determine the final list of goods whose import and export are restricted or banned, will adopt regulations on eliminating export quotas, and will introduce a new and modern custom-tariff policy.

We shall advance toward limiting the monopolies, decentralization, and liberalization of the foreign trade activity. The government will make special efforts to ensure the fuel and power resources needed for the normal functioning of our economy and everyday life. Agreements (?will be) signed with the USSR on the import of oil and other raw materials, for quantities that exceed the previous limit.

By developing the market economy the government will be relieved of this burden and will transfer it to the economic and trade organizations. In all cases, however, the government will have the responsibility for monitoring and ensuring the necessary minimum of those resources.

The government created an interdepartmental commission on managing the foreign debt and conducting talks with the international financial organizations. During the second three-month period we will begin talks with the IMF and with the Group of 24. The talks with the private banks and creditors will continue. A program of measures is being prepared on restoring Bulgaria's credit relations with the developed countries and the export-credit agencies, and on collecting our dues from Nicaragua, Angola, Iraq, and other countries that owe us.

Let me turn to some structural changes in our economic system. It is the intention of the government to prepare and introduce in the Grand National Assembly draft laws on reorganizing state property [words indistinct], which will include all forms of economic activity—private, cooperative, state, and mixed organizations and associations, with a view to developing the role of private property as a priority.

In February we will adopt and propose a program on decentralizing and demonopolizing economic activity in the state sector and on making this activity autonomous. The status of the state companies and the forms of their activities will be changed completely. We will introduce an appropriate system of contracting with the economic leaders. The necessary measures for this have already been adopted. The regulation of the state companies status will facilitate the process of privatization and will restrict the abuse of state property.

The Decree No. 56 on Economic Activity, the code on its application, and the Decree on Auctions, adopted by the Council of Ministers, create broad possibilities for privatization in all economic spheres already at the present stage. By the end of January the government will introduce in the Grand National Assembly a draft law on

privatization agencies, and in February—a draft law on privatization. This will allow us to prepare by the end of March a program on purchasing and leasing property, which will apply to large-scale projects and longer periods of time.

By the end of April the government intends to prepare a program on transferring a part of the national property to the municipal administration services—the municipalities—and to new institutions of social security and other funds, which will become large-scale institutions of property in the future market economy.

By February we will introduce in the Grand National Assembly a draft law on foreign investments that will create conditions for attracting foreign capital to Bulgaria.

During its mandate the government will do everything possible to create the basic institutions of a market economy in Bulgaria. We will introduce in the Grand National Assembly bills on trade law, a national bank, banking and credit, amending the labor code, regulating labor conflicts, and so forth. We will create institutions for a labor market, a state treasury, a commodity funds exchange, a tax system, and so forth.

In the sphere of agriculture the government will do everything it must for the rapid application of the land law, whose adoption the people are impatiently awaiting, and for restoring the right to property of those who have been deprived of this right for political reasons. The government will facilitate the establishment of development banks, which will finance agriculture and cattle breeding, ensure agricultural equipment, obtain seed, and provide fodder for the cattle. The government will encourage every efficient way of cultivating the land in all possible forms—private initiative, company involvement, agricultural cooperatives, mixed forms, and so forth.

The government will propose a credit-stimulating tax policy. It will encourage the creation of private institutions, formations, and scientific-research institutes, which will facilitate the development of agriculture. Through various state institutions it will facilitate the redistribution of the land among the owners and whenever necessary will help them to prove their right to the property through facilitating access to tax registers, to municipal registers, as far as they exist, protocols on contributing land to the Cooperative Agrarian Farms, and most important, will provide the documents preserved by the notarial services in cases of eventual conflicts. This will help the people not only to acquire land, but also to prove their rights, all of which is a part of the agrarian reform and the ensuing consequences. The government is prepared to work out, propose, and do everything possible in adopting the legal order on the basis of which the agrarian reform must be conducted, and in facilitating the beginning of this reform and its management within the term of its mandate.

Let me turn to the sphere of defense. The government will pay special attention to providing funds for further constructing the Bulgarian Army as a nonparty structure subject to the state, so that it will always be ready to defend the country's territorial integrity and national sovereignty and serve as a stabilizing factor in the processes of renewal in Bulgaria. The special problems of Bulgarian Army personnel will be studied and a program on their solution will be prepared.

The discussion and adoption of laws on defense and on the Armed Forces will have a special place in this sphere.

The policy of the government in the sphere of health care will take the form of constant care to ensure the most necessary medicines, baby food, medical equipment, and sanitary products related to health care and normal functioning of hospitals, as well as for helping elderly, disabled, and ill people who depend on social benefits.

The government will organize the receipt of significant humanitarian aid. Talks are being conducted on the urgent supply of necessary vital medicines and equipment. Means have been allocated and some of those medicines have already been provided. The government constantly monitors the situation in this sphere and will adopt measures to rapidly satisfy pressing needs. The reform of the health care system and preparation for adopting a health insurance system by 1992 will continue.

In the sphere of education, science, and culture the government will make the necessary efforts and allocate the necessary means for education, science, and culture, regardless of the grave situation. The process of their total de-ideologization will continue.

In their activities and development they shall rely on national traditions and on the best achievements in the cultural and intellectual spheres. They will regard educational development as a strategic task in the transition toward a new society.

In connection with establishing a normative base for the educational sector, the executive power shall strive for a consistent application of the principles for the democratization and intensification of education, for the protection of children's rights, state protection of socially deprived students, improving the public image of teachers, and for enhancing their social prestige.

Draft projects have been prepared for changes in the structures of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, which envisage a total liberation of the activities and work of these ministries from tutelage, from special protection, and for promoting the efforts of these institutions devoted to modern science and education in accordance with European standards.

The major emphasis is laid upon ensuring wide opportunities for the development of strong personalities and institutions.

The government assumed the task of improving conditions in connection with environmental protection. The

poor state of this sphere hinders our economic development and is a source of serious social tension. A new law on environmental protection is required and it is necessary to apply environmental experts' opinions in all economic activities.

Urgent measures must be adopted for improving environmental conditions and the ecological situation in the country. Experts' opinions should be introduced in the case of 40 industrial projects.

We shall begin to draft rules for the application of ecological rules in the use of natural resources, and we shall intensify the preventive, not the administrative, function of the Ministry of the Environment. The role of municipalities and regional government services in connection with environmental protection shall be encouraged.

It is necessary to build a national system for supervision and control in assessing the ecological state of the environment. We shall conduct an active policy of cooperation with ecological organizations and movements in solving the problems of environmental protection. Active international cooperation is a prerequisite for our integration with the all-European and world public in the sphere of environmental protection.

The government devotes particular attention to its work with trade unions and with the Employer's Union. As we already pointed out, the government observes its agreement with these institutions for the sake of preserving social peace. This agreement provides great opportunities for the solution of all social conflicts, for the implementation of updated joint programs, and for achieving joint solutions.

The trade unions, being aware of the historical and decisive importance of the measures that the government has to adopt under the present conditions, have assumed with a lofty sense of responsibility the task of contributing their share to the drafting of a program for overcoming the current difficult situation. The trade unions are actively participating in drafting the program for the social compensation of the population for some unpopular measures, such as the increase of basic and other interest percentages, price increases, and the deterioration of the market situation. The trade unions are working on special questions and are drafting individual programs.

On the basis of the aforementioned agreement, we are expecting upcoming negotiations and the signing of additional new agreements with the trade unions and the employers. These negotiations and agreements are connected with the requirement that within the framework of the 200-days social peace that was announced, the implementation of the government's program should be facilitated so that we may overcome the current economic crisis.

The government keeps and shall continue to keep the trade unions informed about its current policy and problems, especially those which affect the trade unions' interests. We shall strive to establish and maintain a genuine (?social consensus). The trade unions and employers are the allies and partners of the government.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen of the National Assembly, the tasks that the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria is facing and that are submitted in this declaration, stem from the agreement between the political forces represented in parliament, and from the agreement on preserving social peace and stability in the Republic of Bulgaria. These are topical tasks, they are tasks pertaining to the present and future. They are not the result of amateur activities, of political ambitions, or of disorientation. In accepting to form the government, we base our actions on consensus among the parliamentary political forces on the aforementioned tasks.

I realize the difficulties that we expect to encounter in implementing the tasks, especially if we take into consideration the dramatic situation in which we are involved today.

This is a program for the rescue of the people, of the country; it is a program of survival, a program of hope.

In the modern history of mankind, not one nation, not one country has disappeared from the planet just because it was involved in a similar, or even more grave crisis. Many nations and states have been in distress and have struggled for their mere existence for many years, being unable to overcome the crisis.

Our people bear no personal ethnic guilt for the fact that as a result of World War II the great powers condemned it to the destiny of living and working under a system that was unable to guarantee conditions for the most favorable development and life. Those who had the lot of living and working under a different system made great progress and this even applies to those who were defeated and whose countries' were destroyed. I think that we have the moral justification to hope that these nations will help us, now that we have the greatest need, while they have the material means to do so. Irrespective of all things, it is the great hope of the government, and I would like to believe that it is also your hope, that the people will understand us, trust us, and support us. We hope that the people will accept our program, although it contains some difficult conditions for them, that they will accept the measurees as their own. This is so because this program was not made for me, nor for the government, nor for the parliamentary political forces. This is a program for the people themselves.

For this reason we believe that the people will be at our side in this difficult and decisive struggle for survival and for creating a better, more dignified, and happier life.

Ludzhev on New State Administration

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[Interview with Dimitur Ludzhev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, by Nora Stoichkova; date and place not given: "An Administration Which Is To Work for Society"]

[Text] [Stoichkova] What is the main task that faces the government and you personally as deputy prime minister?

[Ludzhev] When we formed this government, we did not simply create a coalition between parties, but a political scheme that will be a precondition for restructuring the state administration. This is our first task—to create a modern, efficient state administration that should not be a service that uses force to govern the country's social, political, and economic life.

[Stoichkova] What will be the chief functions of this new state administration?

[Ludzhev] To implement state policy and interest; to liberate economic life as far as possible; and to build up a new structure of social organization, in which the state will have its own modest place. This will be a mechanism that works for society, instead of issuing orders to it. The Council of Ministers itself has a completely new function—not to command the ministries, but to coordinate their work. It will "tie up the details" of the economic reform.

[Stoichkova] What is hampering this process most of all?

[Ludzhev] In the petroleum supplies affair I found out that the old structure of power is still in place. Parallel authorities exist in the country. This relates not only to the institutions, but also to a circle of people who are connected in time, by their mentality, and by personal and party links. They form a Mafia that wants to preserve its group interest at any cost.

[Stoichkova] What specifically has to be done in restructuring the administration?

[Ludzhev] The elimination of monopolies in trade and services will be completed. It is now the turn of industry—the light and food industries. Let the companies decide themselves when and whether to combine to form larger units. In this manner we will eliminate the entire upper layer of the administrative-command system.

[Stoichkova] Nevertheless, this does not cover the entire range of work that is engaged from 0800 in the morning until midnight.

[Ludzhev] Of course not. In addition to the new administrative structures, I am also dealing with the construction of the new Sofia airport which, heaven knows why, was frozen by the previous government. Also, with setting up an American Express bank in Bulgaria, not to mention the fact that all kinds of people seek meetings with me, ranging from members of parliament and journalists to ordinary citizens, each with his own question to discuss.

[Stoichkova] When you started your work, did you receive support from the former government and your own colleagues?

[Ludzhev] Former Premier Andrey Lukanov left us without any information regarding the state of affairs. He simply walked out and went off to have a vacation near Moscow. I have no doubt that he could have left much more than a current report, for example about the petroleum deliveries. He did not do this. The state of affairs that we found when we took up our posts provides clear evidence that during the last four or five months the government has done almost nothing. I am extremely disappointed in Lukanov as a politician and a man. To put off applying the necessary measures for five whole months with the aim of deriving political advantage—this is extremely immoral behavior.

[Stoichkova] What point has the work on the state of the national security services reached?

[Ludzhev] The draft proposals for the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will be ready before the end of January. Until now, the national intelligence service and the other services possessed no clear legal statute. This was the reason that they were uncontrolled and monopolized by one party. To a large extent, the state security services formed a Mafia. At the moment preparations are in hand to set up a special investigation commission on these issues, which will unravel various cases, for example the "Kaptagon" case.... If we want to be accepted by the world, we must make a break with our criminal past.

[Stoichkova] How do you evaluate your own personality—does your job weigh heavily upon you?

[Ludzhev] It is my fate to do the dirty work. I am a pragmatic and dynamic person. I like to do a concrete job of work. In contrast to other people, it is a bit more difficult for me to achieve things. I do not know how to create an "image" for myself, as they say. I do have supporters, however, most of whom are followers of the Union of Democratic Forces.

[Stoichkova] When a man holds a high position, all sorts of things are said about him. Is it true that your father was a prison governor?

[Ludzhev] My father retired from the post of chief accountant at a prison, nothing more nor less.

Views Government Reforms

AU2301120291 Sofia ANTENI in Bulgarian No. 3 16 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Dimitur Ludzhev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "A Clean-Up Is Required"]

[Excerpts] [ANTENI] Mr. Ludzhev, did you find anything in your office that could be described as a legacy from your predecessors?

[Ludzhev] What did I find? Nothing, apart from a filing cabinet decorated with wood carvings and a painting representing a partisan camp, which I removed. Nothing else. We are new people, and we have no experience in administration. As far as I am concerned, I acquired some experience during my work at the president's office. I am absolutely convinced that this is a real revolution. We are engaged in changing the system. Hence, the experience of the past may be valuable, but it may also be regarded as an obstacle at the same time. The experience of the past may be useful only in as far as it contributes to the solution of certain technical difficulties.

The administrative cadres working in the Council of Ministers are certainly competent people. Nevertheless, they have been inactive such a long time that they are hardly capable of any substantial cooperation today. Whenever I ask them for some information, they provide it, but....[passage omitted] We did not inherit any documentation, but even this shortcoming has its advantages.

Considering the totally inactive and parasitic state machinery and the civil servants who are not guilty, but do not know where they are and what they should do, considering the existing apparatus does not know why it exists, we can say that we have inherited a bunch of contradictions. The positive aspect of this situation is the fact that we view this situation with a new approach and with the unmistakable intentions of accomplishing our tasks. We will either establish a modern and professional state administration, similar to the European system, we will either separate the state from party bias—or nothing will ever change. In this respect, I am certainly not happy that I inherited nothing but the carved wood and the discarded painting, however, I accept the situation as normal, and I even discover some symbolic meaning in it. [passage omitted]

[ANTENI] How did the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers distribute the tasks among themselves, and what is your "field of work?"

[Ludzhev] The distribution of "working fields" is not so much based on professional sectors, but rather on functional tasks. I am dealing with certain CEMA problems, and trade with the USSR is also one of my responsibilities. In addition to this, I am in charge of defense questions, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' organization, and so forth. All these things are linked to each other. Political, administrative, managerial, jurisdictional, and economic reforms are closely interconnected.

[ANTENI] Everyone is talking about the unpopular measures that you are expected to adopt very soon. On the other hand, the International Monetary Fund [IMF] firmly insists on certain conditions for giving the long awaited "initial impetus." How do you intend to coordinate the compassion for our impoverished country with the inevitable "cup of sorrow?"

[Ludzhev] The IMF did not invent the aforementioned measures. The SDS adopted 80 percent of the same measures as ideological principles in its election platform, as far as the theoretical aspect is concerned, at least. I am not talking about the missing figures. The measures result from the country's situation. The IMF approves only programs that reflect a country's real state of affairs.

[ANTENI] What kind of assistance should we really expect?

[Ludzhev] Some people believe that we will get a sack of money. There is no such thing. The financial means granted by the IMF are relatively modest, considering that the fund's resources are limited. The signing of the agreement and the approval of the national program, however, is the key to the influx of further private, or state-owned financial resources. The agreement represents a symbol that alerts the international financial community that the program is feasible and that confidence in a bankrupt country can be restored. [passage omitted]

[ANTENI] Would you say something about the team you are expected to work with?

[Ludzhev] We are facing a serious test of loyalties. It is difficult to trust people who have supported the old apparatus. Nevertheless, I would not hesitate to accept an honest man. Decent people are usually competent professionals.

[ANTENI] What does the government intend to do about the notorious new companies engaged in "laundering activities?"

[Ludzhev] In the first place, we will take care of the well-known companies that tried hard to assist certain people in accumulating great wealth at the expense of our common prosperity. Later on, we will examine their "subsidiaries." If we want the world to show us respect, we should show some self-respect, and once and for all break with the criminal aspects of our past. Certain people should be forced to admit both political and administrative responsibility.

Dertliev Interviewed on Anti-SDS Campaign

AU2201140391 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 16 Jan 91 p 1

[Interview with Bulgarian Social Democratic Party leader and SDS cochairman Doctor Petur Dertliev, by Silvia Stefanova; place and date not given]

[Text] [Stefanova] We have recently witnessed various attempts to discredit the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. Recently, we even heard the following version,

namely that the SDS is an invention of the Communists to simulate a struggle for democracy and organize fake opposition activities.

[Dertliev] The struggle against the SDS is pursued with different methods. One of them is direct confrontation. Let us ask ourselves who would be interested in disgracing the SDS to begin with? The enemies of the SDS come from the left, but also from certain small, unofficial groups that might belong to the opposite pole. In examining this conglomeration of parties, small groups, and candidates for leadership, we can say that only God knows to which political trends they belong.

What are their methods? The easiest method is slander, the attempt to destroy the image of the SDS by disgracing its leaders. All personalities who have the courage of assuming the leadership of the democratic opposition should realize that they will be a target of all kinds of slander.

Why is this so? The people who were involved in the most tragic era of the dictatorial regime and who utterly disgraced themselves do not hesitate to apply all kinds of means to mask their own extremely unattractive image. People who are interested in destabilizing the country's situation and who have no scruples whatsoever are doing everything within their power to make the opposition as repulsive as possible in the eyes of the people, because the SDS is the support and hope of democracy today. The SDS will pursue its progress along the same path as long as it has not fulfilled its historical mission. Our union emerged as a result of the people's suffering and the people's aspirations for freedom and economic prosperity. No one is capable of halting the people's striving for such goals.

[Stefanova] Public accusations are directed against you. It would not be surprising if they should become more frequent following your election as cochairman of the SDS parliamentary group.

[Dertliev] Anyone who plays a role in Bulgarian public life should be ready to suffer all kinds of insults. In my lifetime I have been called a British spy, a social fascist, a social traitor, a conspirator, an agent of communism, and recently I was even described as one of the most dangerous communist agents within the SDS. I even received some nice anonymous letters accusing me of being responsible for the death of 11 people. The most outrageous accusations of all this nonsense was when Mr. Khristozov, one of the champions of the most sinister era, claimed that Milan Drenchev had betrayed Nikola Petkov prior to and after 9 September 1991, while I had betrayed Krustyu Pastukhov. I did not even react to the accusations, because people of Mr. Khristozov's kind—let him rest in peace—are not worth talking about. In addition, anyone who has even a grain of intelligence would understand that a man capable of providing such valuable information about the leader of his own party would not be imprisoned. Therefore, if you should hear some more about me tomorrow, do not be surprised. It can only be the latest insult against a man who has dared to face the limelight of public life.

Prime Minister Popov Meets Trade Union Leader

AU2101193891 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prime Minister Dimitur Popov today received Professor Krustyu Petkov, chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [CITUB] at the latter's request.

The government leader was briefed on the reactions of the trade union organizations to the signing of the social peace agreement and to the government decision about interest percentages.

The prime minister briefed the chairman of the independent trade union organization on the most important features of the government's declaration.

They exchanged information on the labor conflicts involving Bulgaria workers in Komi and in certain areas of the country.

Future Economic Relations With USSR Viewed

AU2301131291 Sofia MLADEZH in Bulgarian 17 Jan 91 p 2

[Ognyan Kostov article: "Bulgarian-Soviet Economic Relations After 'Crowning' the Dollar"]

[Text] The powerful convertible ruble dominated Bulgarian-USSR trade exchange for almost 30 years. Indeed, this was normal, because the ruble was CEMA's standard currency. In addition, the annual intergovernmental agreements and contracts were obligatory, and this guaranteed the smooth functioning of our economy, which was closely dependent on energy and raw material supply from the USSR.

At the beginning of this year the ruble was replaced by the dollar, and the agreement that was signed between the two countries does not have a binding character. It contains three appendixes, which precisely point out what we must receive, and what we have to export. Since green banknotes are not abundant in both Bulgaria and the USSR, for the time being the dollar will have the role of a standard unit, rather than means of payment. The payments will not be made in cash, but on the basis of exchanging groups of goods. Nevertheless, the two countries' foreign trade banks will open special dollar accounts, which will reflect the situation of the trade exchange.

The transition toward the dollar in trade relations must lead to appropriate changes in price-forming of the goods. Their prices will not be as firm as until now, and they will be coordinated with changes in the markets. The technology of concluding deals also will be changed and coordinated to a maximum degree with world practice. It is no secret that the USSR finds itself in a better

position under those circumstances, because it has raw materials whose price is high and continues to increase, while our goods are far away from the international quality and functional requirements.

According to Ivan Kolev, deputy head of East European Countries Department at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, last year Bulgaria had a positive balance with the USSR to the tune of 300 million convertible rubles. For the time being this amount cannot be used for the import of oil and other raw materials, because there still are problems in determining the coefficient in transferring rubles to dollars.

As repeatedly pointed out, in 1991 Bulgaria will receive from the USSR 6.5 million tonnes of oil. What remain unexplained, however, is the fact that we will receive the oil only if we export to the USSR meat, medicines, soda, wheat, and machines. In addition, only 5.5 million tonnes have been centrally contracted. The rest will be supplied through extra-plan supplies, based on direct contracts with the producers. For the producers, those will be quantities above the state orders. This means that if oil production in the USSR decreases, those supplies will not be easily implemented.

I think that the inability of our economy to produce the goods that we must export represents a greater danger for the implementation of the agreements, Ivan Kolev said. On the basis of my long-lasting contacts with the Soviet partners, I am convinced that they are the more accurate side. We have great problems at present. For example, we need foreign currency to produce medicines, because we must import the various components. This also applies to a part of our machine-building production. It is well-known, however, that we have no foreign currency....

MLADEZH learned that last week Khimimport signed the specific contract on the supply of the mythical 5.5 million tonnes Soviet oil. In addition, in 1991 we must receive 7 billion cubic meters natural gas, fuel for our nuclear energy, 45 billion kilowatt/hour electric power, coke and regular coal, and diesel fuel for our vessels. It is envisaged importing 36,000 private cars—about 20,000 Ladas and a lesser quantity of Volga and Niva cars. We shall continue to receive Moskvich cars for assembly. There is an agreement on the import of tractors and heavy diesel trucks.

The list of the goods we must export also is long. According to experts of the Ministry of Foreign Trade Relations, the quantity of all goods we will import from the USSR, except oil, will be the same as in 1990.

At present, negotiations are being conducted on processing Soviet oil in Burgas, to engage the entire capacity of the enterprise. If an agreement is reached, the mazut that will be produced as a result of processing the oil, will remain in our country.

Press Correspondents on Black Market Situation

AU2101205091 Sofia BTA in English 1809 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 21 (BTA)—There was a new rise in the prices of most of the goods sold at the end of last week in the private sector and in the black market here.

According to the BTA correspondents in the country, a can of petrol (20 l) is 300 leva in Sofia, 250 leva in Plovdiv and Varna, 200-250 leva in Ruse, 250-300 leva in Blagoevgrad. In most of these towns a "Dollarization" of petrol sales and purchases is observed which, however, can be said of other goods too. In the capital the price of a can of petrol is $ 15 dollars.

The price of meat (pork and veal) in Sofia is 20-25 leva; in Plovdiv it is 15-20 leva; in Varna it is about 18 leva; in Blagoevgrad 15-18 leva. The "tariff" in Ruse is lower about 12 leva, "but the fat is 50 percent of the meat", which is true of the meat sold in other towns too.

A liter of grape brandy costs 25-30 leva in Sofia and Blagoevgrad, 25 leva in Plovdiv, 23 leva in Varna, 20 leva in Ruse. One has got to pay 36 leva for a bottle of "Pliska" in Sofia and 20- 23 leva in Plovdiv; "Pliska" is not available in Varna and Blagoevgrad.

The exchange rate of the U.S. dollar in Sofia is 23-25 leva; of the Deutsche Mark it is 14.70-15 leva. The exchange rate in Plovdiv is respectively 22-23 leva to a dollar and 14-15 leva to a Deutsche Mark; in Varna it is respectively 23 and 12 leva; in Blagoevgrad 22- 25 and 14.50 leva.

It is interesting to know that a calf costs about 1500 leva in the free market in Kurdzhali (Southern Bulgaria) and that the inhabitants of Ruse relieve their petrol and monetary balance by availing themselves of the services offered by the petrol stations in Giurgiu. In many cases it is not necessary even to cross the Danube, because the Romanian tourists often bring cans of petrol with them.

Government Will Observe Indexing Agreement

AU2201135991 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 16 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Nora Stoichkova report: "Neglected Problems Knock on Government's Door"] [Excerpts] The government is prepared to observe the agreement between the trade unions and the former government on the indexation of personal incomes in December 1990, despite the difficulties. This was stated yesterday [15 January] by Deputy Prime Minister Dimitur Ludzhev. Pensions and children's benefits will be indexed. The issue of indexing wages evokes unpleasant complications. According to Mr. Ludzhev about 30-40 percent of the companies will not be able to implement the indexing "if they do not use some of their funds."

The Council of Ministers instructed the tripartite commission on the civil peace agreement to conduct talks

with the trade unions. If no difficulties emerge, the indexation for December will be incorporated in the general compensation amount that will be paid after price liberalization.

According to Mr. Ludzhev, the new interest rate will be announced within two days. During the first stage it will amount to 15 percent, while in the second stage it will be a floating interest rate. The new prices are expected within two weeks, the deputy prime minister said. [passage omitted]

The government will continue to seek credits to meet basic foodstuffs needs. Presently, the state has only a 10 day sugar supply; 45 days for rice and legumes; and enough cooking oil until 15 April. Some $100 million are needed if we are to survive until the next harvest. [passage omitted]

Private Producers Regard Price Rises as Ruinous

AU2201162691 Sofia BTA in English 1512 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 22 (BTA)—The raising of the base rate and of prices before even small-sized businesses are privatized will destroy the emerging market relations and will ruin 90 per cent of the private producers, Mr. Valentin Mollov, president of the Union of Private Entrepreneurs and co-president of the newly established Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs, told a news conference here today.

The ruin of private producers will make privatization in Bulgaria pointless, and in a month's time at the latest it will be followed by a commercial collapse, Mr. Mollov claims. In his view, if privatization starts first, the interest rate will not exceed 5 per cent and the price rises will be measured in percentage terms, not in times.

The Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs, which the Union of Private Entrepreneurs and the Vuzrazhdane Union of Private Producers formed yesterday, will submit its stand to the Council of Ministers. Both organizations in their capacity as employers have signed the three-party agreement on social peace between the government, the trade unions and the employers, but believe that the government does not honour its obligations and under definite circumstances they will no longer feel bound by their signature, the participants in the news conference were told.

Deputy Minister on Food, Animal Feed Shortages

AU2301113891 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Boris Gergov report on Deputy Minister Lyubomir Draganov news conference in Sofia 15 January]

[Text] The warehouses contain almost no stocks of food products, Deputy Minister Lyubomir Draganov stated yesterday. Sugar is being provided for hospitals, children's establishments, and for one-fifteenth of the requirements of the industrial enterprises. The deputy minister said no sugar would be available in February, and added that stocks of olive oil and pulses are also almost exhausted. It is proposed that the government should ensure imports to solve the situation.

For a month now, the animals on the large farms have been receiving 50 percent of the standard feed ration, and this amount has now fallen to 30 percent.

Deputy Minister Mikhail Trifonov, who is responsible for animal farming, announced that this branch of agriculture is in a disastrous situation. The shortfall of grain is assessed as 1,700 million tonnes. In his view, it is necessary to export animal products to hold and stabilize the situation.

During the first quarter of 1991 the large agricultural concerns are expected to supply 5,000-6,000 tonnes less pork, 11,000 tonnes less poultry meat, and 70 million fewer eggs than in the same period of 1990.

Deputy Minister Draganov said there were no fertilizers or plant chemical agents for the spring sowing. Foreign currency is needed for agriculture, which has been left without resources, and one of the ways of providing it is to mortgage the harvests of the cooperative farms. It is difficult to win acceptance for this idea, the deputy minister stated.

He explained that no meat is arriving in Sofia and the large nonproductive regions, because the managers of the pig combines are waiting for the new prices. In many places, animals of 100-120 kg live weight are available, but they are not being sold.

Foreign companies are showing interest in investing in our food industry, but they are still holding back for two reasons, Draganov announced. The first reason is the absence of political calm, and the second, the lack of stable laws. He announced that talks are in progress with several Western companies with the aim of increasing sugar production; the companies in question are ready to engage in producing sugar beet in Bulgaria.

The deputy ministers reported that grain stocks for animal feed are running out. The arrival of 300,000 tonnes of feed grain from France is awaited.

The latest information from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry is that about 100,000 tonnes of U.S. corn is being loading.

Minister Interviewed on Labor, Social Welfare

AU2101184391 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 12 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Emiliya Maslarova, minister of labor and social welfare, by Svetlomira Dimitrova; place and date not given: "Our Ministry Will Always Be in Opposition"—first paragraph is DEMOKRATSIYA introduction]

[Text] Emiliya Maslarova is a graduate of the Sofia Higher Economic Institute. She worked in the State Planning Commission with living standard problems. She is a candidate of economic sciences, a senior scientific fellow, and does not belong to any political party.

[Dimitrova] Mrs. Maslarova, you were a member of the Lukanov cabinet and you remained in the new government. Why?

[Maslarova] I was invited to join the Socialist cabinet as an expert and not because of my political convictions. I can work in any government whatsoever as I have been familiar with the Bulgarian people's worries for many years. I am gratified by the fact that I remained a member of the government, but I also regard it as a serious challenge for me, because it means that I have to justify the confidence of all political forces in the country.

[Dimitrova] Nevertheless, the name of your ministry has changed—instead of Ministry of Employment, it is called Ministry of Labor. Does this indicate a change in its work?

[Maslarova] Perhaps the previous cabinet took into consideration the unemployment we are expecting. Our new ministry will not only deal with unemployment, it is also expected to deal with the country's general labor policy, working conditions, people's incomes, minimal wages, and minimal pensions.

Unemployment will be one of the major problems, of course. For this reason a nationwide labor exchange was established—it is natural that a labor exchange should exist under the market economy system. The labor exchange should be similar to all other such institutions existing throughout the world. The structure of the labor exchange has already been established. We are still expected to restructure the employment agencies. We have received many complaints about them, but strict control will be exerted on the work of the agencies in the future both by the national labor exchange and by our ministry. Every complaint will be checked.

[Dimitrova] The minister of finance said that he has no money for social welfare activities. How do you understand this?

[Maslarova] Mr. Ivan Kostov is very specific in his views, but I hope that together we will find an optimal alternative. I am convinced that even today the resources for social welfare activities will remain untouched, it is only a question of their more effective distribution. It is no coincidence that we are so eager to separate the social welfare sector from the state budget, but initial incentive must come from the state. Later on, we will obtain a different level of resources based on insurance contributions that should permit us to distribute the funds according to different categories of retirement. It is certainly not the same whether an employee receives a pension for 15, or for 30 years of service.

[Dimitrova] What do you prefer—to pay unemployment assistance to the unemployed, or to finance the creation of new jobs?

[Maslarova] Naturally, I prefer the second option. Nevertheless, it is much harder within tight schedules. We have drafted a total system of training and retraining, but Bulgarian citizens should realize that the total economic restructuring of the country today demands drastic measures. Naturally, we shall seek the assistance of the employers who are also interested in this issue.

[Dimitrova] Can you describe your ministry's relations with the trade unions?

[Maslarova] Frankly speaking, we have no basic differences with them because the problem of the unemployed and of socially weak citizens is a common burden they share with us. Under any government, our ministry would always be in opposition as it defends the working people's interests in one or another way.

[Dimitrova] Social welfare—a rather ungrateful activity—must be new to you. How do you cope with it?

[Maslarova] Well, at the same time, this is a very noble task, as long as we devote our sincere efforts to it. We managed to obtain an increase in the number of social workers per capita of the population. Favorable opportunities exist, but only people who have a real vocation should work in this field. This applies to psychologists, educators, and sociologists, who should be free to devote themselves to such tasks.

[Dimitrova] Can you guarantee that no one in our country will die from starvation and cold within the forthcoming months?

[Maslarova] The situation will actually become even more difficult in the near future. Provided that we all show the necessary understanding for the extreme situation we are confronted with, however, no one in Bulgaria should starve to death. Nevertheless, some people have overstocked their larders for the next four-five months at the expense of others. This is the moment for greater mutual compassion and generosity in human relations.

Unemployment Figures Reported; Vacancies Down

AU2101162291 Sofia BTA in English 1540 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Sofia, January 21 (BTA)—Unemployment in Bulgaria is not of a mass character and has not assumed alarming proportions yet. By January 10, 1991 there were 72,187 unemployed on record, but after the economic reform is started they are expected to become 250-300 thousand by the end of the year, Ms. Emiliya Maslarova, minister of labor and social welfare, said at a press conference.

65 percent of the unemployed are women and 47 percent are young people under 30 years of age. In the last four months

of 1990 the number of unemployed doubled. The number of jobless specialists with higher education grew by 2.6 and now they account for 16.2 percent of the unemployed. Most of them are engineers 40 percent; then come economists 19 percent and teachers 11.4 percent.

At the same time the number of vacancies has rapidly decreased. In June 1990 the vacancies were double the number of unemployed, at the end of December the vacancies were already two times less. From September to December the vacancies for specialists with higher education decreased by 22 times.

For the time being there are dismissals mainly in the sphere of material production which is due to the lack of raw materials and feedstock, the restructuring of the economy, the closure of ecologically harmful productions and the conversion. When the new budget is passed there will be layings off in the non-industrial sphere too.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare seeks a solution to the problems in the improvement of the normative basis. At the moment the following bills are being drafted and will be submitted to the Bulgarian parliament shortly: of employment, of qualification and re-qualification, of amendment to the Labor Code. Reserves are also sought: Opening new jobs, part-time or seasonal work even in Bulgaria's neighbor countries. One of the main hopes is agriculture, Minister Maslarova said, provided the land !aw is passed in time.

Mr. Goranov, director of the National Labor Exchange, announced he expected an agreement to be signed with the Ministry of Labor of Germany by the end of February 1991, under which about 2,000 Bulgarian construction workers would go to work in Germany for an initial period of three years.

Ministry Calls For End to Baltic Violence

AU2301123191 Prague CTK in English 1651 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 21 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry today called upon responsible Soviet officials to halt the violence in the Baltic republics, and appealed for the settlement of problems in a democratic way.

Following Sunday's action by a special police unit in the Latvian capital of Riga, in which five persons were killed and others were injured, Deputy Foreign Minister Vojtech Wagner today summoned Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Boris Pankin to the Foreign Ministry and expressed surprise that the action took place despite an official statement of the Soviet Government, conveyed by Pankin to the Czechoslovak foreign minister Saturday, stating that the Soviet Government would do its utmost to prevent the tragic events in Lithuania from being repeated.

The Czechoslovak side is of the opinion that the violent steps in the Baltic republics have an adverse effect on both development in the USSR itself and on its international position and relations with other countries, as well as on the overall climate in Europe.

Deputy Urges Recognizing Lithuania's Independence

LD2301222591 Prague CTK in English 2158 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 23 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia should recognize Lithuania's independence, but need not be the first to do so, member of the foreign committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament House of the People Jaroslav Suchanek told CTK here today.

Suchanek visited Vilnius together with another foreign committee member, Miroslav Sychra, last week. The two deputies representing the strongest Czech political force, the Civic Forum, were sent to Lithuania as observers by the Czechoslovak Parliament.

According to Suchanek, Lithuania's independence should be first recognized by the U.S.A, Britain or some other great power.

Possible adverse impacts of the recognition on Soviet oil supplies to Czechoslovakia could be solved through direct talks with individual republics, Suchanek said. He sees a possibility in the Russian Federation which supports the Baltics' effort at independence.

According to Suchanek, the Lithuanians still face a serious threat of mass violence which may last several months. He agreed with Gorbachev's claim that the mass media distort developments in the Baltics.

Demonstration for Sovereignty of Baltic States

LD2401063791 Prague CTK in English 2331 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 23 (CTK)—Several hundred people gathered on Wenceslas Square today to criticise Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and appeal to the Czechoslovak Government to recognise the sovereignty of the Baltic republics.

According to organisers from the Czech-Latvian Club and the Czechoslovak-Lithuanian Society more than 16,000 people signed a petition calling for Czechoslovak policy-makers to open diplomatic relations with the legitimate governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Trade-union organisations, theatre collectives and school groups also lent support to the demonstrators' demand.

Civic forum deputy to the Federal Assembly Miroslav Sychra told the gathering about his visit to Lithuania which convinced him that Lithuania must be an independent, sovereign and as such it must be recognised, said Sychra.

Recognising Lithuania as a sovereign state may carry certain risks for Czechoslovakia but that is a chance we must take, according to Sychra.

Also today the Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee proposed to the International Helsinki Federation in Oslo to request the participant states of the CSCE to implement the Conference's human rights mechanisms vis-a-vis the Soviet Union for its interventions in Latvia and Lithuania.

The committee is also asking through the Foreign Affairs Ministry for the Czechoslovak Government to support its request, according to the committee's vice-chairperson Libuse Silhanova.

Communists Want Negotiations on Gulf, Lithuania

AU2401104991 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Jan 91 p 2

[CTK report: "Coordinating Body"]

[Text] Prague—The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Federal Council, which met in Prague yesterday, is, according to the adopted statute, the conceptual, policy-making, and coordinating body of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—the federation formed of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and of the Communist Party of Slovakia-the Party of the Democratic Left Wing. Various expert commissions are gradually being formed, for example political, social and economic, and one for the issues of agriculture and the countryside. The Federal Council Commission for the Analysis of the Development and Activity of the Party and its Members Prior to and After 17 November has started work. At the meeting, the Federal Council

adopted a position regarding the current international situation. It sees the solution to the Persian Gulf conflict as lying in the organization of a broad international conference to discuss all issues and provide conditions for overcoming the problems in all their complexity, including the Palestinian question. Regarding the situation in Lithuania, it expressed its firm belief that the tense situation will not be settled by unilateral steps and the use of force but rather by a fair political dialogue respecting the interest of all involved parties.

Ruml on Expulsion of Arabs, Border Issue

LD2401064291 Prague CTK in English 0017 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 23 (CTK)—Czechoslovak First Deputy Interior Minister Jan Ruml told CTK today that forty Arab citizens were detained today because they did not have a valid permit for stay in Czechoslovakia and will be expelled from the country.

The Arabs were checked as stricter measures are now being applied in relation to foreigners, especially those from the Middle East, in connection with the Gulf war.

Speaking about the situation on the Czechoslovak-Soviet border in connection with the developments in the Baltics, Ruml said that in the past the border was protected by 37 policemen. Last year, they were reinforced by 480 border guard soldiers.

A project has been worked out for transferring soldiers from the borders with Poland and Hungary who are capable of reaching the Czechoslovak-Soviet border within 180 minutes, Ruml added.

According to him, the interior ministry can in case of emergency re-order to the border another 290 soldiers from the border guard in Bratislava where they now reinforce the police to fight growing criminality.

Ruml said that a minimum of 800 soldiers can be concentrated on the border within a very short time. This is 10 per cent of all border guards, while the border with the USSR accounts for a mere 2.8 per cent of the total length of Czechoslovakia's border.

Palestinian Envoy Alleges Distortion of Statement

AU2301124391 Prague CTK in English 1802 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 21 (CTK)—Palestinian ambassador to Czechoslovakia Samih 'Abd-al-Fattah expressed here today disagreement of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with reports in the Czechoslovak media which emphasize the negative impact that possible terrorist actions in Czechoslovakia might have on bilateral relations.

While calling on Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Vojtech Wagner, Sami 'Abd al-Fatah stated that Czechoslovak media repeatedly distorted the meaning of PLO statements made in Tunis, and that the PLO clearly dissociates itself from any terrorist acts against any country.

Four Soviet Warsaw Pact Officers Still in Prague

AU2301113391 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Jan 91 p 7

["jet"-signed report: "They Are Packing"]

[Text] Prague—Four Soviet Army officers, representatives of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, are still operating at the Ministry of Defense in Prague. However, as Colonel Petr Tax, press spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, said in reply to a question by our correspondent, they do not influence decisions by the ministry in any way. They are, in fact, only symbolic figures and will leave as soon as the elimination of the military part of the Warsaw Pact is decided. There are still eleven of our officers stationed in Moscow. As of 1 February, there will be only three or four. Their main task will be really just to pack before the definitive departure.

Last Soviet Air Fighter Squadron Leaves

AU2301123091 Prague CTK in English 2123 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague January 21 (CTK)—Soviet Army 114th Air Fighter Squadron left Milovice, central Bohemia, today, being the last Soviet Army Central Group Squadron left on the Czechoslovak territory.

As many as 24 MiG-23 fighters and 10 cutting-edge MiG-29s returned to the Soviet Union. They landed at the Ukrainian Ivano-Frankovsk airport and will be part of the Carpathian Military District.

The chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for the Soviet Army Withdrawal Supervision Michael Kocab has expressed a positive view on today's action in spite of a three hours delay caused by bad weather at the Soviet airport. He voiced the conviction that all Soviet soldiers will withdraw as agreed.

The mixed commission for the Soviet Army withdrawal met at the Milovice airport today. It recommended that the Soviet troops stationed till now in the former GDR should not use Czechoslovak territory on their way home until at least June 30, 1991 in view of the situation in the Baltic republics and in order to ensure a smooth Soviet Army withdrawal from Czechoslovakia.

Kocab said a three member sub-commission was set up to deal permanently with the complaints of Czechoslovak citizens who suffered harm in connection with the Soviet Army arrival, stay or withdrawal. He also announced that the mixed commission will take a stand on the prepared intergovernmental agreement on the settlement of property questions. The wording of it exists already but most of the articles have two versions, a

Czechoslovak and a Soviet one. The commission wants to examine it more closely and recommend the final form of the agreement.

There are still seven Soviet transport planes and 21 non-combatant helicopters left in Czechoslovakia as well as 16,500 soldiers, 71 tanks, 266 armored vehicles, 4,757 trucks and 133 artillery weapons.

The 146 combat helicopters and all 30 launchers have already been withdrawn. The last unit will leave Czechoslovakia exactly one year after the intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal was signed, i.e., February 26, 1991. The final stage of withdrawal will end June 30, 1991.

Sokol on Soviet Soldiers Selling Weapons

LD2301143991 Prague CTK in English 1350 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 23 (CTK)—The danger of weapons, sold by Soviet soldiers in Czechoslovakia, getting into the hands of children was pointed out by Czech Interior Minister Tomas Sokol today.

During a break at today's meeting of the Czech government, Sokol said Soviet soldiers have sold hundreds or possibly thousands of firearms and a large quantity of ammunition. He said that according to reliable sources, submachine guns and hand grenades can be bought from Soviet soldiers.

Referring to the possible transit through Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops leaving the territory of the former GDR, Sokol said he would prefer if no Soviet soldiers were transported via Czechoslovakia.

Military Agreement Signed With Hungary

LD2101163291 Budapest MTI in English 1420 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague, January 21 (MTI)—An agreement on long-term defence co-operation between Hungary and Czechoslovakia was signed by Hungarian minister of Defence, Lajos Fur and his Czechoslovak counterpart, Lubos Dobrovsky in Prague on Monday.

The five-year agreement stipulates the basic principles of security policy and military co-operation, with regard to the dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty, making it necessary for the two countries to place their military relations on a new legal footing.

The agreement speaks of the necessity for mutual information between the two countries on military exercises and the redeployment of troops, especially in the case of border territories of the type of radio frequency to be used by the two armies to avoid interference between the two.

Labor Agreement Signed With Hungary

LD1801224391 Budapest MTI in English 1813 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Prague, January 18 (MTI)—An intergovernmental agreement was signed between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the employment of each other's citizens in Prague on Friday.

The agreement is to ease employment problems of companies, located in border countries, creating the possibility for each side to employ 1,000 persons from the other country.

The agreement was signed by Czechoslovak minister of labour, Petr Miller, and Hungarian ambassador to Prague, Gyorgy Varga.

Communists Comment on Domestic, Foreign Issues

AU2401135291

[Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA and Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 23 January both publish correspondents' reports on a news conference with Pavol Kanis, chairman of the Federal Council of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and Peter Weiss, chairman of the Communist Party of Slovakia-Socialist Left Party (KSS-SDL), held in Bratislava on 22 January.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 23 January on page 3 carries a 400-word "ur"-signed report on the news conference entitled "Change of Name Is Inevitable." Pavol Kanis is quoted as having told journalists that "a change in the name of the Communist Party is inevitable," and the failure to change the party's name at its congress in Olomouc last year was a "wasted chance."

According to the PRAVDA report, Kanis and Weiss also criticized the economic reform "which does not respect even its own logic." Because price liberalization preceded demonopolization and privatization, "it cannot lead to economic recovery and a balanced market but only to an even greater poverty of the socially weaker strata of the population. This course of action only increases the danger of the 'Latin Americanization' of the Central and Eastern European realm in the economic and political areas."

Pavol Kanis was also critical of the Federal Assembly's legislative work. He reportedly said that "laws are being passed which are then presently violated, such as the Bill of Human Rights and Freedoms," that laws have to be amended soon after their passage, and that "a law against the internal enemy is being prepared under the cloak of the war in the Persian Gulf."

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 23 January on page 2 carries a 600- word "jg"-signed report on the above news conference entitled "Briefing With Peter and Pavol."

According to the SMENA reporter, Peter Weiss expressed the confidence that his proposal to drop the

first part of the KSS-SDL's name will receive the necessary three-fifth majority of Central Committee members. He added that "it will be up to the conservative part of the membership base to decide whether or not to establish an independent Communist Party."

Commenting on the presence of a Czechoslovak military unit in Saudi Arabia, Pavol Kanis "said that it is apparent that this was not a properly considered step that will cost our republic considerable financial resources. He pointed out that none of the countries of the former community of the so-called socialist countries has become involved in the military conflict on either side, which is what we, too, should have done. Kanis described Iraq as an aggressor, but in the same breath he said that the situation in the Persian Gulf must be considered from the global viewpoint and from the aspect of the causes that provoked the conflict."

Dealing with the Czechoslovak Communists' assessment of the situation in the Baltic republics, the SMENA reporter says: "Communist representatives' assessment of the events in the Baltic republics is not unequivocal. They condemn acts of violence, but at the same time they point to the complicated situation in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia caused by the large number of Russians and members of other Soviet nations and ethnic groups living there, in addition to the indigenous population, who disagree with these republics' breaking away from the Soviet Union. Pavol Kanis, for example, said that at the November meeting of representatives of communist parties in Moscow, he learned from Mikhail Gorbachev about the adoption of a drastic law in Lithuania, under which Communists who agree with the policy of the CPSU can be sentenced to death.... [sentence as published]

"According to Peter Weiss and Pavol Kanis, the situation in the Baltic republics is different from the situation in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and should not be compared with those events."

Government Officials on Foreign Trade in 1990

AU2101130291 Prague CTK in English 1605 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 18 (CTK)—The Federal Republic of Germany ranked second among Czechoslovakia's trade partners last year with 19.2 percent after the USSR (25 percent), Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Zdenek Cerveny said today.

At a conference on Czechoslovak-German economic relations following Germany's unification, held in the west Bohemian spa of Marianske Lazne, Cerveny stated that businessmen from the FRG accounted for more than 50 percent of 1,000 joint ventures involving foreign capital.

Cerveny said the foreign trade monopoly no longer exists. Of the old structure there remained 45 joint-stock companies which last year controlled 85 percent of the foreign trade. Another 2,700 enterprises as well as private businessmen control 15 percent.

As regards the five provinces which constituted the former GDR, Cerveny suggested reconsidering possibilities of further cooperation which represented over 1,000 million dollars annually.

He added that an agency for direct foreign investments had been set up to verify the reliability of offers (about 50 percent of them had not been serious) and to mediate direct contact for enterprises capable of realizing foreign investments.

Vice-president of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia Jaromir Zahradnik said at the conference that 26 offices of foreign banks are currently working in Czechoslovakia, and ten foreign banks will start working this year. Zahradnik stated that the bank does not consider devaluing the koruna in the coming months.

Meciar Discusses Screenings, Economy, Security

AU2401104891 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 22 Jan 91 pp 1,3

[Andrej Javorsky report: "We Need All Prudent People"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—Our daily's editorial office was in a state of great commotion yesterday. After all, we were welcoming among us the Slovak prime minister, who is also one of the leading Public Against Violence movement representatives. Vladimir Meciar did not disappoint our expectations. Through our informal personal contact with the prime minister we found out that Slovakia has in him an uncompromising politician who asserts the whole nation's interests. [passage omitted]

The Slovak prime minister described the screenings—in view of their problematic effect—as an extremely sensitive issue in the current political situation. He referred to this process as a boomerang which will achieve its aim, but which may return to us as an immeasurable social time bomb. In this connection, the prime minister declared that he is in favor of the gradual removal of those who compromised themselves. He repeatedly emphasized that the methods utilized by the State Security [StB] in its work could drag unsuspecting people into the mud of the screenings. He also did not forget to mention that he had to subject himself to repeated screenings while, during the immediate post-November state of development, he pressed for the removal of collaborators with the former StB. However, the current complicated domestic political situation—in view of the possibility that the screenings may be abused in a political struggle—requires a more carefully considered course of action.

The Slovak prime minister characterized economic reform as one of the most vital current issues. However, he also pointed out that salvation will not be found in the market alone and that all the problems will not solve

themselves. In reply to a question about the situation regarding the injection of foreign capital to revitalize our economy—in which the Bratislava Automobile Plants [BAZ] are a classic example of marking time—V. Meciar said: "We originally established contacts with Volkswagen. One of this company's conditions was that we must not make our mutual agreements public until its relationship with Skoda Mlada Boleslav was clarified. Then, when we requested written confirmation of our previous written agreements, Volkswagen refused. We lost a great deal of time by this. We began to orient ourselves toward General Motors. GM came up with an offer which envisages producing transmission systems in Bratislava and assembling Opel Vectra cars. However, this does not involve filling BAZ's overall capacity, only part of it. GM is also asking for the construction of an infrastructure, which would mean an investment of half a billion in hard currency. They want 150 million from us. However, we do not have this money. Business negotiations are being conducted. This is the main obstacle which, to date, prevents us from definitively concluding the issue of BAZ's future production. We were unable to hold talks with other companies before 15 December 1990, but today we are already in contact with other automobile manufacturers. The position of our Finance Ministry is changing; however, our hands are still tied by some of the federal organs' points of view. The issue involves exemption from specific a tax and it is not clear what the situation will be like as far as some other activities are concerned. Therefore, it seems that BAZ is stagnating."

The prime minister described the issue of Slovakia's security, particularly as far as its eastern border is concerned, as very delicate. In this connection, he stated that the security of Slovakia's borders is an inseparable element of Czechoslovakia's security as a state. The Slovak government is emphatically insisting on the deployment of Czechoslovak military forces in Slovak territory where, at the moment, only 15 percent of our overall armed forces are deployed. This redeployment should take place as quickly as possible.

Official Contests Meciar's Claims on Screenings

AU2301165991 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Jan 91 p 2

["pat"-signed report: "Who Was the Agent?"]

[Text] President Vaclav Havel approves of the screening of the staff of the presidential office and has expressed his readiness to testify before the commission investigating the events of 17 November 1989. This was announced to journalists by Deputy Petr Toman, spokesman for this parliamentary commission. He also commented on some remarks on screenings that were made by Vladimir Meciar, Slovak prime minister, during the weekend: "Prime Minister Meciar said that the federal minister of interior had promised him that archival material would not be removed from Slovakia and that he did not keep this promise. The fact is, however, that this material was not transferred on the initiative of the federal minister of interior but on the initiative of our investigating commission. In doing so, we made use of an authorization which we received via an order of the minister of interior.... The dossiers we took out of Slovakia are fully within the jurisdiction of the federation."

According to Vladimir Meciar, the screenings exposed a leading Czechoslovak representative as an agent but when the matter was investigated further, it turned out that it was a brazen provocation. Commenting on this statement, Petr Toman said: "This circumstance is not known to us. I repeat that the screenings are absolutely reliable. Should Prime Minister Meciar avail himself of anything corroborating his claim, we would like him to inform us about it.... No one is imposing screenings on either the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic. The resolution of the parliament [approving the screening of officials] concerns the federal level only."

Tendencies Toward Presidential Regime Criticized

AU2201101391 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 12 Jan 91 p 4

[Vladimir Adamec commentary: "Vaclav Havel as President and Prime Minister?"]

[Text] Vaclav Havel, who is highly esteemed worldwide as a philosopher, is the president of our Republic. His speeches—especially on moral and ethical issues—are even listened to with enthusiasm in the U.S. Congress. However, I have a different opinion of those speeches where he, either directly or indirectly, intervenes in our domestic policy. This applies to his ideas and proposals—presented to the legislature last year—when he was discussing the preservation of the federation in September and, in particular, when the jurisdiction laws were being debated. These ideas and proposals were, to say the least, a disappointment. This was not the philosopher Vaclav Havel speaking; these could only have been statements prepared by the so-called expert advisers in his shadow cabinet. What a pity. He lost a great deal of support by making these two speeches. In his New Year address he presented himself as an impartial representative of the state, a state made up of two nations. When I recall his enumeration of the specific tasks which—according to the president's detailed account—await our federative state, I come to the conclusion that such a program should, in accordance with the current valid Czechoslovak federative constitution, be presented by the prime minister and not by the president. We have, de facto, an extraconstitutional presidential regime which would be legalized if, in the future, the Federal Assembly ratified it by approving the expanded authority requested by Vaclav Havel. What example is there for this? After all, in federations constructed on a national basis, there are no presidential regimes. The only good example is the truly representative authority conferred on the king of Belgium.

The recent government negotiations in the Gulf states provide us with the freshest evidence of the tacit, but real, cooperation between our official and shadow castle governments. Foreign Minister Dienstbier was partnered by Sasha Vondra, President Havel's foreign policy adviser, when he addressed foreign policy issues and by R. Wagner, the president's economic adviser, when—on account of the absence of a foreign trade minister (is the Public Against Violence movement, six months after the death of Minister Stracar, still not interested in filling this post?)—he dealt with foreign trade issues. It seems that Wagner has been in his unappointed post as foreign trade minister for rather a long time or even permanently. During the course of the negotiations on the jurisdiction laws, the tendencies toward a presidential regime were somewhat obvious. Vaclav Havel had to intervene when the three negotiating governments became embroiled in disputes. If he himself had been present, his presence as an arbiter with recognized authority would have been accepted.

It is a failing of our democracy that these, in essence quadripartite, government talks were not viewed as such by either the National Councils or the republican governments. There were no protests from the political movements and parties in Slovakia and the Czech lands—either through their representatives or through their dailies. They did not react and it seems that our professional deputies in the Federal Assembly will also not react. Deputies from the governing coalition have maintained their discipline. This has become a totalitarian tradition. But why do the opposition deputies not make themselves heard?

Politicians' Authoritarian Tendencies Viewed

AU2301152991 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 16 Jan 91 p 3

[Igor Cibula commentary: "Artificial Information Alone Is Not Enough"]

[Text] Warnings that some leading political figures act too authoritatively and do not show proper respect to other public officials have recently become rather commonplace. It is possible—within the subtext of these warnings—to detect anxiety about whether such a subjective description of this mentality could come to light in the future in grave deformations in policy—first and foremost, to the detriment of democracy. The public's oversensitivity in this area results from their experiences under the former totalitarian regime when a raised finger alone from a politician boded ill for the citizen.

On the Czech political scene the name most often mentioned in connection with the situation described above is that of Civic Forum Chairman Vaclav Klaus. His critics state that his constant and thorough endeavor to politically defend his radical economic reform policy is a negative trait. They dislike the tenacity with which he tries to establish—along with the changes in the economic sphere—an adequate political system and its components which should be the active heralds of these changes. In particular, they consider some of the ways in which he deals with his political opponents—as revealed recently in the contest for the Civic Forum's political profile—to be controversial.

However, from the point of view of practice in democratic states, there are no grave reasons for drawing—from Klaus' obstinacy—suspicious conclusions about his inclination toward dictatorial mannerisms. The human shortcomings in his character are more damaging to the Civic Forum's political line than to our democracy, which already has sufficient institutionalized guarantees to safeguard us from the possibly harmful ambitions of individual politicians.

This, perhaps, applies in the case of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar since his authoritative speeches and indelicate polemics with his opponents are also commented upon. He strives tenaciously to achieve his aims; at the same time, he does not in every case take into consideration the reaction of those around him. Those around him are not obliged to accept all his views with the same degree of tolerance. However, in Slovakia the situation has not reached the stage where Meciar's aspirations could exceed democracy's acceptable limits. Therefore, there is no reason to draw an impression from his behavior which, in the final analysis, casts doubts upon his policy of uncompromisingly asserting Slovak interests in the Czechoslovak Federation.

Politicians deserve to be constantly supervised by the public which has a right to know what is going on in their offices. Journalists should not simply serve up the press secretaries' prefabricated information; they should also acquaint citizens with the political background so that they may be equal participants in the decisionmaking that concerns them.

Parties Criticize 'Premature' Price Liberalization

LD2201235891 Prague CTK in English 2204 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 22 (CTK)—The majority of political parties represented in the Czechoslovak parliament criticise the current liberalisation of prices as premature, according to a survey released today by CTK.

Prices in Czechoslovakia were liberalised at the beginning of the year as part of a radical economic reform, with a certain degree of regulation for basic foodstuffs, for which the maximum allowable retail price is determined by the federal government.

The Slovak Christian Democratic Movement says "for incomprehensible reasons" price liberalisation preceded the privatisation process by three months. At the same time the Christian Democrats claim the freeing-up of prices is strongly infuenced by the monopoly status of wholesalers. The Christian-oriented Czechoslovak People's Party, which functions in Bohemia, shares this

opinion, saying the liberalisation has brought only further advantages for monopoly producers, thus shifting the burden of economic reform onto the population.

The Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia believes the premature inroduction of free prices has caused the price of goods to increase to the maximum allowable level, creating a burdensome situation for certain social groups in society and not only for pensioners. (From March 1, pensions are to be raised an average of eight per cent-ed.) The effect is "a wilful violation of the agreed-upon sequence of individual phases of the economic reform", says the Movement.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party notes that its program advocated a gradual price liberalisation, developing in harmony with the evolution of a competitive environment. The Communists point out that businesses are now violating regulatory provisions by setting the price of some products above the maximum set by the government. State regulatory authorities are so far not completely fulfilling their function, says the Communist Party.

The ruling Civic Forum (led by the creator of the concept of economic reform designed to bring the market economy to Czechoslovakia, Finance Minster Vaclav Klaus) claims price liberalisation is still in its infancy and that it is too early to evaluate it. Attendant adverse signs result from a lack of experience with market mechanisms in an insufficiently demonopolised environment, according to the Civic Forum.

Of the parties represented in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, no response to CTK's survey was received from either Public Against Violence (VPN) or the Slovak National Party, both operating in Slovakia.

Governments Differ on Big Privatization

AU2301134991 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 16 Jan 91 p 2

[Jiri Leschtina commentary: "The Very Marrow"]

[Text] When Dusan Triska, deputy federal minister of finance, expressed the hope at this week's session of the Federal Assembly's Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committees that the government-sponsored bill on the transformation law would not undergo any substantial changes in the committees, [Slovak] Deputy Milan Cic reacted tersely: "It is always good to hope, but it is also possible that the committees will return the bill to the government so it can rework it!"

Why is there such uncertainty about the text of this absolutely cardinal law on "big privatization," by means of which the great majority of the cumbersome state enterprises are to be transformed into brisk private companies and which legislative deputies refused to discuss as far back as last November because of some half-baked clauses?

The very first moments of the present debate in legislative committees have already made it clear that completely new differences, differences of principle, have crystallized between the CSFR Ministry of Finance, which is submitting the law, and the ministries of the republics. The main polemics between the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Czech Ministry for Privatization have erupted over the concept of the federal and republic funds of national assets. According to the Federal Ministry of Finance bill, these funds should abolish the present state enterprises, transform them into state shareholding companies, and then gradually sell their shares to private persons. The Czech Ministry for Privatization, on the other hand, upholds the view that the abolished state enterprises should be transformed into shareholding companies by their founders and that the activity of the funds of national assets should be limited to the issuance and sale of the shares of the companies thus founded.

Even more difficult to reconcile, however, are the differences that have arisen between the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Slovak Ministry for Privatization over the concept of the much-discussed investment coupons, which are a kind of registered stock which every CSFR citizen will be able to exchange for the shares of an enterprise of his choice. The Slovak ministry demands, with the tacit blessing of the Slovak National Council, that these coupons not be issued federally but by the governments of the republics and that their validity be restricted to the territory of the respective republic. As Engineer Huska, Slovak minister for privatization, stated in the Federal Assembly yesterday, the place of permanent residence should be decisive for the use of the investment coupons. Citizens living in the Czech Republic would then be able to purchase for their coupons only the shares of Czech enterprises and the situation in Slovakia would be analogous. This would lead to the paradoxical situation that a Slovak with permanent residence in Bohemia would be able to buy the shares of the Plzen brewery but not the shares of the Slovnaft refinery in Bratislava. Commenting on this concept, Deputy Minister Triska observed that the reaction of the [federal] government and "partially also of the castle" to the Slovak proposal has been "surprisingly strong and negative." Conservative-minded deputies in particular draw attention to the fact that any limitation of the citizen's investment opportunities represents discrimination against private enterprise and reprehensible state encroachment upon individual freedom.

The fact remains that the two problems mentioned above concern the very marrow of the philosophy of the law and that their enforcement would make it necessary to completely rework the federal government's bill. The demands of some deputies, which were also vented yesterday, that the entire law be withdrawn and that the problem of big privatization be coupled with the laboriously brought forth law on land are of a similar caliber. Only one thing is certain: The struggle for the transition of state ownership into private ownership and, by the

same token, for the transformation of the "socialist" society into a capitalist one is starting anew and will continue for a long time.

Dlouhy on Different Federal, Slovak Reform Ideas

AU2201110591 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Jan 91 p 13

["Excerpt" from an interview with CSFR Minister of Economy Vladimir Dlouhy by an unidentified reporter of the weekly RESPEKT; place and date not given: "Minister Dlouhy's Admission—Different Impact of Repercussions"—reprinted from the 1991 issue No. 1 of the Czech weekly RESPEKT]

[Text] [RESPEKT] Some steps taken by the Slovak government create the impression that its economic spirit is a bit more paternalistic than the philosophy of the liberal economists in the federal and Czech governments.

[Dlouhy] This will apparently be one of the most complicated problems in the near future. At the same time it seems to me that we (I mean the so-called authors of the economic reform) made a mistake here. The economic reform—and I still believe, in spite of all fears of its social repercussions, that it must be uncompromising and fast—will affect individual regions of our country with a varying degree of intensity. Regions in Bohemia will be severely affected, as will regions in Slovakia. What I will tell you now is only my hypothesis, but my impression is that the Slovak colleagues have arrived at the opinion that the impact of the reform on Slovak regions will be more severe and that, consequently, Slovak interests will not benefit all that much from a rapid economic reform. Or, let me put it differently, they are of the opinion that the maximum degree of Slovakia's economic independence and the maximum (self-evidently equitable) transfer of authority over capital, profits, etc. under Slovak jurisdiction will create foundations for far more extensive redistribution processes and the continuation of subsidies within the framework of the Slovak economy. This can, of course, come into conflict with the federal concept of rapid economic steps. I am not passing any judgment on this; rather I note that this is the political reality. And precisely that was the federal (and my own) mistake. Whereas after Trencianske Teplice [where the Czech, Slovak, and federal governments first agreed on the transfer of powers from the federation to the republics in the summer of 1990] I was able to understand that the surrendering of all powers simply was an indisputable fact and supported it as a step toward decentralization (and, hence, as a pro-reform step), at Zidlochovice [another venue of talks on the division of powers between the federation and the republics] I already had a vague notion that something more complicated was involved. We in the federal government should have simply been politically more far-sighted, should have known how to assess the situation, and how to proceed more tactically in line with this assessment. But the other side, too, did not proceed clearly and openly. No one came and placed his cards on the table. Quite to the contrary, it seems to me that the basic strategy was an a priori distrust of the federation. Although, who knows, there surely is a gradual evolution of views also among Slovak colleagues.

Impact of OF's Transformation on Coalition Viewed

AU2201134391

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST and Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 January publish correspondents' reports on a news conference given by Fedor Gal, chairman of the Public Against Violence (VPN) Council, in Bratislava on 14 January. Apart from condemning the Soviet military intervention in Lithuania, Gal also discussed the impact of the Civic Forum's (OF) transformation into a right-wing political party on the OF/VPN coalition. The coalition issue is discussed by Fedor Gal also in an interview for the 15 January issue of Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES. "Speculations" about an end to the OF/VPN coalition on the federal level are also the subject of a 500-word Igor Cibula commentary in Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 15 January on page 3.

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 15 January on page 2 carries a 400-word "sm"-signed report on Fedor Gal's news conference entitled "Not To Shake the Political Scene." Commenting on the outcome of the OF Assembly held on 12 and 13 January, which decided to transform the movement into a right-wing political party, Gal reportedly said that "the deliberations of the Prague assembly were conducted almost exclusively in the spirit of finding a solution to internal problems, and it would therefore be premature to speak at this moment about the impact of the OF's internal transformation into a political party on its political conduct." Asked about his reaction to the possible extension of the OF's activity to Slovakia, the VPN chairman replied that "the only meaningful course of action is consensus with the VPN as the coalition partner. Partnership cannot be formulated in any other way but in a working relationship and in the search for joint solutions." At his 14 January news conference, Gal also mentioned that "the date of the planned OF/VPN summit with the president has not yet been fixed."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 January on page 3 carries a 500-word Frantisek Melis report on Gal's news conference entitled "We Are Not Facing the Threat of a Split." The report includes the following passage on Gal's remarks on the OF Assembly and its impact on developments within the VPN: "The course of the OF Assembly provided us with some food for thought, Fedor Gal said. He stressed that there is no need to reproduce the OF model in Slovakia, even though, on the other hand, he regards the OF's internal crystallization as a natural process. This process must, however, be regulated in some way, because no metamorphoses of this movement should upset the continuity of the post-November development and the guarantees residing in

the legitimacy of the existing power structure. I assume, Fedor Gal went on to say, that the OF's internal transformation will compel us to newly identify our coalition partners on the federal level. The VPN does not have to change its platform; it does, however, feel the need to update its 'Chance for Slovakia' program so that it respects practical problems and their efficient solution. Fedor Gal does not expect a development to take place within the VPN similar to that which has occurred within the OF because there exists no platform within the movement he leads which would set it apart as a grouping with clearly defined views."

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES on 15 January on page 2 carries a 250-word "telephone interview" with Fedor Gal by MLADA FRONTA DNES correspondent Jindrich Filo entitled "We and the OF Are Natural Partners." In the interview, which was conducted on 14 January, Filo asks whether the VPN will now leave the legislative and government coalition with the OF "as many people have concluded from your insinuations." Gal replies: "None of us has ever said anything to this effect. Such a move would not only be absurd at this moment but absolutely foolish. We are facing specific problems that would not be solved without our mutual coalition. This is not a mere proclamation. After all, we have a common history and a common program. Our coalition is the prerequisite of the common federal state's stability and further development." Gal also denies that the coalition is a "marriage of convenience" and asserts that the OF and the VPN are "natural partners."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 15 January on page 3 carries a 500-word Igor Cibula commentary entitled "Fantasy Versus Reality; Conjectures About OF's Coalition Partners." The commentary deals with "speculations" that, following its transformation into a right-wing party, the OF might be "contemplating a new coalition with the Christian Democratic Union in the Czech Republic and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] in Slovakia." According to these "conjectures," this new "right-wing bloc" should replace the OF's current coalition with the "centrist" VPN.

Cibula dismisses these speculations as belonging to the realm of "fantasy" because "the national program of [KDH Chairman] Jan Carnogursky and the federal doctrine of [OF Chairman] Vaclav Klaus could be reconciled only if the Slovak Christian Democrats or the OF right wing denied their true selves." Cibula believes that the differences in how the KDH and the OF right wing "define their basic attitudes to the idea of Czechoslovak statehood" are too fundamental to make any cooperation possible, despite their shared right-wing platform. This is why, in Cibula's opinion, "conjectures about the OF's alternative coalition partners in Slovakia must be taken with a grain of salt."

Democratic Union Election Coalition Formed

LD2101222391 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1500 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Today's conference in Prague of representatives of more than 10 opposition parties and movements in the Czech and Slovak Republics resulted in the creation of a Democratic Union election coalition. The statement emphasizes that the joint program of the Democratic Union will provide alternative solutions to all current problems of society with emphasis on social problems and increasing the certainties of the citizens. At the same time, however, it should preserve the identity and political structure of each party or movement within the Union.

The new coalition proposes a dialogue with all representatives of the government, the Federal Assembly, and the National Council, and a roundtable meeting where it will present alternative solutions to the most important social problems.

The Democratic Union also turned to the public with an appeal for new general elections.

Parties Form New Election Coalition

AU2301124691 Prague CTK in English 2024 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 21 (CTK)—An election coalition, the Democratic Union, was formed here today at a conference of representatives of over 10 oppositions parties and movements in the Czech and Slovak Republics.

The participants signed a statement pledging to pursue a common line of action in view of the next parliamentary elections, due in 1992. The program of the Democratic Union (DU) will offer alternative solutions to social issues, with emphasis on social security, and will, at the same time, enable each party or movement associated in the DU to maintain its identity and political structure.

The signatories include representatives of the Czechoslovak National Congress, the Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia, the Confederation of Political Prisoners, the Movement for Autonomous Democracy/Society for Moravia and Silesia, the Slovak Republican Party, the Republican Union, the People's Party-Movement 90, the Free Democrats Party and the Beer Party.

Each party will be represented in the Union's supreme body, the Council, which will coordinate the activities of the parties and movements.

Deputy Explains Classification of Secret Agents

AU2301103191 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jan 91 p 2

[CTK report on interview granted with Deputy Stanislav Devaty, member of the Parliamentary Commission Investigating the Events of 17 November, by unidentified reporters; place and date not given: "Residents and

Agents; S. Devaty About Classification of State Security Collaborators"—first paragraph is LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] **The fact that many of our fellow citizens, including highly-placed persons, collaborated in various ways with the State Security services is again on the order of the day. The existence of a register of the files of secret collaborators, now at the disposal of the Legislative Commission Investigating the Events of 17 November, and the requests for its publication call forth an ever increasing number of questions. Some of them were answered for LIDOVE NOVINY last week by S. Devaty, a member of the commission. He commented on some more questions in an extensive interview granted to CTK and ZLINSKE NOVINY. In the ZLINSKE NOVINY interview, Devaty deals, among other things, with the classification of State Security collaborators.**

The two basic categories were secret collaborators (SC) and confidants (C). A secret collaborator "fulfilled assigned orders and provided data and information on the subversive activities of hostile foreign intelligence, ideological, and economic centers and associations, their domestic help, and the remaining domestic enemies." The secret collaborators were divided into subcategories: resident—R, agent—A, owner of an apartment to be lent—LA. A **resident** was characterized as a specially selected, dependable, and experienced secret collaborator, usually a former National Security Corps member, holding a civilian job. He directed the work of agents entrusted to him by State Security staff independently. An **agent**, among other things, fulfilled assignments involving the exposure of criminal activity, obtained information on clandestine expressions of hostility, and also conducted "disruptive work in hostile environments, particularly in cities with concentrated hostile, anti-socialist, and anti-social elements." An **owner of an apartment to be lent** was a secret collaborator who provided an apartment for conspirative meetings with State Security staff. Such apartments were also at the disposal of another category of people, namely, the State Security agents themselves who were for this purpose provided cover ID cards.

The other type was the so-called **confidant**, who was engaged in "exposing or investigating anti-state activities." These individuals were selected from the ranks of the citizens who were willing to collaborate with the State Security "on the basis of mutual trust" This category also included the so-called secret collaborators candidates (SCC) who were suggested as potential collaborators, then contacted and checked. If that particular person was not suitable, his file was closed and an explanation was entered in the register stating why the collaboration was not developed. In the opposite case, the candidate was listed in one of the categories of secret collaborators, which was also entered in the register.

Fire at Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant

AU2301125091 Prague CTK in English 2251 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 21 (CTK)—A fire broke out in the switch-room in the first unit of the power plant at Dukovany, south Moravia, at 1658 local time today and was extinguished at 1756, Director of the Plant Jan Krenk told CTK.

After the fire was signalized by the automatic system, the first unit was shut down.

It was found during a preliminary analysis that as only one switchboard of the three independent feeders had been involved, the fire had no direct influence on the nuclear or radiation safety of the power plant. No injuries occurred and the extent of the damage is being investigated.

This is the second fire at a Czechoslovak nuclear power plant within a week, last Tuesday a fire broke out at Czechoslovakia's oldest plant at Jaslovske Bohunice, west Slovakia, but was soon put out and there was no radioactivity leak.

Czech Parliament Presidium Recalled

AU2101143591 Prague CTK in English 2044 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 17 (CTK)—Dagmar Buresova (Civic Forum Liberal Club) was re-elected chairwoman of the Czech National Council (parliament) after it recalled all members of its presidium today.

The presidium was recalled at the request of the Club of the Democratic Right Wing in the Civic Forum, the political force which has 123 out of the total of 200 seats in the parliament of the Czech Republic (the bigger of Czechoslovakia's two republics). This demand was raised after two main political streams were formed in the Civic Forum the democratic right wing and the Liberal Club at the close of 1990.

Communists voted against the reshuffle of the parliament's presidium or reduction of the number of presidium members as they feared that the Civic Forum right's intention to reduce the presidium might deprive them of their positions. The Communists, the second strongest party in the parliament, occupy 32 seats.

x x x

Buresova told newsmen today that the reconstruction of the Czech parliament's presidium was necessary as there has been a considerable shift to the right in the Civic Forum and in the whole society as well.

She said that representatives of the parliamentary groups of the parties and movements represented in the government have agreed that in the future only representatives

of the coalition parties will be elected deputy chairpersons of the Czech parliament. A communist representative will thus not be elected to this post. There will be only three communist representatives in the new presidium. Buresova said that the reconstruction of the presidium should not affect the composition of the Czech government.

Referring to streams in the Civic Forum she welcomed the foundation of right-wing and liberal groups. She said that there are 45 deputies of the Civic Forum's interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right Wing and 55 of the Liberal Club. Deputies who are members of none of the clubs (Civic Forum has 123 deputies in the Czech parliament) are preparing a "Group of the Authentic Civic Forum", Buresova said.

Press Views Outcome of Civic Forum Congress

AU2301153391

[Editorial Report] Czech and Slovak newspapers of 14, 15, and 16 January publish 300 to 1,800-word commentaries and evaluations of the Civic Forum [OF] Assembly, held in Prague on 12 and 13 January. The commentaries focus, in particular, on the decision of the assembly to transform the OF into a political party and on the OF's newly approved program and organizational structure. Of the commentaries available thus far, the following are worth noting:

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 14 January on page 2 carries a 700-word Petr Sabata commentary entitled "Both Enough and Too Little."

Sabata believes that the OF program approved by the assembly is "wide enough for many of the hitherto OF supporters to be able to identify with it." It should also "present no obstacles" to the OF's continued coalition with the Public Against Violence movement and to the "continued functioning of the parliaments without shocks." On the other hand, he says, the program appears to be "too wide" to be acceptable to "some personalities with clearly defined views, such as OF deputies who are close to the Civic Democratic Alliance." Commenting on the newly approved organizational structure, based on clearly defined horizontal and vertical links and on individual membership, Sabata says that it is bound to "narrow down the base of the future party." At the same time, however, by rejecting the demands of some delegates that former members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and other parties of the former National Front be excluded from membership, the assembly simultaneously "expanded this base."

Sabata therefore qualifies the program and organizational structure of the OF as a "compromise that will win some people, while discouraging others." Who will join the new party is, however, "written in the stars," he says.

Summing up, the commentator says: "OF is not any stronger after the assembly—that could not even be expected. The edge of the conflicts within the OF has been blunted, however, or, at least, they are no longer as evident, and a party is beginning to take shape. This is enough of a result but, in view of the upheavals in the world, desperately little."

On the same day, on page 5, MLADA FRONTA DNES carries a 300-word unattributed review of foreign media reactions to the OF Assembly. The review includes a brief summary of an interview with Peter Uhl, CTK director and OF deputy in parliament, carried by the UPI agency. Uhl is quoted as having told UPI that he will not apply for membership in the OF now that it has become a party but will retain his seat in the Federal Assembly. Uhl believes that "20 to 30 percent of OF parliamentary deputies and activists will refuse to join the OF as a party."

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 15 January on page 3 carries a 1,800-word Robert Kotian article on the OF Assembly entitled "An Impartial Slovak in Prague." Evaluating the outcome of the assembly, Kotian says: "The OF Assembly can be regarded as a victory for Vaclav Klaus. This victory has not, however, resolved the fundamental antagonism between the right wing and the liberal alternative, it has merely postponed its resolution. It can be expected that once the opposition parties and the OF's liberal alternative specify their program in greater detail and once the anticipated consequences of the economic reform start to make themselves felt, they are more likely to gain the favor of voters [than Vaclav Klaus].

"It therefore was, figuratively speaking, a Pyrrhic victory. One more such victory and the OF will cease existing even as a political party."

Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 15 January on page 3 carries a 700-word Milan Srb commentary entitled "No Longer for Everyone." Srb points out that the words of the slogan with which the OF contested the parliamentary elections in June that "Parties Are for Party Members, the OF Is for Everyone" no longer apply. The OF no longer is for everyone and "it will no longer be the spokesman for the majority of the nation," as the clear identification with the "capitalist system" in the OF program shows.

Srb considers the decision to transform the OF into a political party "natural and, most probably, also necessary." He concedes, however, that this transformation "could make uneasy many voters who had given their votes to an OF that was for everyone."

Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 15 January on page 1 carries a 300-word statement by the Czechoslovak Socialist Party [CSS] entitled "On the Results of the OF Assembly." Commenting on the transformation of the "decisive political force in this country" into a political party, the statement says that "in a normal parliamentary democracy a similar situation would be followed by the resignation of the supreme collective state bodies and by new elections." This should not be interpreted as a

CSS "demand," the statement says, as there exists no legal basis for such a demand. Such a step would, however, be warranted by "political ethics," according to the CSS.

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 15 January on page 2 carries a 350-word Tomas Marek commentary entitled "Dance Between Pieces of Broken Glass." The commentary deals with the demand of "radical" delegates from districts, voiced at the OF Assembly, that former Communists be excluded from membership in the new party or that their admission be made conditional on "some sort of cadre screening." Marek points out that this demand is "likely to exacerbate even more the already tense situation in the OF. One can scarcely imagine how many ministers and deputies who had for many years be screened by the security forces of the state once again testify before a commission testing their loyalty—this time, paradoxically, to a right-wing party." Should the next OF Assembly approve this demand, Marek says, the likely result will be "a government and parliamentary crisis, disgust of a substantial part of voters, and other complications that are hard to foresee." This is why Marek believes that "Vaclav Klaus as party chairman is now facing the opposite problem than he has been confronting thus far—how to restrain the radicalization of district representatives lest they recklessly jeopardize the stability of the political scene."

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 16 January on page 2 carries an 800-word Sergej Michalic commentary entitled "The Consequences Are Hard To Predict." Michalic views the OF Assembly as a victory of the "radical" delegates from districts over the intellectuals, most of them former dissidents, who were dominant in the movement after the November revolution and who continue to hold important government and parliamentary posts. As Michalic observes, apart from Vaclav Klaus, "not a single minister or member of the Federal Assembly Presidium" has been elected into the new 16-member OF Council. Michalic views this development as a "quite understandable reaction, reflecting the actual mood of the people 13 months after the euphoria of meetings" which toppled the communist regime, and as the expression of a "generation conflict." Michalic refuses to predict what the consequences of the OF Assembly will be, saying that any forecast would be "mere speculation." He only expresses the hope that the call of Jan Urban, former head of the OF Coordinating Center, will be heeded that the OF should "look ahead and work on the basis of agreement."

Civic Forum Liberal Group Opposes 'Nomenklatura'

LD2301173791 Prague CTK in English 1536 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Prague Jan 23 (CTK)—"We will not allow the Civic Forum (OF) to change into a political party of nomenklatura, thereby shutting itself off from many of those who gave it their full confidence in free elections and attached to it their hopes and ideas of democratic development in our country," declared the Civic Forum's Liberal Group today.

The term "nomenklatura" refers to the system of privileges for Communist Party members which prevailed under the former regime.

Relations between the Liberal Group and OF are conditional on Civic Forum's faithfulness to principles of democracy, humaneness, and responsiblity toward the citizens who gave it their trust in elections, notes the statement.

The Liberal Group considers the guarantees of democratic development as follows:

1. The idea of Czecho-Slovak solidarity and the inviolability of cooperation with the Slovak movement Public Against Violence (VPN) and its coalition partner the Christian Democratic Movement;

2. The integrating role of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel;

3. The programmes of both the Federal and Czech governments;

4. The freely elected legislative bodies and municipal councils.

According to the Liberal Group, these are the foundations for the successful progress of Czechoslovak economic reform.

Slovak Commentary Condemns Czech Attack on Meciar

AU2401112291 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Jan 91 p 3

[Igor Cibula commentary: "The Problem Does Not Lie in Criticism of Meciar"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Directness contributes to Czech-Slovak relations, but not in the manner utilized by the author of the commentary "Questions for the Slovak Prime Minister" published in yesterday's edition of MLADA FRONTA DNES. What is one supposed to think when one of the most widely distributed Prague dailies asks questions such as: "Is it only Vladimir Meciar's magnetism that compels the Slovak ministers to remain embarrassingly silent? Or is it true what people are saying—not only in the corridors of the federal parliament—that perhaps half the members of the Slovak government do not have an unblemished past? Could such a government—and, as the case may be, national council—instead of being an executive or legislative organ possibly become an obedient instrument for the assertion of all kinds of willfulness?" The author admits that these are probably groundless suppositions; however, he makes no attempt—not even by insinuation—to substantiate with specific arguments these grave allegations concerning the most senior members of the Slovak government.

The above-mentioned article falls completely into line with the anti-Meciar campaign set by the tone of the Civic Forum weekly FORUM. In its most recent edition this newspaper even went so far that Civic Forum Chairman Vaclav Klaus considered it necessary to distance himself from an article with a typical headline "The Past and Aims of Vladimir Meciar." It is unnecessary to reproduce the contents of this contribution for Slovak readers. They can already appreciate from the headline that the mentioned person's past is shady and that his aims are most certainly even shadier. From another article in the most recent issue of the Civic Forum Coordinating Center's paper it is possible to come to the conclusion that among certain Prague journalists Meciar is worse than Saddam Husayn.

Some advocates of Czech-Slovak mutuality in Slovakia think that relations between our federation's nations are harmed if such scribblings about Slovak politicians in the Czech press are negatively analyzed by us. It is as if they do not understand that the problem does not lie in criticism of Meciar, but lies in its context. This does not say much in favor of the generally recognized and indisputable culture and knowledge of the Czech people, although—apart from the specific instances mentioned above—it is unquestionable.

Meciar Accused of Dictatorial Ambitions

AU2401111891 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Jan 91 p 3

[Martin Komarek commentary: "Questions for the Slovak Prime Minister"]

[Text] Even the strong and resolute voice of the Slovak prime minister is somewhat drowned in the general saber-rattling. Nevertheless, if we correlate his Sunday television appearance with some of his earlier utterances and with lobby-obtained information from the highest representative bodies, we cannot but raise several highly disturbing questions. These are only hypotheses, and I voice them realizing the risk that I may be attacked for unsubstantiated muck-raking. I accept this risk particularly because if even a small portion of these questions hit the target, the federation would be in serious danger and its concealing could be classified as aiding to a catastrophe.

In a speech, which was unfortunately only broadcast by the Slovak television circuit, Prime Minister Meciar informed the public that expert teams are intensively working on the draft of the new Slovak constitution. This draft is to be presented for a public discussion. Vladimir Meciar indicated that "some Slovak circles" are contemplating a confederal rather than a federal constitution. A substantial part of the speech dealt with the question of screening. While by the Czech and by the federal representation we can observe almost meticulous concern with the clean past, the Slovak attitude is, according to the supreme representative of the Slovak executive power, diametrically different.

Question Marks

I quote from the daily VEREJNOST: "The question of screening is a question of a political tool, of the political struggle. It is not a clean tool, it brings with itself a lot of dirt." The prime minister accuses the federation that contrary to the original agreement it had the archive materials transferred to the center and he emphasizes the unreliability of the screening and the possibility of using it against honest people. "Of course, neither the Slovak National Council nor the Slovak government are interested in having the State Security agents permanently working in their ranks. (...) However, this process must be controlled by these bodies with respect to time, content, and organization, and cannot enforced from the outside," Meciar continues and concludes: It is better if two State Security collaborators sit where they should not, than if we wronged just a single person...." On Wednesday, during a session of the federal parliament, Deputy Toman expressed his surprise at this and stressed: "The screening is absolutely dependable!"

Why does Vladimir Meciar retard the progress of the screening in Slovakia? Why does he prefer gratifying rhetoric, and why does he avoid the most significant and politically the only important aspect of the screening—which is that the former agents are the most suitable subject for blackmail? They could literally become puppets in the hands of a blackmailer who would force them to decisions that which the victim would not by free choice. When were the archive materials taken from Slovakia? It was not until after the revolution when Vladimir Meciar was already the interior minister and had a practically unlimited use of them. Are there really no copies, or even originals of the compromising materials anywhere in Slovakia? Why are there, as alleged, missing pages in the Bratislava file register, and why did the Banska Bystrica register vanish altogether?

If my memory does not deceive me, in the television program "With the Cards Down" broadcast January 14, Vladimir Meciar indicated that he negotiated in Trencianske Teplice without a counsel of his first deputy. How could he be so certain of his approval? We have experiences that even the strongest personality may not be able in a democratic society to push his opinion through. Is it just the personal magnetism of Vladimir Meciar that reduces Slovak ministers to an embarrassing silence? Or, is the rumor of the parliamentary lobby true that maybe as many as one-half of the members of the Slovak government do not have a clean past? Could such a government and perhaps also the national council not become an obedient tool of personal whims rather than an executive or a legislative body? They may be absolutely unsubstantiated assumptions. However, why should one so strongly object to screening that would elucidate all this? If there is only a speck of truth in this, then who could know the compromising materials best and who would have the best opportunity to use them to his own advantage? Let us leave the Slovak public to answer these questions for itself. The Slovak nation

aiming at a sovereignty within the framework of a democratic state certainly will not allow itself to be cheated.

A Post-Totalitarian Politician?

Renowned political scientists warn against excessive enthusiasm over East European revolutions and point out trends, which could lead to the establishment of an authoritative, so-called post-totalitarian government. Nations can easily be captivated by strong personalities, and thereby they can extend the already taxing road to freedom and normalcy. The Slovak press is, as far as I can judge, practically unconditionally loyal to the person of Vladimir Meciar. On 12 January, the paper NARODNA OBRODA published an article, which fully conforms to this. However, it quotes psychologist Gustav Matijek, who opposes the idea that Meciar become the Public Against Violence movement chairman. He warns against his extreme authority, which could lead to the establishment of a post-totalitarian dictatorship. The author, Igor Cibula, considers Matijek's conclusions to be arrant and is fully on the side of the prime minister. Could his judgments be rash? Why is Vladimir Meciar after the leading post in the Slovak ruling movement? Can that be explained by his interest in democracy? Or, is he perhaps consciously building an antidemocratic position of a "leader of the nation?"

Vladimir Meciar began his Sunday speech with the constitution. Let us imagine the catastrophic scenario so popular today. Expert teams under Meciar's supervision will put the constitution together and upon "approval" it will be presented to the Czech and the federal governments as a fait accompli. There will be nothing left but to adjust oneself because constitutions, if they are to work, must be precisely amended. The federal and the Czech governments will have to either retreat gnashing their teeth or say their definite "No!" But will that not be these governments then, who incited the argument and perhaps the dissolution of the federation? Prime Minister Meciar wants to have clean hands.

Slovak Foreign Relations Minister Discusses VPN

AU2401105691

[Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 21 January on page 3 carries a 1,600-word interview with Milan Knazko, Slovak minister for foreign relations, by Alzbeta Rosenbergova entitled "Well, Such Are My Problems...." The place and date of the interview, which deals with various aspects of Czech-Slovak relations and the situation of Slovakia and the Public Against Violence movement (VPN), are not given.

In one of her first questions Rosenbergova asks how Knazko, as one of the organizers of the November revolution in Slovakia and a VPN founding member, feels when "the masses chant Enough of VPN!"

In his reply Knazko points out that in December 1989 and January 1990 between 5,000 and 10,000 people joined the VPN every day. In this situation it was difficult to assess "who was who" and, consequently, many people joined the movement who "had nothing in common with its aims and ideals," including collaborators with the State Security Corps. Knazko believes that it is just people from these circles "who now shout enough of VPN." At the same time Knazko asserts that the movement cannot be held responsible for these people as "it has no vertical structure and does not issue any orders to anyone."

Another question concerns Knazko's former post as presidential adviser. As the interviewer points out, many Slovaks fear that, by Knazko's departure from Prague and his acceptance of the ministerial job in Bratislava, the Slovak nation has lost its "spokesman" in Prague "through whom Slovak problems could directly reach the president's ears."

Knazko replies that only one of the president's eight advisers, Mr. Butora, is now from Slovakia, which means that "an adviser at Prague Castle who would like to defend Slovakia's interests is in a minority position." To illustrate the precarious position of a Slovak at the Castle, Knazko recalls that "when I proposed last April that a branch of the presidential office be opened in Bratislava, some of the president's close associates responded by asking why such a branch could not be set up in Ceske Budejovice, for example." At the same time Knazko acknowledges the "natural right of the president to choose the people whom he wants to have around him."

While on the subject of Knazko's relationship with President Havel, the interviewer inquires whether Knazko prefers "Vaclav Havel's plays to his speeches as statesman." The minister replies: "It is hard for me to speak about this. During the president's speech in the federal parliament prior to the approval of the law on division of powers I realized that a statesmen can make 10 to 15 speeches that are excellent but can still wreck everything by a single speech that is of a different category. Proceeding from the philosophy of the president's previous statements, I expected him to side with those who require protection...."

In another portion of the interview, Knazko responds to the view of the Czech public that the Slovak revolution of 1989 "was only some sort of an appendix of the Prague revolution." He says: "Watching the Prague Television series 'What Happened A Year Ago' toward the end of the year, I experienced the feeling of a stolen revolution. I found out that nothing happened in Bratislava at that time.... Even in Slovak Television they have erased the recordings of the first days, a matter that is now under investigation. There does not even exist a recording of the first historic 'Dialogue' program of 24 November 1989 when the first public proclamation was made in this republic about abolition of Article 4 of the Constitution concerning the Communist Party's leading role. This call was made in a situation when Prague was

still seeking a compromise and consensus with representatives of the Communist Party. I must say that something should be done to prevent history from being falsified already today. We were neither an appendix of the Prague revolution, nor were we guided from Prague, be it by the Charter [77], dissidents, or anyone else. It was an autonomous Slovak revolution." In Knazko's opinion, "the two revolutions took place in parallel and each had its own atmosphere and its own flavor."

Knazko is also asked about the problems he must deal with as Slovak foreign relations minister. He replies that one of the problems is the concept of Slovakia's foreign policy. For this concept to be drafted, he says, Slovaks must "become clear about the basic terms, about who we are and who we want to be." In this context he says: "People often say in one breath that they want an authentic federation and a sovereign Slovakia. I am afraid that, from the viewpoint of international law, it is not possible to reconcile the two. It is a question that will also have to be answered by lawyers."

Another problem Knazko mentions is the need to correct Slovakia's image abroad. It seems, Knazko says, that even Slovak newborns are being suspected of nationalism, separatism, and anti-Semitism: "I have here, for example, an article from yesterday's LE MONDE, in which Slovaks are automatically associated with nationalism and separatism. It is an article from which one can almost feel hatred. I ask myself—why? Who is presenting this image of Slovakia to the outside world and with what intention?"

Slovakia Demands Compensation From Government

LD2401064191 Prague CTK in English 0057 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Bratislava Jan 23 (CTK)—The Slovak Government has presented to the Federal Government a demand for 3,000 million crowns to compensate for the losses inflicted upon the Slovak economy by its past decisions and promises, journalists were told by Slovak Economics Minister Jozef Belcak here today.

The losses have been caused mainly by conversion of the armament industry which has had adverse economic and social impacts especially in Slovakia which accounts for some 80 per cent of armament production in Czechoslovakia.

If the original pace set for cutting back armament production, pushed through by the Federal Government, were observed, conversion in Slovakia would deprive 70,000 people of their jobs, Belcak said.

Since January 1, 1991, armament production has been under the jurisdiction of the Czech and Slovak republics and the Slovak Government decided to slow down its conversion. The government also authorized continued arms exports.

Slovak Official Refutes Hungarian Accusations

AU2301163391 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Jan 91 p 14

[Statement by Engineer Jan Klepac, deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council: "Utterances by a Hungarian Diplomat Beyond Comprehension; Incriminations Do Not Incite Trust; An Unfortunate Prologue to the Tri-Lateral Negotiations of Hungary, the CSFR, and Poland in Visegrad;" place and date not given]

[Text] On 11 January 1991, the Hungarian daily MAGYAR HIRLAP published an interview with Tamas Katona, Political State Secretary of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the upcoming meeting of the highest representatives of Hungary, the CSFR, and Poland in Visegrad. The state secretary asserted in it, among other things, that "we cannot bear witness to the renaissance of a virulent, antiquated, and impatient anti-Czech, anti-Hungarian, and anti-Jewish Slovak nationalism."

[Klepac] At first I did not think it possible that a diplomat of a neighboring country, who claims to be our most natural ally, would use such undiplomatic wording. Moreover, that he would do so just before the Visegrad meeting of our highest state representatives (21 January 1991), and also just prior to the visit by the Slovak political representation in Budapest (probably 8 February 1991). Or is it because of these meetings?

As a constitutional representative of the Slovak nation, upon verification of all the facts at the CSFR Embassy in Budapest, I consider it my duty to issue the following statement.

It is hard to comprehend that Mr. Katona would attempt to present to the world as an overly nationalist, even chauvinist, anti-Semitic, and who-knows-what-else the smallest nation in central Europe, the living space of which has been constantly reduced but which has never taken over even a millimeter of foreign soil, a nation that has never attempted to oppress anyone of any nation but which has been often deprived of its national identity, a nation, the minority of which over just a few decades has been decimated in Hungary from hundreds of thousands to thousands.

We are used to such attributes. It is not the first time this came from the Hungarian side and I would have a hard time believing it to be the last time. One has to contemplate, however, the sincerity of Hungarian proclaimed endeavors in forming a zone of stability, cooperation, and mutual trust in central Europe, when such a statement comes from the mouth of an official representative. The casting of doubts on the tripartite agreements and the unacceptable interference of Hungarian media in the internal development in Slovakia are, judging by Mr. Katona's statement, about to progress to an open accusation on the international stage of the Slovak nation. Nationalism—judged by the Hungarian side—has always been solely the disease of the others. So, what has

been the Slovak anti-Hungarian policy been like in reality during this highly sensitive period? In the Slovak parliament, 24 out of the 150 deputies are of Hungarian nationality, which far exceeds the proportional representation of Hungarian population in Slovakia. In comparison, among the 386 deputies in the Budapest parliament is a single Slovak. Recently, the Slovak National Council adopted an Official Language Act that is fully compatible to the West European legislation. The Law on Elections to the Local Self-Administration made it possible that in the linguistically mixed areas the citizens of Hungarian nationality would gain a majority representation often even to the detriment of Slovaks. At the same time, the Hungarian parliament refused to approve financial support for Slovak ethnic education in 18 communities in Hungary. Just before Christmas, the Slovak National Council approved a statement on the deportation of 57,000 Jews from Slovakia during World War II. It apologized for the suffering caused by its predecessors to the Jewish survivors and to families of the victims. Where does a member of the nation from which hundreds of thousands of Jews were deported take the courage to describe the present Slovak attitude as anti-Jewish?

In Budapest, they found a way to deal even with the already-mentioned comparisons. It is based on the rejection of the policy of reciprocity, which is the essence of every fair partnership anywhere in the world. It is certain, however, that if a similar reciprocity policy were implemented in Hungary, we would not have to worry about our future coexistence.

On the other hand, as long as it is not implemented, I reject the unsubstantiated accusations by Mr. Katona as misleading and demand an apology.

Concurrently, I appeal to the highest representatives of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic that during the negotiations in Visegrad they ask for guarantees that similar attacks on the Slovak nation by the official Hungarian representatives will never again be repeated.

All the state and official visits to Slovakia so far have had it confirmed that the national movement here is healthy and reaches the European political, civic, and humane standards, that it does not threaten anybody and is not aimed against anybody.

The Slovak nation does not want to revive the old disputes and wrongs done long ago. Nevertheless, the idea of pan-Hungarianism is alien to it. It will sit at the common European table together with the Hungarian, Czech, and other nations as a mature nation with equal rights. It wants to enrich the others but also gain from them. Let us realize that a united Europe is our common future.

Slovak Crisis Staff Meets, Security Increased

AU2301113291 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Jaroslav Svechota, chief of the crisis staff of the Interior Ministry of the Slovak Republic, by unidentified reporter; followed by a statement by Ladislav Pittner, interior minister of the Slovak Republic, both by NARODNA OBRODA correspondents signed "am,fe;" in Bratislava on 17 January: "On Security Situation in Slovakia; the Crisis Staff Meets"]

[Text] [NARODNA OBRODA] Colonel Jaroslav Svechota is the chief of the crisis staff of the Interior Ministry of the Slovak Republic. The members of the staff met for the first time yesterday [17 January] at 4:00 am [0300 GMT]. What measures were adopted?

[Svechota] We concentrated above all on maintaining regular operation of industry, health care, shops, and transport. It is very demanding but also unavoidable. At the same time, we adopted measures that persons of Arab origin currently staying in our territory without a valid visa be advised of that fact. We are trying to prevent their getting involved in any activity irreconcilable to the position of a foreigner in our territory.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Where is the situation most difficult for you?

[Svechota] Undoubtedly in Bratislava. It is a location of an international airport, a large chemical complex, central bodies, and foreign representation.

[NARODNA OBRODA] What kind of increase in the number of security staff have your measures necessitated?

[Svechota] As of this morning, even those employees of the ministry who normally are not on regular duty are present. I do not want to talk about any other numbers.

[NARODNA OBRODA] There are also many students from Arab countries in Bratislava. Are they unusually active?

[Svechota] We have not noticed any extraordinary activity. I listened to interviews with some of them on the radio, and I was surprised by their negative reaction to our aid to Kuwait.

[NARODNA OBRODA] We assume that you have more information than just from the radio....

[Svechota] Certainly we do, but so far I cannot speak about it for security reasons.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Just before the session of the Defense Council of the Slovak Republic called for the evening hours by Vladimir Meciar upon his return from Prague, Ladislav Pittner, interior minister of the Slovak Republic, told us:

[Pittner] Thus far, no terrorist activity has been registered. Three Arab citizens were heard talking of a missile

near a certain community. The circumstances are being investigated, but a provocation cannot be excluded. Our agents detained an Arab citizen who apparently had Semtex with detonators in a children's chocolate "surprise egg". We will provide information on further results of our work.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 21 January on page 1, under the headline "No Need To Fear," published a correction to the above Pittner statement by Major Jaroslav Pilat, press secretary of the Interior Ministry of the Slovak Republic: "It is a case of illegal possession of armament by our citizen who was found in possession of explosive Semtex in the size of an egg, rather than concealed in the children's chocolate 'surprise egg' as the public was informed."]

Slovaks Prepared To Stand Firm on Tax Matters

AU2301123391

[Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 17 January on pages 1 and 5 carries a 1,400-word interview with Rudolf Filkus, Slovak minister for economic strategy, by Tatiana Repkova entitled "We Need Our Own Fiscal Policy." The interview, the place and date of which are not given, deals with a document on the "economic strategy for Slovakia until 1992" which Filkus' ministry submitted to the Slovak government in December 1990.

According to the minister, the aim of this document is to "show ways of creating an environment conducive to the assertion of the market mechanism." The document subdivides the period in question into three stages: the first half of 1991, which will be marked by a "price shock"; the second half of 1991, "the stage of adaptation of the economy," which will be marked by falling production, growing unemployment, and the process of privatization; and the year 1992, "toward the end of which the third stage should start—economic recovery." The document expects the rate of unemployment to peak in late 1991 and early 1992, when it could reach 8 percent. It should start falling again in the second half of 1992, with the start of economic recovery.

Asked why he believes that recovery will start at that point, Filkus replies: "Thanks to the privatization process and, above all, thanks to consumers' behavior and the relationship between supply and demand. Demand will fall in the second stage and producers will have to see to it that they sell their products." The "inflow of foreign capital" is also expected to play a significant role. Moreover, Filkus' ministry proposes various forms of tax relief to stimulate the creation of new jobs. This tax relief should be granted to "enterprises that will be privatized and that will have a foreign stake in ownership." In this context, Filkus indicates the possibility of a conflict with the federal government over the taxation issue. This passage reads:

[Repkova] "When can we expect the above [tax relief] measures?

[Filkus] "We intend to present them in the government as soon as possible. But there could be a problem here: What if this causes a differentiated taxation of profits in Slovakia and in the Czech lands?

[Repkova] "Should Slovakia not determine these matters independently, all the more so as the Slovak unemployment rate is expected to be twice the Czech rate and as Slovakia will have to cope with it on its own?

[Filkus] "This is exactly our line of reasoning.

[Repkova] "In other words, we shall uphold these proposals even if a different decision were to be made on the federal level?

[Filkus] "Indeed, that is what we want to do."

In his concluding remarks, Filkus justifies the recent decision of the Slovak government to slow the pace of conversion of the Slovak arms industry. He says that conversion cannot be carried out "overnight" but must be a "longer-term process." He also claims that there is "interest in these products" abroad.

Gal Opposes VPN's Change to Political Party

AU2201103391

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 14 January on page 2 publishes a 600-word statement made by Fedor Gal, chairman of the Public Against Violence (VPN) Council, on the "Radio Journal Extra" program of Bratislava radio on 13 January. In the statement, Gal voices his opposition to any "fundamental metamorphosis" of the VPN before it has fulfilled its election program, which the VPN formulated as a civic movement and not as a political party, and before the start of the election campaign for the next parliamentary elections. He himself and people of his "type," he says, have "no desire to become members of a political party." Gal continues: "I would be, therefore, very careful in laying down the obligation of individual membership in the VPN movement. I believe that we would lose at least 50 percent of our activists and supporters if we were to become a political party tomorrow. And that would be a terrible loss."

Gal also stresses the VPN's responsibility for the solution of specific problems of the Slovak society (privatization, unemployment, economic reform and its social repercussions) and regards the arguments about the movement's "structure, discipline, membership, and a change of its name" as irrelevant in this context.

Radical VPN 'Faction' Meets on Future

AU2301130591 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 17 Jan 91 p 13

[Milan Zitny article reprinted from RESPEKT No. 3: "The Future of the Public Against Violence Movement"]

[Text] A meeting involving several Public Against Violence [VPN] movement members, who may be defined as representatives of a radical political stream that emphasizes national interests, was held in Banska Bystrica a few days ago. This so-called Trnava Group—named after the city where it held its first meeting last October—very emphatically expressed its dissatisfaction with the movement's development and orientation and with the lax attitude of the VPN Coordinating Center toward urgent political issues (these include the hyphen in our state's name, the negative stance toward the Slovak National Party and its activities, the preparation of the language law and attitudes toward the Matica Slovenska [Slovak Heritage Foundation] version, the attitude toward the Matica Slovenska chairman, internal democracy within the movement, and so on). The faction has submitted its critical conclusions and suggestions for a solution to the Coordinating Center. However, according to a statement made by one of the meeting's participants, no reply has been received. The Banska Bystrica meeting intended to evaluate the Coordinating Center's attitude toward the Trnava Group. At the same time, it meant to agree upon a candidate to take part in the election of a new VPN chairman, who should be elected at the movement's republican assembly this February. It seems that the hottest—and unopposed—favorite for this post is Prime Minister Meciar. An offensive in his support is being conducted on several fronts. One of these is the daily NARODNA OBRODA where Igor Cibula, the commentator on domestic political events, has several times defined this tendency as the only possible solution for the successful development of the VPN and Slovakia. If we analyze the results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Bratislava Center for Research Into Social Problems, we can see that Prime Minister Meciar is far more popular than the other political personalities in Slovakia. Therefore, it is more than likely that there will be changes in the VPN leadership. The overall composition of the VPN Council will also change to the disadvantage of its current members who are well known for their liberal views.

V. Meciar's path toward the movement's most senior post is, in essence, possible in two ways. Either the assembly votes to change the articles in favor of directly electing the chairman or the assembly elects those people onto the council who will provide a guarantee that the council will elect Meciar. The moment the Slovak prime minister becomes the most senior representative of the VPN movement, he will begin to shape it in accordance with his views. He will thus attract a number of supporters, will gain broad support for his policy, and will change the unfavorable results of the local elections. The movement's name will also be changed; however, the most significant change will be in the attitude of the VPN Federal Assembly Deputies' Club toward its coalition partner the Civic Forum. Judging by experiences so far, it is unlikely that mutual relations between the most senior Civic Forum representative and the new VPN leader would improve.

Slovak Measures To Prevent Economic Crisis

LD2401063991 Prague CTK in English 0046 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Bratislava Jan 23 (CTK)—The Slovak Government Economic Council approved here today a package of measures to prevent crisis phenomena during the implementation of the economic reform in Slovakia, Slovak Deputy Premier Jozef Kucerak told journalists.

The measures include state support for stabilization of enterprises, breaking the monopoly position of the trade sector, setting a subsistence level and others, Kucerak said. He added that they should not be interpreted as a return to central-command economy.

Listing adverse phenomena in the Slovak economy, he mentioned especially the internal debt of enterprises which now stands at 18,000 million crowns.

Speaking about the delay in the privatization of shops, services and small business in Slovakia, so-called small privatization, Kucerak said it is due to the belated passing of appropriate laws and a slow pace in setting up privatization commissions. The law on "small privatization" became effective at the beginning of this year, but the first auctions will take place only on February 22. In the Czech lands, auctions start this week.

Slovak Government Approves Security Measures

AU2301153291 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Jan 91 p 3

[Alena Melicharkova, Jan Fuele report: "Government of the Slovak Republic Calls on Citizens To Be Attentive and Alert"]

[Excerpts] The eruption of the volcano of war in the Persian Gulf has also had an impact on yesterday's session of the Slovak Republic government. As Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar was participating in a session of the CSFR Defense Council, the session was chaired by Jan Carnogursky, first deputy prime minister of the Slovak Republic. The session was attended by Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council.

At the outset of the meeting, members of the government were briefed about measures of the Slovak Republic Ministry of Interior against possible terrorism in our territory from Arab citizens who arrived in Czechoslovakia in the last few days with forged passports. Important buildings are being guarded, such as the Slovak National Council and Slovak Republic Government buildings and consulates, particularly those of countries that supported the UN Security Council call for anti-Iraqi measures. Suspicious persons are under observation. [passage omitted] The protection of civil defense warehouses, ammunition depots, and similar facilities has been ensured. Mass meetings and events are being called off to avert needless threat.

Jan Carnogursky, first deputy prime minister of the Slovak Republic, said that individual ministries, too, have adopted protective measures of their own. Most large health care facilities and health offices are in a state of heightened alert to be able to intervene in due time and contain possible sources of contagion or other forms of contamination. The Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic is ready to isolate suspicious elements and some prisoners who are mentally unstable or have a tendency to imitate terrorist acts, should any occur. The Ministry of Industry attends to the protection of important factories, especially those where a terrorist assault might cause material damage or endanger the environment. Similarly, churches, too, are under protection, as are sources of water and water reservoirs, silos, and large food warehouses. These measures should minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack. At the same time the government appealed to citizens to be extraordinarily alert and attentive and to inform the police force in due time about everything [suspicious].

Although the government session was repeatedly interrupted by the latest news on the situation in the Persian Gulf and in our country, it dealt in great detail also with the planned items on its agenda. It approved 200 million korunas in repayable financial assistance for the Prievidza brown coal mines. Other measures [in support of coal mines] will follow as this year's loss of the brown coal mines in Slovakia could otherwise reach approximately one billion korunas. [passage omitted]

The Slovak Republic government discussed several possible solutions for the utilization of the Czechoslovak section of the Gabcikovo hydroelectric power project. In view of the Hungarian Republic's negative stand on the completion of the system of dams in accordance with the valid international agreement, groups of experts have drafted an alternative permitting the completion of the project as a separate entity on Czechoslovak territory alone, without participation by the Hungarian side. The government assigned, among other things, the task of consulting with the ministries and organizations, concerned with the aim of minimizing ecological risks, on the technical aspects of this alternative. The delay in the operation of the system of Danube dams causes an annual loss of 3.5 billion korunas to the Czechoslovak side. [passage omitted]

Slovak Government Demands Completion of Dam

AU2101143491 Prague CTK in English 2201 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Bratislava Jan 17 (CTK-Pentag)—The Slovak government today presented for final expertise a proposal which recommends that the Gabcikovo project on the Danube on Slovak territory be completed.

Addressing a news conference here Slovak Minister of Forestry and Water Economy Viliam Oberhauser said that the Slovak Government also decided to calculate the damage caused to the Slovak side by Hungary's withdrawal from the agreement on the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros water-dam system. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar will probably raise this issue during his visit to Hungary.

The Slovak minister said that the completion of the Gabcikovo project, planned for 1993, will require some 6,450 million korunas. He added that this is a provisional solution and that the Slovak government will continue talks with Hungary on the completion of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project from which Hungary has withdrawn unilaterally.

Official on Pact Withdrawal, CSFR Ties

AU2401104191 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Bab, head of the Analytical Department at the Foreign Ministry, by Tibor Ferko; place and date not given: "Whom Does It Benefit?"— first paragraph is NARODNA OBRODA introduction]

[Text] The summit meeting involving representatives from the three Central European states has been somewhat delayed; however, the questions that I asked Ivan Bab, head of the Analytical Department at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry shortly before the original date of the meeting have lost none of their topicality.

[Ferko] Czechoslovakia has come up with an initiative—either to speed up the process for ending the Warsaw Pact's activity or to withdraw from it immediately—intended to signify reciprocal action for the military intervention in Lithuania. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was recently in Hungary, has reacted dubiously to this intention several times. Obviously, the issue will be discussed at the meeting involving the foreign ministers of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. What is the Hungarian point of view?

[Bab] We consider it ill-advised for one country to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. This would just be a political gesture. We have not forgotten that there are still tens of thousands of Soviet troops in these countries. Withdrawal from the Pact is a political decision and will have a rational significance when Soviet troops withdraw from all three countries. We think that withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact is the final aim of a single process. This must be preceded, however, by the complete withdrawal of troops and by the complete dismantling of the organization's political structure. The ending of the Pact's validity should also correspond to international legal norms.

[Ferko] Prior to the important high-level talks, Tamas Katona, a Foreign Ministry state secretary, implied in an interview for MAGYAR HIRLAP that extremist manifestations in Slovakia correspond to the Slovak Government's views and policy aims. Everyone knows, however, that not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in Hungary, these phenomena belong to the dimension of democratic freedoms. Whom does this benefit?

[Bab] In view of the fact that there is freedom of the press in our countries, newspapers and journalists write what they want. Extreme views also crop up and, regrettably, manifest themselves in Slovakia and Hungary. It is necessary to very clearly separate statements made by politicians and government representatives from what is written by journalists. A very important process worthy of attention is taking place in Czechoslovakia. This is happening, for example, in legislation. Your political representatives have taken a decisive step in a direction toward European legal integration and, by its adoption, have helped to resolve the problems connected with the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. This is unequivocally positive. I personally feel that unfriendly articles in the Slovak and Hungarian press should not be corroborated. It is necessary to dwell on the positive phenomena that undoubtedly exist in Czechoslovak legislature and in its politicians' activity.

[Ferko] I absolutely agree with you; however, the recriminations were made by a state secretary and not by a journalist.

[Bab] I cannot say anything other than what I have already said. Do not ask me to get involved in polemics.

Foreign Affairs Committee Views NATO, Baltics

LD2301204591 Budapest MTI in English 1950 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 23 (MTI)—In its Wednesday Session, the Foreign Affairs Committee of parliament approved a draft resolution concerning the North Atlantic Assembly's recent offer for granting the status of "associate member" to Hungary. Last November, the London session of the NATO parliament was attended by a Hungarian delegation, headed by Alajos Dornbach, deputy speaker of parliament.

The draft resolution sets great store by the initiative of the NATO parliament, and emphasizes that deepening relations with the various organizations of European integration are indispensable for Hungary's alignment with Europe. The draft proposes that parliament should pass a resolution on accepting associate membership in the North Atlantic Assembly.

Commenting on the draft, Alajos Dornbach said associate membership would mean that Hungary would have the right to attend and make proposals at the sessions of the General Assembly and its special committees but would not have the right to vote.

Reporting on his Monday meeting with his Czechoslovak and Polish counterparts, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky said that the trilateral summit, originally scheduled for Monday, had had to be postponed since Polish President Lech Walesa wished to pay his first official visit to the Vatican, giving his first trip abroad symbolic meaning by visiting the pope. Jeszenszky said that the foreign ministers had not linked the affair of the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty with the tragic Baltic events. In their joint statement, the foreign ministers expressed total sympathy with the aspirations of the Baltic peoples. Jeszenszky said the central European states felt responsibile that there should be no rollback in the Soviet Union.

Concerning the special session of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee (PCC), which was postponed previously, Jeszenszky said that a date in the middle of march would still be acceptable. Should the meeting fail to take place by that time, the central European states will consider other solutions, he said.

If it is in any way difficult for the Soviet leadership to attend the PCC session, then even a meeting on a lower level would be acceptable, Jeszenszky said.

Earlier, the Committees of Defence and Foreign Affairs held a joint session. Gyorgy Balogh (Independent Smallholders' Party), and chairman of the Defence Committee, told MTI that the committees heard a report on the international military policy situation by Brigadier General Janos Kovacs, head of Hungary's military intelligence.

Compiled on the basis of information provided by the Hungarian military attaches, the report concluded that Hungary was not threatened by any external danger at all. The Hungarian military intelligence does its job appropriately and "keeps watch over the military policy situation of the neighbouring countries, so guaranteeing that the Hungarian people will not be exposed to any unexpected, unpleasant surprise..." [ellipses as received]

Antall Evaluates Situation in Baltics

LD2401092591 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0700 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Hungary will try to find a solution for the Baltic problem along with Czechoslovakia and Poland. According to Jozsef Antall, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw will try to work out a proposal equally acceptable for the Baltic states and the Soviet central leadership. This was said by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to journalists in Vienna after his discussions with Chancellor Vranitzky.

The Hungarian prime minister said that in evaluating the Baltic events, it must be taken into account that the Soviet Union has substantial military forces stationed in eastern Germany. It is presently not clear how far the personal role and responsibility of Mikhail Gorbachev extend in the development of the situation in the Baltics, or what effects these developments could have on perestroyka, the Hungarian prime minister said in the Austrian capital.

Foreign Minister Cancels European Visit

LD1801210891 Budapest MTI in English 1812 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 18 (MTI)—As a result of the international tensions, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky has cancelled his visit to northern Europe, scheduled for January 22-31.

His official visit to Sweden, planned for January 29-31 is uncertain as yet.

Embassy Staff To Be Maintained in Israel

LD2301112391 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] We have just received a report from Israel that affects Hungary. Hungary is not reducing the number of staff at its embassy operating in Israel. This was decided by the interdepartmental committee dealing with the Gulf crisis. A Foreign Ministry spokesman justified the decision by saying that they continue to want to maintain the present level of Hungarian-Israeli relations, and the embassy's staff must take care of the over 80 Hungarian citizens still in Israel.

Gas Masks Sold to Saudi Arabia for $24 Million

AU2401095991 Budapest MTI in English 1556 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, 21 January (MTI)—A Hungarian company has sold to a buyer in Saudi Arabia half a million gas masks, filters, and protective outfits against chemical warfare, for a total value of $24 million.

Three quarters of the gas masks sold were Soviet and Czechoslovakian-made, while a quarter of them were manufactured in Hungary.

Hungary has a peacetime capacity of 500-600,000 gas masks a year.

Minister Galszecsy on Anti-Terrorist Measures

AU2401101291 Budapest MTI in English 1118 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Report on interview with Minister Without Portfolio ANdras Galszecsy by unidentified reporter; place and date not given]

[Text] Budapest, 23 January (MTI)—Andras Galszecsy, minister without portfolio supervising the Hungarian civil secret services, replied with a firm "no" as to whether Hungary had received terrorist threats in view of the Gulf war. Galszecsy answered several questions put to him by the daily "MAGYAR NEMZET," and carried in the Wednesday issue.

In answer to whether such threats can be expected, the minister said:

"I very much hope not. I hope that the Iraqis, and those emotionally committed to the Iraqis, will see that Hungary is providing humanitarian assistance in solving the Gulf crisis."

Question: Is there a greater chance for American interests or Jewish institutions in Hungary coming under attack?

"The risk of this exists. However, we strive to guard against this. Were you to walk past the American Embassy, or the Jewish school, you would see that we are doing everything possible to avoid such risks."

Question: Have any "sleeper" terrorist agents been discovered yet?

"We are not convinced that sleepers exist in Hungary. What is more conceiveable is that efforts will be made to recruit people who arrived from the countries concerned, and who have been living here for some time."

Question: Will any restrictive measures be introduced against Iraqis and Arabs living in Hungary?

"I can't really see a general restriction being introduced. Many Arabs of all sorts live in Hungary. No-one can be suspected merely on the basis of his or her origin. In case concrete suspicion arises against someone, we shall naturally pay greater attention to that person. And if it seems the suspicion has grounds, then various things might be possible, including restrictive measures, questionning, or house searches. But I could not agree with harrassing thousands of completely innocent people and excluding them from the possibility of a normal life merely because they happen to be Arabs," Galszecsy said.

SZDSZ Views Future Tasks as 'Opposition Party'

LD2001213391 Budapest MTI in English 1746 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 20 (MTI)—The meeting of the Parliamentary group of the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) [SZDSZ], which opened in the south Hungarian town of Paks on January 18, came to an end on Sunday.

Participants discussed the tasks facing the AFD as an opposition party in the present difficult situation. They agreed that the forthcoming period would put to the test the whole system of democratic institutions. They pointed out that society found it difficult to distinguish between sacrifices which are likely to promote subsequent progress and which stem from the lack of an economic government programme, the protracted wrangling about the land law and the government's efforts at extending its power by centralization measures.

Such being the condition, the Free Democratic MPs face the special responsibility of working out a crisis-management programme, pressing for economic restructuring and pointing out the week points of the government in order to demonstrate that recovery and alternative are only conceivable within the system of democratic institutions, through the consistent economic restructuring and liberal policy represented by the Alliance of Free Democrats.

Ivan Peto was re-elected as head of AFD's Parliamentary faction.

Parliamentary Factions Disagree Over Land Issue

LD2101194191 Budapest MTI in English 1749 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 21 (MTI)—Addressing the Monday session of parliament before the commencement of the agenda, Jozsef Torgyan, head of the parliamentary group of the Independent Smallholders, Party (ISP) [FKgP], called upon the government to withdraw its compensation bill and settle the land issue on the basis of reprivatization. (Parliament declared earlier that compensation should be based on privation.)

Torgyan's address unleased a storm in the National Assembly. Viktor Orban, head of the parliamentary group of the Federation of Young Democrats, qualified it as unconstitutional. Orban accused the senior ISP politicians of supporting the attempts at seizing land illegally. Moreover, the ISP has a greater responsibility, he said, because the Ministry of Agriculture is headed by an ISP politician.

Matyas Szuros (Hungrian Socialist Party) termed it as particularly strange that law and order were violated by a governing party when some of its leaders were encouraging the arbitrary seizure of land.

Ivan Peto, head of the parliamentary group of the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) [SZDSZ], said that the speech held by the head of the parliamentary group of a governing party should in any case entail political consequences. All the more so since any amendment to the compensation bill would affect the accepted central budget.

Torgyan denied that the ISP would encourage the rural population to seize land.

Imre Konya, head of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) [MDF], termed it as unfortunate if disputes within the coalition were settled in parliament.

Addressing the debate, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall said that the government sought to maintain constitutional order under all circumstances, which was binding on all parties, including the ISP. Antall pointed out that Torgyan had not spoken on behalf of his party and parliamentary group, he rather expressed his personal opinion which was shared by a number of MPs belonging to his party.

Goncz Addresses First Congress of Roma Parliament

LD1901235291 Budapest MTI in English 2014 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 19 (MTI)—"We are facing a historic responsibility to be shouldered," Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic of Hungary, said in his address to the first congress of the Hungarian Roma parliament in Budapest on Saturday.

He pointed out that the gypsy population was divided by differences in language, social background, and other areas. The Roma Parliament aspires to help iron out the existing conflicts and facilitate action against discrimination.

Goncz warned that the gypsies have just demands, as has society towards the gypsies, and drew attention to the need for agreement between Hungarians, gypsies and the other minorities. He called it essential for the minority to adapt to the majority, and for the majority to understand the minority.

Participants in the conference noted with satisfaction that most of the Roma organizations had joined the Roma Parliament set up in December last year. The 119 delegates from 14 organizations adopted the founding

declaration qualifying the Roma Parliament as a representative social forum in charge of co-ordinating and safeguarding minority interests. It is not a party and must not serve party interests. Its sole function is to act on behalf of Romas represented by the founding organizations in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Hungary, the declaration says.

The document calls for constitutional guarantees to be given to Hungarian gypsies with regard to national minority rights, the conditions of cultural and political autonomy and the financial background to setting up national and local minority governments.

Hungary has a total population of 10.4 million, including 200,000 gypsies.

Financial Expert Queried on Economic Solutions

AU2201130991 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 15 Jan 91 p 9

[Interview with Erno Huszti, deputy director of the National Trade and Credit Bank, by Denes Kovacs; place and date not given: "Where Does the Limit of Inflation Lie?"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Excerpts] Inflation has been creeping along for years, and three years ago, it stepped over the magic limit: It went to double figures. This year, we can expect the value of our money to fall by 30-40-50 percent (?). Is it possible to determine a critical limit that inflation must not overstep? How could inflationary tendencies be dealt with, how long can they be controlled? We asked Erno Huszti, a renowned financial expert.

[Huszti] Where to draw the critical line? That depends on the population's level of tolerance, as well as on the degree of depreciation that would threaten to make the financial system unviable. It is difficult to predict when we might reach that stage. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] I presume you do not question the necessary quick and efficient implementation of an anti-inflationary policy?

[Huszti] Of course not, but people have to realize that Hungary's shortage economy, and the ensuing budgetary deficit greatly contributed to the depreciation of the forint's purchasing power. In Hungary, inflation has mainly been the result of over-distribution; domestic consumption surpassed the national income produced. Prices went up even if there was no economic reason for their increase, because people could sell anything at almost any price.

[Kovacs] Are there any financial methods to repair this unfortunate situation?

[Huszti] We cannot make any progress as long as there is not adequate harmony between our monetary and our fiscal policy. Indeed, on the one hand, the issuing bank is visibly behaving in a constructive way, but, on the other, the budget is recreating a deficit. Defying elementary textbook lessons, the budget does not adjust its spending to its income. For decades, the expenditure side has been the "independent variable," so through constant modifications of the regulating system, the state budget has been forced to deduct and centralize an increasingly great proportion of its total net income. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] Nowadays, in our economic policy, we only talk about reductions in demand. Do you think that in future, we should pursue—indeed, that we need to pursue—a policy that not only limits demand, but also stimulates supply?

[Huszti] That is a very hard question, because it is a well-known fact that the regulation of demand usually goes hand in hand with a limitation on supply, whereas the stimulation of demand is usually accompanied by an increase in revenues. Nevertheless, I think that in the interest of a better future, we should take the risk—that is, we should combine two different policies. This applies to agriculture, for example, where a supply market already exists. It would be illogical to repress this market, and to pursue such a policy; it would be advisable to clarify agricultural production conditions as soon as possible, in large-scale industries, in cooperatives, as well as in the private sphere. We may be breaking away from the concept of one-sided branches, but we do not need some sort of general stimulation. The determining factor should be whether the businesses concerned are profitable or not, irrespective of the owner of the enterprise or the branch in which it operates. At the moment, it is chiefly private producers who deserve our assistance, but there are also suitable large-scale industries, perhaps more than we think. [passage omitted]

[Huszti] We can only fight inflation if we have a supply market and a monetary policy that assists this market. Naturally, we can also apply other measures that contribute to a market economy, such as privatization, or the development of competition; this would also lead us toward economic development. I wish to add one more thing: From the point of view of supply, we should not neglect or repress those producers and suppliers who provide for domestic market needs. In fact, we should even stimulate these producers, because domestic market needs are approximately three times greater than the needs of our export markets—and this is something we often forget. Under the present difficult circumstances, we can hardly assess the positive effect that such a policy would have on the general atmosphere in this country.

Walesa, OKP Voice Concern Over Soviet Union

AU2301113691 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Jan 91 p 1

[Kazimierz Grobiewski report: "The OKP Visits the President"]

[Text] On Thursday, Lech Walesa received the Presidium of the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP] at the Belweder. They discussed, among other things, a date for the parliamentary elections.

The president said he thought that spring elections would mean a repetition of the scenario of 4 June, 1989. To win these elections and prevent any threat to democracy, one should mobilize the very same forces as in June 1989 (the OKP, the Citizens Committees, and "Solidarity,") otherwise the elections would not cause any significant changes in Parliament, he said.

The new political parties still need another few months to organize themselves, said the president. If the elections are postponed until fall, no repetition of the old scenario will occur.

After the meeting, OKP Chairman Mieczyslaw Gil said that the president would prefer a later date for the elections.

The OKP Presidium did not present any unified stance on this matter. The OKP is still debating this subject.

Senate Speaker Andrzej Stelmachowski said that there are only two possible dates for the elections; either May or near the end of October and the beginning of November.

Lech Walesa preferred the later date. "One has to give the government time to act," he said. Asked to express his opinion about the events in Lthuania, Lech Walesa said he foresaw various ways in which the situation could develop. According to the most pessimistic scenario, Lithuania is the first stage in the Soviet Union's effort to "make good the losses" in Eastern Europe, which would mean a danger to Polish statehood.

The president said he did not wish to adopt any stance until the development of the Lithuanian situation becomes clear. He said he had never recognized the Ribbentropp-Molotov Pact. The Lithuanians deserve freedom, and the only question is when and at what price, he said.

Andrzej Drzycimski, the president's spokesman, was asked during the news conference what effect the situation in the Gulf and in Lithuania has on the Soviet Union's stance concerning the withdrawal of its troops from Poland.

"The Soviet Union is making its stance increasingly inflexible," said the spokesman. "The social tension in the Soviet Union and the envisaged collapse of authority in that country are increasing Poland's anxiety about a quickest possible withdrawal of the Soviet forces. However, our demands are encountering increasing resistance. One cannot rule out the possibility that Russian generals are thinking about winning back Eastern Europe, and, as we know, it's closer to Warsaw from Vilnius than it is from Moscow."

Drzycimski stressed on behalf of the president that Wladyslaw Baka, who had just resigned from the post of president of the Polish National Bank, would be reassigned to other state duties.

Skubiszewski Comments on Soviet Troops, Baltics

LD2401105291 Warsaw PAP in English 0932 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 24: Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski talked extensively with GAZETA WYBORCZA interviewers on a number of issues: The problem of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, Poland's attitude towards and relations with Lithuania, relations with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Polish-Czechoslovak relations.

At the outset, the minister stated he was not afraid of Soviet military action against Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. "The changes have gone too far for a military action to change anything for one thing and to be tolerated by the western states, the United States in particular for another. The NATO has its place in the European security system and cannot stay indifferent vis-a-vis perils in the Central European region."

"The events in Lithuania and in other Baltic republics arouse anxiety but I believe the Soviet Union will not overstep some border of action. This is our eastern wall."

Further on the minister said there was no impasse in the negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. "There is only one sticking point - the date for pulling the Soviet troops out," said he, adding the Soviet side does not agree to complete the withdrawal by the end of this year.

"This way or another the attitude that Soviet troops will leave Poland after they are gone from Germany is unacceptable to us," said Skubiszewski, adding that Poland's relations with Europe also call for their withdrawal.

On the Baltics the minister had this to say among other things: "Sooner or later the Baltic republics will become independent but it is going to be a long process. I am afraid that sometimes they think of that in Vilnius in a simplified way. The problem cannot be settled down by one declaration on an indpendent statehood. That must take many years of effort."

Elaborating on Polish-Lithuanian relations Mr.Skubiszewski said Minister Saudargas was five times in Poland, if not more. "Never did he invite me to Lithuania. How should we understand this? The draft of a Polish-Lithuanian declaration has been prepared and that

exactly calls for talks and visits. That also calls for clarifying the situation of Polish minority. I would expect from Lithuania a broader vision, a better vision of our relations and not, let's call a spade a spade, a nationalism."

Winding up Poland's foreign minister stated this country puts much stock on the triangle Warsaw-Prague-Budapest. "We do not have any conflicts with those states," said he. "I am also all out for bilateral cooperation with Czechoslovakia: The moment will come when our strivings will be pooled," he opined.

Deputy Proposes Parliamentary Mission in Vilnius

LD2401064591 Warsaw PAP in English 0124 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—Deputy Jacek Kuron addressing today's meeting of the Democratic Union Parliamentary Caucus proposed to ask, together with the Citizens Parliamentary Caucus (OKP), the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee to create a permanent mission of the Polish Parliament in Vilnius. The mission would also maintain contacts with Riga and Tallinn.

The defence of Vilnius and the mobilization of world opinion, is at the same time a defence of Warsaw, argued Jacek Kuron who recently returned from Vilnius and Riga.

Chairman of the Democratic Union Caucus, Deputy Bronislaw Geremek told the meeting that Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski is to inform on Thursday members of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee on the opening of information bureaus of the three Baltic republics in Warsaw. However, added Geremek, the recognition of state independence of Lithuania would be a risky political step.

Daily Views Baltics-Gulf Connection

AU2301145591 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Jan 91 pp 1, 9

[Ryszard Malik commentary: "A Great Game"]

[Text] Saddam Husayn's dreams of leading the Arab world have burst like a soap bubble. The attack by the allied forces has clearly shown how inadequate Iraq's military potential is against the technological might of America and its allies. When the state of armaments of the anti-Iraq coalition was examined before the conflict, experts wondered whether there was a real possibility of using the ultramodern weapons and whether all the previously unused missiles, bombs, and technical resources would pass their test. After all, they had never been used in a war but only in war games during maneuvers. There was also concern that the 28-nation coalition gathered in the Gulf might get bogged down in disparities and misunderstandings. But it did not. The first joint operations confirm an understanding and a will to fight.

The most important question being asked by everyone today is: How long will the conflict last. In a global sense, it would be best for it to end as soon as possible. However, military scenarios have to take into account the reality of the battlefield and the behavior of the opponent. They do not have to pay too much attention to what politicians say, up to a certain point, of course.

Today the politicians are concerned. In the face of Husayn's behavior, war in the Gulf was inevitable, and everyone understands that. But there is also a threat from another direction. The bloody events in Vilnius and the threat of a military crackdown in Latvia and Estonia have convinced Western politicians how shaky is the system of cooperation established with Moscow since the end of the cold war. Mikhail Gorbachev is claiming he knew nothing about the Vilnius operation, but unfortunately, analyses show that it is no coincidence that the end of the ultimatum against Iraq and the start of the Vilnius operation have occurred at almost the same time. Also not a coincidence, and this has been called to mind recently, is the fact that in 1956 Nikita Khrushchev exploited the West's involvement in Suez to intervene in Hungary.

Therefore, many things indicate that Moscow is pursuing its policies exactly the way it used to, despite the avalanche of words about perestroyka and new thinking. The Americans are already talking of postponing the Bush-Gorbachev Moscow summit scheduled for 11 February. The U.S. President is in a difficult situation. Until now, the Americans have trusted Gorbachev. They approved an aid plan in response to the difficult food situation in the USSR and encouraged all their Western allies to help the USSR. Now what?

It is necessary to take care of the Iraq and Kuwait business as quickly as possible so one can concentrate on Europe and pay attention to the development of the situation in the USSR, say the advisers in the White House. But who can guarantee that the war with Iraq will last a short time? Despite their superiority, the military men do not want to say anything for sure. The only source of hope is the fact that everything has been proceeding according to plan so far.

A great war of nerves has commenced. Who will settle his business first? The United States in the Gulf, or the USSR on the Baltic?

Gulf 'Crisis Team' Views Safety of Poles

AU2401103591 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19-20 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Z.L. report: "Poles in the Danger Zone, Crisis Staff in the Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] Israel's attitude in the present conflict is becoming a crucial point, concluded a Friday closed meeting of a crisis team that has been formed inside the Polish Foreign Ministry.

Andrzej Majkowski, director of the Africa and Asia Department in the ministry, said that if Tel Aviv joins the war, the entire political configuration in the Middle East will certainly be changed; in particular, the mood among the Arabs will become more radical. The policy line pursued by other countries in this region will also be called into question. Right now this is mere speculation, but the Foreign Ministry draws attention to the increase in tension in the countries that are adjacent to those taking part in the Gulf conflict. So far, contacts with Amman, Damascus, and Tehran have been good. Poland has had no problems with receiving help from the neighbors of Iraq and Turkey in evacuating Polish citizens from those zones in the greatest danger.

But the situation of Polish citizens in Israel is more uncertain. There are estimated to be between 5,000 and 7,000 Poles there. The reason for the lack of an exact figure is that many Poles, working in Israel "on the side," have not extended their visas and decided to stay on in Israel illegally. In any case, many prefer not to show themselves before their final departure because the Israeli authorities are very consistent about imposing fines for not having a valid visa.

On Friday, seven persons reported to the Polish mission in Tel Aviv and asked for an immediate return to Poland, citing increasing danger as their reason. The Foreign Ministry fears these could be the first signs of panic among our citizens in Israel following Friday night's missile attack by Iraq on Israeli cities. For the time being, El Al is maintaining air links with Europe without any disruptions.

There are also disturbing signals coming from Iran. The Iranian authorities have allowed Iraqi refugees to cross the border. There are many Poles in Iranian border areas working on contracts (there are several hundred Poles throughout Iran). Some of them contacted our diplomatic facilities on Friday, asking for information about the possibility of departure. This is probably also a sign of a growing uncertainty of the future.

Assuring news, however, is coming in from the United Arab Emirates, where the mood among Poles on Friday was not too bad. The mood was also calm in Saudi Arabia. Communications with the hospital in Khalf al-Batan, where 107 Polish doctors and nurses are located, were successfully established. On 18 January, the Polish medical team was already treating the first casualties of the conflict. No sign of any military activity in the direct vicinity of the hospital, located 170 km from the Kuwaiti border, was noted.

Experienced diplomts inside the Foreign Ministry are surprised by Husayn's calm and lack of response to the allied attack. Until recently, the Iraqi leader's stormy public speeches made his Army out to be a world power. But now his silence, even with the great effectiveness of the American bombardments, is a little disturbing, says Director Majkowski.

Kaczynski on Role of Presidential Council

AU2401101991 Warsaw POLITIKA in Polish 19 Jan 91 p 4

[Interview with Jaroslaw Kaczynski, minister of state, head of the presidential office, and head of the Center Accord, by Marek Henzler; place and date not given: "Acceleration Will Come Later"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Henzler] What do you consider to be the tasks of the political section of the presidential council?

[Kaczynski] It will consist of several bureaus with a small number of staff. Nobody is trying to bend the Constitution or create a supergovernment or any other structure. The political office will ensure that the president can exert influence on the government's work and state policy. This guiding influence, as I would put it, will not have any administrative consequences, because we are not in that kind of relationship. Nevertheless, one must recognize hard facts, namely, Walesa's position as a president elected in general and democratic elections.

[Henzler] The presidential council will have a bureau for military affairs, for agriculture, for socio-economic affairs, and other matters. Is there not a danger that these structures will begin interfering in ministerial work in the same way that former departments of the Central Committee did?

[Kaczynski] Those departments had their structures at voivodship and other levels and interfered in everything. Our bureaus will only be sparsely staffed. We shall set up continuing contacts, because only they will allow us to keep an eye on policy making. As usual, one must master the important details if the president is to comment that, for example, the agricultural policy direction is wrong. The comment he makes must be thought through and point to alternative solutions. He cannot simply say he thinks that things are going badly. The same can be said for the Sejm's legislative process. External suggestions that do not impose overt constraint can be very useful. [passage omitted]

[Henzler] One of your tasks is to build a political base for Walesa. Is this still a priority now that Walesa has been elected in a general election?

[Kaczynski] Today the president is in the position of a person who is conducting a highly mobile war. At present, he does not see the need to build his own power base like, for example, a Gaullist-type party. He is talking to various politicians. Seen from the viewpoint of his election campaign supporters, he is holding surprising talks and making surprising decisions. One cannot preclude any attempt to build such a party, or even a broader coalition, but this would be in response to the appearance of unforeseen difficulties. [passage omitted]

[Henzler] What political forces support the president? The new government is composed of specialists from various parties, even from the Citizens' Movement-Democratic Action.

[Kaczynski] In the Center Accord we do not hide the fact that the Gdansk liberals bear the responsibility for the new government. It supported J. Olszewski's attempt to form a government and I supported his nomination. We only achieved limited success. We wanted a government that would effect a breakthrough and introduce more fundamental changes than J. Bielecki's government is likely to do. We are sticking to the choices made when Center Accord was born and declared its support for Walesa. We respect his decisions. We have two Center Accord specialists in Bielecki's government. We voted in favor of his government and it has our qualified support.

[Henzler] We shall soon have the Sejm elections. How is the Accord preparing for these, because at present it is only a collection of various parties and individuals.

[Kaczynski] I have said before that we are aiming to become a single party. Today I had talks with the Christian Democrats from the Christian Democratic Forum in the Center Accord. This group has the majority of Christian Democratic factions. You are right when you say, however, that we are a strange collection of parties. [passage omitted]

[Henzler] Does the Center Accord want to be one of the two pillars, namely, the right pillar of the so-called political pillars of Walesa of which he spoke last year?

[Kaczynski] You have to ask Walesa. We are pro-Walesa, but we want to build a totally separate party with its own values. A party our grandchildren can ultimately belong to. If Walesa is thinking of forming a coalition, then we think we should form one of its strongest pillars. For us, early parliamentary elections are a priority. They could be held before the pope's visit, that is, around the end of May or the beginning of June, as well as afterwards, but many better-off people who vote go on summer holidays, and an election should not be held then. That leaves the period at the end of September or beginning of October, but there are plans to extend the election period from 60 to 98 days and that means that an election could only be held at the end of 1991. We want it to take place before the pope's visit.

[Henzler] But we do not even have an electoral law.

[Kaczynski] True, but right from the start we campaigned for a mixed type, a proportional-majority version. Today this is gaining support in the Sejm. We also want to limit the number of parties who can nominate candidates. Only large parties and trade unions should have this right.

[Henzler] Why not all parties and citizens' groups?

[Kaczynski] Not citizen groups, because it would only be confusing. Similarly, not social organizations. In Poland, it is so easy to set up a party that the exclusion should not be seen as a restriction on democracy. There must be some kind of barrier.

[Henzler] Not so long ago you, TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, and Center Accord called for more pluralism in our democracy. Now you want barriers.

[Kaczynski] You have misunderstood me. My example of rules governing the creation of a party is highly theoretical. A party must support its electoral list with verifiable signatures. Today our political system is fragmented. This threatens our democracy. Democracy must have an element of rationality. If this is lacking, the Sejm will be a vast collection of mutually hostile and absurdly small parties. If this happens, the Sejm's prerogatives will shift elsewhere, for example, to the president or the government. This will be a long process or a sudden upheaval, as in Poland in 1926. We need a strong presidency on the French or Finnish lines with a strong party system of large parties. The electoral law must ensure this happens.

[Henzler] What if the Sejm refuses to dissolve itself?

[Kaczynski] This is a practical matter. According to Sejm Marshal M. Kozakiewicz, the present alignment of forces indicates it will dissolve itself. But he could be wrong and we could be faced by a problem of how to get around it? Of course, it would have to be within the law. The president, too, has some rather general prerogatives in this area and with open support from Polish society, could invoke these.

[Henzler] Would the Center Accord arrange this "social support" by organizing demonstrations outside the Sejm?

[Kaczynski] Legal demonstrations—although I would not resort to them—are accepted throughout the world as a means of exerting pressure. We could tackle the problem in another way, for example, by holding that the rejection of the self-dissolution bill infringes Poland's international obligations. [passage omitted]

[Henzler] After the Center Accord was formed, you talked of the need for acceleration. This was an important element of Walesa's campaign platform. The elections are behind us and we now have a new government. Is acceleration about to begin?

[Kaczynski] We talked about acceleration and the need to liquidate the "roundtable" agreement. The latter has almost been done. However, we still have—to use Marxist terminology—the economy in the hands of the old guard, although this is now on different principles. This group still dominates the state sector and our emergent capitalism. We reject this because it hinders the creation of a real market economy. It will also give us a Latin American-type economy. A predominant section of society rejects this. We could have an explosive situation. That is why we have to reclaim property from nomenklatura companies and finalize the replacement of

people in the state sector. I do not think Bielecki's government will go for acceleration. As a result of certain factors that are still difficult to make public, we were unable to form the government that would have accelerated things. These are complex issues and in some respects they were external. Acceleration can take place after a successful election campaign and that is what we have to concentrate on now.

[Henzler] You mention external circumstances. Was Walesa's decisionmaking sovereignty hampered in some way?

[Kaczynski] Quite simply, we have to take external realities into account. They did play an important role, although they did not limit our sovereignty. [passage omitted]

[Henzler] You have spoken in favor of a real political life based on a strong president and strong political parties. Today Walesa is forming his own political council and some politicians have called this a distortion of normal political life. What do you think?

[Kaczynski] I am not a supporter of this and the president knows this. I do understand, however, the motives that are guiding him to seek such solutions. He wants to create a forum which will admit all political forces and lower their frustration potential, which, given certain circumstances, could be dangerous. One must remember that Poland is governed by people who have a revolutionary past. In the 1970's, this group was small, isolated, and lived a clandestine existence. Nevertheless, in time, this group shook Poland to its foundations and, indirectly, the world. These kind of experiences are powerful and makes this group look at everything in minuscule detail.

[Henzler] What is to happen to the Citizens' Committee?

[Kaczynski] This is a complicated and painful matter. It would be unnatural if it were to remain attached to the president. Walesa has suggested that it be dissolved or change its character. A solution must be found. [passage omitted]

[Henzler] A new constitution is being prepared. Are the presidential powers—from a bygone political age—appropriate to the new president?

[Kaczynski] The powers are vague and will have to be clarified in the same way that the president's precise role has to be defined.

[Henzler] What other prerogatives are you considering?

[Kaczynski] Ones that would create a realistic relationship with the government. We must introduce the principle of countersigning the prime minister's decision. [passage omitted]

Walesa, Bankers Discuss Banking Reform

LD2301124591 Warsaw PAP in English 1200 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—President Lech Walesa today received Senators Zdzislaw Nowicki and Stanislaw Obertaniec representing the Bankers' Club as well as Witold Rutkowski of the NBP National Bank of Poland and Edward Zbik of the Bank Handlowy to discuss the reform of the banking system, especially the re-establishment of the Bank Polski as a central state bank regulating money flow.

The president assured the bankers he would create conditions for a banking reform in Poland.

Belorussian Union Concerned About Ministry Report

LD2301200691 Warsaw PAP in English 1828 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Bialystok, Jan. 23—The Belorussian Democratic Union expressed its concern over a confidential report by Poland's Foreign Ministry prepared in the autumn of 1990 on the political situation and relations between Poles and the Belorussian minority in the Bialystok area (northeast Poland).

The union charged that the report suggests that Belorussians are an alien body in Poland's state organism and hints that they are a political instrument of another country and consequently threaten Poland's reason of state.

"The democratic process in Poland urgently calls for the normalization of Polish-Belorussian relations in the spirit of respect and full understanding of political, economic and cultural aspirations of this part of the Belorussian nation that lives in Poland," wrote the union in its statement issued today.

The report was disclosed by Deputy Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz at a recent Sejm (lower house) session.

Bielecki Comments on New Information Policy

LD2401063891 Warsaw PAP in English 2241 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—We do not intend to directly control the press. We will try to strive for the understanding of our arguments by the journalists. We want to transmit information through journalists and not by our own propaganda instruments, Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki told PAP today, commenting on last Tuesday's meeting with President Lech Walesa devoted to the new information policy of the government.

The prime minister added that government representatives would also have to defend their reasons at meetings outside their offices with people from different professional groups.

Geremek Elected Head of Parliamentary Floor Group

LD2301222991 Warsaw PAP in English 2118 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—Bronislaw Geremek was elected head of the Democratic Union Parliamentary Floor Group today.

Deputy Senate Speaker Andrzej Wielowieyski is to be Geremek's deputy. No other candidates were named.

Miodowicz Gets Confidence Vote; Remains Chairman

AU2401111791 Warsaw PAP in English 2101 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 21—During today's session of the Presidium of the OPZZ All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions, its chairman, Alfred Miodowicz, received a vote of confidence allowing him to stay in office. Twenty-one members of the Presidium voted in favor and two abstained.

The vote was held in connection with the decision taken earlier by the Council of the Federation of Miners' Unions to indefinitely suspend its OPZZ membership as well as charges that the OPZZ leader had devoted too much attention to politics while neglecting the protection of working people.

The Presidium came out with an initiative of meeting with the Council of the Miners' Unions Federation and stressed that suspension of membership was not envisaged by the OPZZ statute.

The OPZZ Presidium also adopted an agenda of topics to be discussed with the government on January 23, the most important being the principles of further privatization, main directions of social policy with emphasis on unemployment, and changes in the state's financial policy.

Government, Trade Unions Hold Talks

LD2301142691 Warsaw PAP in English 1354 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—Poland's Government and All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ) are holding talks on wages and social issues.

After the talks Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and OPZZ leader Alfred Miodowicz said that despite different approach to the excessive wage tax, the government and OPZZ would continue talks. They also agreed to set up a joint team for work related to pay and social welfare.

Report Presented on Tirgu Mures Ethnic Strife

AU2301211891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1859 GMT 23 Jan 91

["Parliamentary Diary: Report of the Commission Inquiring Into the Tirgu Mures Events"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 23/1/1991—Analysing the general and specific causes of the events, the document shows inter alia:

The inter-ethnic relations in Transylvania have deteriorated against the background of a multiple historical inheritance:

a) The keeping alive in the collective memory (in a latent state and periodically revived) of conflictual moments and situations in the past centuries when, in the historic context of Romanians' oppression in Transylvania, the Hungarian domineering class benefited by a privileged socioeconomic, political and cultural status;

b) The period spanning 1918-1940, marked by real prospects for peaceful and constructive co-existence between Romanians and Hungarians, firmly opened by the December 1, 1919 proclamation of Alba Iulia, the provisions of which were not integrally included in the 1923 constitution;

c) Horthy's occupation (1940-1944) of northern Transylvania following the Vienna Award, marked by atrocities specific to the fascist-type regimes, which produced a maleficient stratum in the people's memory in the sphere of Romanian-Hungarian relations;

d) The totalitarian communist period in which the inter-ethnic relations in Transylvania have traversed all variants of crisis: from those generated by the application of the Stalinist-proletarian internationalism to those engendered by an exacerbating nationalism marked by the cult of Ceausescu's personality which inevitably led to baleful consequences for the conservation of national identity of the ethnic minorities in Romania.

Specific and vital organizations in any present-day democratic state either did not exist (a special intelligence service, for instance), underwent a serious power crisis (police, learning institutions, and others) or acquired new functions (the mass media) characteristic of a democracy before the prerequisites it needed should have become an effective reality.

The principle of depoliticalization of vital institutions to ensure the order of law (like the police) has not been consistently applied, and the creation and activity for several months of "groups of pressure" in the Army have contributed to making the new power fragile, thus indirectly stimulating the destabilization of the country.

The statistical survey shows that in the period after the December revolution the relationship between the Romanian and Hungarian executives has changed only a bit at the level of Mures County, as the Romanians are well represented, while the Hungarians underrepresented considering their share in the county's population.

The "detonator" of the crisis in a first stage lay in the changes produced in the learning units with tuition in Hungarian that had been seriously affected by the administrative measures taken by the dictatorial regime in the last few decades. The passage to the reorganization of the learning network without considering all its implications and difficulties, and without a constructive political dialogue between representatives of the Romanian and of the Hungarian population were conducive to wrong procedures and, consequently, to open conflicts. Both sides, feeling deeply affected in their national sentiments, turned this problem into a battlefield thus resorting to street pressure as well. Neither the Ministry of Education nor the cultural and political groupings in the area grasped on time the decisive importance of a prudent policy, of understanding and conciliation. That is why action was not taken on time and, when it was, it was inconsistent.

On the one hand, the claim for separation in the sphere of education generated anxiety and rejection in certain Romanian intellectual media, while in the given collective psycho-social context the reason was not minor: such a separation could be interpreted as only "one step" which would have particularly serious consequences: after cultural separation, the political and administrative one would inevitably follow.

The large gap between the previous stifling of people's aspirations and the suddenly won freedom as well as certain shortcomings in democratic culture and in adequate civic behaviour of all socioprofessional categories (another aftermath of the totalitarian communist inheritance) are causes of the chain of extremist manifestations in the last few months.

In this specific sociohistorical context one can understand why the violence taken on (in the areas with preponderantly Hungarian population) by the clashes with some of the exponents of the repressive apparatus of the dictatorial regime (December 21 and 22, 1989 was used as an element that incited the nationalistic state of mind. [no closing parentheses as received]

However, the inquiry commission established most rigorously that both Romanians and Hungarians from the personnel in the Ministry of the Interior in counties (Harghita and Covasna) with preponderantly Hungarian population fell victims to such revenges. Nevertheless, similar violent clashes occurred in settlements in the counties with preponderantly Romanian population (in Cugir, for instance, Alba County). These data do not exclude a potential implication of chauvinistic reasons accompanied sometimes by the negative socio-administrative role of the respective victims. Starting from the aforesaid atrocities, which were few but marked

by "street pathology" as well as from the tension specific to December 21 and 22, 1989, states of "anti-Hungarian psychosis" have emerged.

The tension in the inter-ethnic relations mounted also following the inciting action of external elements interested in compromising the chances for building a climate of understanding. The coincidence between the events in Tirgu Mures and the end of the election campaign in Hungary made certain political groupings in that country develop anti-Romanian nationalistic reasons which were resonant in the state of mind in Romania.

Such destabilizing sources of instigation were also used as the introduction of substantial quantities of books from Hungary, some of them with an anti-Romanian content, and the arrival in Romania of a large number of Hungarian citizens to mark March 15 (the beginning of the Hungarian revolution in 1848) when Hungarian flags were hoisted at various monuments. These facts affected the population in Transylvania, Mures County included.

On the other hand, Romanian publications and political groupings tended to extend the responsibility for the irredentist propaganda of part of the Hungarian emigration to the majority Hungarian population in Romania. So, for instance, anti-Ceausescu manifestos of the Hungarian emigration in the U.S.A. dated 1988 were sent to the country by some of the Romanian emigration's circles as being anti-Romanian manifestos launched in 1990. These circles' letter sent to the country is telling through its xenophobia, inciting character. Such a mystifying act was unfortunately published in a press organ ("CUVINTUL LIBER") of Tirgu Mures on the eve of March 15.

The departure of a great number of teaching staff of Romanian nationality from Covasna and Harghita County was another factor of disquietude. Such a situation was due, on the one hand, to the discriminatory policy of the dictatorial regime that aimed at making the distribution of Hungarian nationality graduates in the above-mentioned counties heavier. So, starting 1985, owing to the system of distributing graduates by university centres, only graduates of Romanian nationality were distributed to those counties, thus tearing them off from their family milieu.

On the other hand, such a departure was also due to the hastened decision of the Ministry of Education which canceled in fact the obligation of serving for three years the unit whereto they were distributed. Taking advantage of such a decision issued by the ministry as well as of the fact that the reduction of teaching norms in the middle of the school year had made jobs available in several localities in the country, part of the teaching staff of Romanian nationality, more particularly from among those who had more recently graduated from faculty, wished to return to their native places. Undoubtedly, the determination of certain teachers and other persons of Romanian origin was accompanied by the moral and psychic tension exerted over them in some settlements with preponderantly Hungarian population.

The profanation of Avram Iancu's statue in Tirgu Mures and the destruction of Nicolae Balcescu's statue in Sovata were provocations with particularly baleful effects also because the police inquiry into the events to establish the culprits was superficial and could not clear up the lawbreakers' national origin. Furthermore, the official reaction of some representatives of the Hungarian minority to sincerely and firmly condemn such provocative acts and show their respect for the significance of such Romanian national symbols had not the due impact on dissipating suspicions. Concurrently, the Hungarian population felt assaulted when the inscriptions in the Hungarian, inclusive of street names, were wiped out after they were written in accordance with a decision of the local PNUC (Provisional National Unity Council).

Against the background of such a climate of mutual suspicion and hostility, the scope the Hungarian population in Transylvania gave to the anniversary of March 15 was seen by certain Romanian media as an irredentist demonstration. Taking into account the fact that the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania viewed the anniversary of March 15 under the sign of reconciliation between Romanians and Hungarians, it would have been necessary, owing to the obviously mounting tension, to widely publish the reasons for and historical data of the event, as well as to prepare the festive program through joint cooperation. This was all the more necessary as the programmatic proclamation of the Pest revolution of March 15, 1848 also included an item (No. 12) which envisaged Transylvania's union with Hungary. It would have also been necessary to consider other correlations of this event with the Romanians' 1848, revolution in Transylvania apt to generate both resentments and rational attitudes with the Romanian population.

The handling of information was a destabilizing element and a decisive factor of the inter-ethnic political crisis in Tirgu Mures. An example is offered by the accident with the "Trabant" car tendentiously commented in the local mass media through an "Appeal" launched by the "Vatra Romaneasca" Union. Without waiting for the result of the legal bodies' investigation, the press immediately stated it was a premeditated act against the Romanian population. The penal investigation established other correlations: the culprit was drunk, his wife is of Romanian extraction and in the car, beside him, there was a Romanian colleague.

The last significant conflict in this stage was an authorized demonstration on learning institutes, inscription in Hungarian throughout the city, and with other violent acts.

Alongside residents of the municipality and of other towns and communes in the county, acquaintances and political leaders participated both in the Hungarian

demonstration (on March 19 and 20) and in the Romanian one, who came here in various stages, alerted by their relatives phone calls. The Romanians came between 5 and 6 p.m., while the Hungarians, after 7 p.m.. Most of them came by buses and trucks without letting their managers know about it. However, there are testimonies showing that is was an organized action in which mayors and other public functionaries from a number of communes in the county were implicated.

The conclusion of this document is worded as follows:

Romania's Parliament and the national public opinion both under the sign of the deepest and most genuine pluralism are at a crossroads: they either embark upon the difficult path of real democratic recovery of Romania from the European perspective of the 90s, or feed recurrent anachronical social national phenomena which, several times this century, have proved their damaging and bankrupt nature from a national point of view. These are our alternatives—we express our hope that we shall be able to choose that variant leading to the development of the bases of a democratic life in Romania, to the triumph of the good.

Speaking about the significance of the crisis for the post-totalitarian evolution of the Romanian society, the report mentions three variants: 1) a symptom of the difficult but firm path towards a democratic political regime or, on the contrary; 2) a symptom of the deadlock of such a necessary evolution; 3) or, even more, a symptom of the perpetuation (or recurrence) of the tendencies of reinstating (at least partially) the old totalitarian methods and objectives.

Considering the above question and the three variants of its answer as the "keystone" of the whole analysis, the inquiry commission is of the opinion that two diametrically opposed variants should be outlined in the process of working out the strategies concerning inter-ethnic relations:

Either it is understood and accepted that the transition to an authentically democratic political regime implicitly presupposes a "toll" that was to be paid, and in this case, the Parliament's optics, attitude respectively vis-a-vis the Tirgu Mures crisis acquires the seriousness, lucidity and civic responsibility so necessary at present;

Or the inherent character of the "toll" to be paid in the transition to democracy is rejected, and in this case a subjective social-political optics is developed which amplifies civic illusions, confusion and fears, all becoming the main raw material for factors that can, but do not understand, or do not want to restrict the sphere and pace of zonal or national politically destabilizing processes.

In the comission's opinion Parliament must opt for the first variant which it considers the only alternative that accords with the truth and with the requirements of the furtherance of the fight for democracy by exclusively democratic means and forms.

The final chapter of the report dwells on the strategic functions of the first variant and on the main operational landmarks such a strategy presupposes.

Such functions are meant to prevent and solve inter-ethnic conflicts by neutralizing the factors that generated, fed and may still generate crises; to turn the social, political and cultural arena of inter-ethnic relations into a decisive factor for post- revolutionary Romania's democratic development and into a criterion by which to estimate the general democratization degree of society.

As for the operational landmarks implied by such a strategy, a list is made of disputed problems, stages and solutions, as well as parliamentary action against any form of disinformation including initiation of a bill thereon and the creation of a standing joint working group of the two chambers to be assigned, inter alia, "vigilant" tasks of the "Helsinki Watch" type.

Pleading for a wide reconciliation of Romanians and Hungarians, the report considers that rights should be gradually given to the Hungarian minority lest such rights should be felt by the Romanian population as privileges or as an attempt to the Romanian nation's status.

Documentary Sources Provided

AU2301161291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1017 GMT 23 Jan 91

["Report of the Commission Inquiring Into the Tirgu Mures Events"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 23/1/1991—The document specifies the following documentary sources used for the report:

The data supplied by the fact-finding mission made up of N.S. Dumitru and Attila Verestoy, members of the Provisional National Unity Council [PNUC], sent to this end by the PNUC Executive Bureau to Tirgu Mures on March 19;

Information given by the members of the inquiry commission during meetings of the Executive Bureau as well as during sessions of the Provisional National Unity Council as they were in the respective sessions' shorthands;

Documents on the events in Tirgu Mures presented by members of the "Vatra Romaneasca" Union;

"Chronology of the events in Tirgu Mures" made up by the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania;

The documents presented by the Provisional National Unity Council in Tirgu Mures Municipality and Mures County;

The documents presented by the Ministry of the Interior;

The documents presented by the Mures County Prosecutor's Office and by the General Prosecutor's Office;

The report forwarded by the minister of national defence to the chairman of the Provisional National Unity Council;

The documents presented by the Education Commission of the Provisional National Unity Council on the measures the Ministry of Education promoted in reorganising the education system in Transylvania—over February-June 1990;

The report forwarded on June 11, 1990 from the personal initiative of Professor Ion Manzatu, deputy chairman of the Executive Bureau of the Provisional National Unity Council but which was not analysed, in its original form, in the plenum of the inquiry commission;

The "Helsinki Watch" report elaborated by Holly Cartner and published in May 1990 by the "Helsinki Watch" American Committee;

The "Mission Report" elaborated by a mission of the International Human Rights Federation sent to Romania over April 21-26, 1990 at the request of two of its Leagues for Human Rights Safeguarding, the League in Hungary and the League in Romania.

The report considers as a characteristic feature of the events in Tirgu Mures the fact that they had taken place against the background of complex processes and accidental situations. Each event of this conflict directly and differently affects the sensibility and perception of their own interests by the two sides involved. Three specific factors of the post-revolutionary period contribute to it: a) the existence of organisations and leaders that distort the facts and increase their reverberation in each side's opinion; b) sudden increase of the population's interest in the ideological-political aspect of interethnical relations which also comprises human current relations—work relations, relations of neighbourhood, and so forth; c) the growing of suspicion and intolerance which become the inherent rule and even an organical need of many persons.

The analysis of these events emphasises the increasing tension in their evolution and the appearance of stages characteristic for political crises.

The report distinguishes four stages in the evolution of that crisis:

The accumulation of the premises for interethnical tensions and the escalation of ideological confrontations generated by various social and cultural situations and attitudes with different reverberation among the Romanian and Hungarian population—January-February 1990;

The appearance of forms of physical aggression but without the involvement of collective agents—end of February-mid-March.

The climax of the crisis the March 19-20 events marked by physical aggression when large social groups were involved which belonged to the two national communities as well as to the population in other localities in Mures County;

The lessening of the crisis and the transition to equilibrium and reconciliation—March 21-31.

PRSh Leader Criticizes Report

AU2301161491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0953 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 23/1/1991—Professor Ion Manzatu set forth on the television his stand on the report of the parliamentary commission set up to inquire into the 19 and 20 March events in Tirgu Mures.

The leader of the Republican Party [PRSh] motivated his address in his capacity as chairman of that inquiry commission set up by the Executive Bureau of the Provisional National Unity Council.

He assessed the report as "bulky, with well structured annexes" but comprising only "part of information." In his opinion the material presented on 16 January before Parliament cannot be considered a report, it is rather an "essay," a theoretical study which does not clarifies things.

"I think that the task of Romania's legitimate Parliament is to ask the restoration of the truth. The report should not be presented as an essay which harms the nation's interests," Professor Manzatu emphasised.

Prosecutor General on Report on 13-15 June Events

AU1801160591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1233 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Report on interview with Prosecutor General Ulpiu Popa by unidentified reporter; place and date not given]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 18/01/1991—"I think nobody has any interest in concealing the truth" said Romania's Prosecutor General Ulpiu Popa Cherecheanu while referring, in an interview with the daily "DIMINEATA", to the report on the 13-15 June events, recently submitted to Parliament. He rejected the accusations brought by the parliamentary opposition group involved in the compilation of the report and expressed his conviction that the report would be duly completed and forwarded to the international fora concerned in the shortest possible time.

He insisted that, on the strength of the present regulations, the prerogatives of the Prosecutor's Office are entirely different from those of the Prosecutor's Office are entirely different from those of Ministry of the Interior and of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). "For this reason, the cooperation between the three institutions in furnishing relevant information to the parliamentary commission investigating into the 13-15 June 1990 events was not even once considered".

"It must be made very clear that the scanning of the whole socio-political context of the June, 1990 events does not fall in the prosecutor's line of duty, nor in that of the judicial bodies generally speaking. Their exclusive concern is to establish breaches of law and hold the culprits responsible", concluded the prosecutor general.

Two Reports on 13-15 June Investigation Drawn Up

AU2301110091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0726 GMT 23 Jan 91

["Parliamentary Diary: Controversy over the 13-15 June 1990 Events"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/1/1991—The parliamentary commission including senators and deputies of the main political forces represented in parliament, set up to investigate into the 13-15 June, 1990 events that caused casualties and great material damage could not reach common conclusions as to their causes, effects and liabilities.

Consequently, the Council of Europe could only be presented with preliminary conclusions, in two versions—one of the parliamentary majority of the National Salvation Front [FSN] and other parties and the other reflecting the viewpoint of the opposition parties.

The former is signed by 11 FSN senators and deputies plus one deputy for each of the other subscribing parties: the Agrarian Democratic Party, the Romanian National Unity Party and the minorities, other than Hungarian. The latter is endorsed by one social-democrat, three liberals, two Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania deputies and one National Peasant Party deputy.

The considerations of the two documents are obviously different and sometimes contradictory. The former makes the final remark that these preliminary reports and the final one will form the substance of the recommendations on the strength of which the Parliament and the government will decide on the measures they deem fit to avert recurrence of such events.

FSN Conclusions Presented

AU2301111491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0806 GMT 23 Jan 91

["Parliamentary Diary Conclusions of the Representatives of the National Salvation Front and of Other Political Parties in the Parliamentary Commission for Investigating the Events on June 13-15"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/1/1991—The document says, inter alia, that the events on June 13-15 were favored by certain circumstances, such as : Features characteristic of the period of transition from the communist totalitarian state to the state of law, marked, like in all the other countries in Eastern Europe, by social convulsions and tensions; the provisional character of the political power between the 20 May elections and the investiture of the new statal institutions.

The report goes on as follows:

Certain forces have constantly tried to replace the political balance subsequent to the formation of the Provisional National Unity Council, with a new political field, based on pressure groups. That was done by asking for the elections to be put off, by attracting army groups, by extensive actions in Romania's big towns, and finally by resorting to force. As for the last, National Salvation Front [FSN] Deputy Sorin Botnaru had certain reserves, one of them is that force was thought of as necessary only by certain extremist forces, that called themselves non-political.

The document states that the evacuation of the demonstrators from the University Square on June 13 in the morning was only a pretext TO THE VIOlence that followed in the afternoon, whose deeper cause is considered to be the groundless questioning of the results of the 20 May elections by political groups that wanted to ascend to power by means other than democratic. The deputy mentioned above makes a specification in this connection as well. He admits the pretext for violence was that mentioned before, but has another opinion on what it was caused by. He thinks the destructive actions and the attack on institutions was of an extremist-anarchic type and were made by groups that were not capable of taking up power and did nothing but destabilize statal institutions.

The document goes on by stating that the actions on June 13 were made possible by the weakness and even inactivity of the police forces, also proved by previous events going on during the caretaker governing.

Pointing to the degradation of the 'University Square' phenomenon particularly after the 20 May elections, the act considers the decision to clear up the place was legitimate and opportune for June 13 in the morning, when a certain climate was necessary for the forthcoming opening of the parliament and the president's inaugural. At the same time it is underlined that the steps taken by the police were deficient in point of organization, which was sanctioned by the dismissal of the minister of the interior and the inspector general of the police of the capital city. Deputy Sorin Botnaru has a somewhat different opinion on this aspect as well, when saying that it is questionable whether the moment of action was well chosen and in his opinion the then situation had certain features that could have favored a different option.

Referring to the evidence available to the commission, the report says there are pieces proving first-rank political personalities of certain parties and political groups were involved in the events on June 13 and in those preceding them, and there are data certain political parties and groups were involved in the events.

The FSN deputy mentioned before, another three FSN deputies and the Deputy Anton Lintmaier (Polish Union) specify there are no proofs that the historical political parties took part in the staging of the violent actions on June 13-15.

But all those who signed the document admit both political parties, through people sharing certain responsibilities, and associations, institutions and private persons were involved in the funding of the demonstrators in the University Square.

The preliminary conclusions contain some other statements, assumed without reserves by all signatories:

— Under the circumstances of the state of emergency existing on June 13 in the afternoon, the elected president and the caretaker government resorted to exceptional measures to safeguard public order and, faced with the increasingly violent actions against fundamental statal institutions, launched appeals to the population to contribute to make them stop. The president launched appeals to the population at large and not to a certain socio-professional category. Large groups of miners came to Bucharest as a consequence of the impact the violent events on June 13 and the breaking off of Romanian Television broadcast had on them.

The arrival of miners to Bucharest is civically motivated but also has a specific psycho-sociological explanation. Spontaneity but also organization is at stake here. The action was locally staged and the staging differed from case to case. In certain places it was the unions that called out to action, in some others it was the bodies of the existing power the Provisional National Unity Council, that grouped together local representatives of the political parties. In some other cases the managerial boards of enterprises staged the departure of miners to Bucharest.

—By their nature, the groups of safeguarding order, made up of miners and other categories of people, had no capacity of acting according to the rules specific to the forces of order. The ad-hoc groups abused a number of people, ravaged the headquarters of political parties and institutions, which resulted in important damage, threatened people in the managerial boards of a number of newspapers, and political personalities.

—In the general state of confusion created by the intervention of ad-hoc groups, police and army forces arrested suspects of violent acts against state institutions. Arrests were abusive in part, as proved by the 1021 people detained, including persons under age, who were set free in a few hours.

—The forces of order did not immediately arrest the members of the ad-hoc groups—miners or other categories of people—who were excessively violent or breached the law in some other way, to send them to court.

The document also underscores that the Ministry of the Interior, the forces of order proved to share mentalities and tendencies to make use of methods proper to the totalitarian regime: excessive violence when arresting people, inhuman treatment in jail, unsatisfactory medical assistance for those under arrest, arbitrary and illegal methods of conducting the penal inquiry, denial of the barrister's right to contact his client etc. Nine of the 14 signatories add that the forces for safeguarding public order were also faced with further difficulties, such as shortcomings of the existing laws, lack of technical equipment, the low number of policemen, the campaign of undermining the authority of the police after the revolution etc.

The document concludes:

—On June 13, 1990, at Miercurea Ciuc, inhabited mostly by Hungarian nationals, the police headquarters were ransacked and arsoned, in a way similar with what happened in Bucharest: the entrance door was forced, sharp objects and gas bombs were thrown, rooms were devastated, the policemen were ill-treated, the action being obviously anti-Romanian. As the police was annihilated, order was re-established only on June 14, at about 2 hours by the troops of the Ministry of National Defense.

—A number of parliamentarians, foreign citizens, journalists, reporters, representatives of embassies were reported to have backed the events in the University Square in prior to June 13.

Opposition Conclusions Presented

AU2301110291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0847 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/1/1991—The preamble to the document terms the Bucharest events of June 13, 14 and 15, 1990 as the gravest sociopolitical conflicts in post-revolution Romania, and their aftereffects as disastrous both for the unity of the Romanian society and for Romania's prestige and credit in the world.

The events, the preliminary conclusions read, were associated with the University Square demonstration that was caused by the discontent of a part of the population, no matter its proportion. That discontent was generated by the worry about the situation in the country likely to turn toward a new dictatorship of a communist type, a fear prompted by the presence in the country's leadership of cadres from the large communist nomenklatura, from the structures of the former Communist Party and Securitate, as well as by the revival of old practices of calumny and intimidation.

Here are the preliminary conclusions:

1. The decision to evacuate the University Square was made on June 11, 1990 in a meeting chaired by Romania's president and the prime minister. It was established that the order forces should be assisted by some 5,000 civilians. The decision to use civilian forces against other civilians is a violation of the norms characteristic of a state of law. The responsibility is mainly the Romanian president's (...) the responsibility is not diminished by the fact that Bucharest TU [trade union] leaders did not

answer the mobilization so as not to have the workers turned against the other Bucharesters.

2. The violent action of the order forces in the morning of June 13 went beyond the necessities of the measures to restore order and turned into an act of repression of the demonstrators who offered no resistance, most of them even trying to run away. That action was the cause of the violence triggered off on June 13-15, 1990. It is the minister of the interior, his first deputy and the cadres that participated in the action that are responsible.

3. The violence with which the demonstrators reacted to the action of the order forces, occupying the square again and attacking state institutions (...) was a grave, penal violation of the legal provisions. The perpetrators, who are under trial, are responsible for this.

4. The abandoning by the order forces of the mission of guarding and defending the targets attacked by aggressors and their withdrawal at a moment where the capital needed them was a grave act of military and command indiscipline. Responsible for that are the prime minister, who did not control and supervise the executive of the ministry of the interior, the minister of the interior and his first deputy, who directly led the operations of the order bodies on June 13.

[No number 5. as received] The appeals of Romania's president and of the government to the population to participate in the restoration of order were not necessary, given the real situation in the capital. Those appeals comprised wrong information and had the effect of an incitation. On the other hand, the procedure to raise a section of the society against another one is alien to the democratic principles of the state of law and could have led to a civil war. Also, provisions of the international law were violated (Art. 4 of the international pact on civil and political rights adhered to by Romania on October 31, 1974), according to which in like cases exceptional or emergency state ought to be proclaimed and the United Nations notified.

6. The television information of public opinion in a selective manner on June 13, 14 and 15, the unjustified stopping of the program on the evening of 13 and the television executive's inciting intervention on the respective evening accounted for a major factor in aggravating the real situation, in involving civilians in aggressive actions and in instigating against the Romani community. The responsibilities shall be shared, to differing extents, by the executive of the Romanian Television and of the Ministry of Telecommunications.

7. The mobilization and organization of the transport to Bucharest of about 20,000 persons—miners most of them—were done upon requests of organizations of the ruling party and of the local power in numerous mining centers and towns in the country. The transportation of most of those persons was made by special trains put to traffic in disregard of the regulations in force. Their accommodation, transport in the city and catering were done with the participation of the City Hall and the Army. Responsibility shall be shared by the local leading bodies, the Ministry of Transport and the government that, although aware of the miners' intention, did not take steps to halt them.

8. Although the Army had restored the order in the capital in the morning of June 14, Romania's president made an address to the miners who had arrived in Bucharest, urging them to reoccupy the University Square, an address that, containing untruths, was also an incitation to aggression. The president of Romania alone is to blame for that.

9. The leading of the groups of miners straight to the addresses of headquarters of opposition political parties, associations, faculties, editorial offices of newspapers and residences of political leaders, the penetration without a right into those headquarters and residences and the damage and thefts of importance accounted for grave infractions of the law. The responsibility for those acts belongs first of all to those who led the groups, the police and agents involved with those groups (...) in connection with those violent actions and thefts, the competent institutions did not undertake investigations to trace the culprits, except for four persons who stole assets from a political leader's residence and from the headquarters of a political party. The Ministry of the Interior is guilty of having failed to ensure the protection of the political parties' headquarters according to legal provisions.

10. The temporary suppression of opposition or independent newspapers, the manhandling of Romanian and foreign journalists who were prevented from doing their job, account for a grave violation of the freedom of the press, of the provisions of the Helsinki and Vienna final documents. The persons who perpetrated those acts and who, to this day have not been traced, which is the fault of the competent bodies, are responsible for those acts.

11. The attacks on the higher learning institutions, the damaging of their labs and libraries, the manhandling of students and teachers, of various citizens suspected to be intellectuals or participant in the University Square demonstration, of women whose attire was not to the aggressors' liking, of citizens who protested against being asked for their ID by miners, or defended the victims, accounted for a grave violation of the human rights and of the penal code provisions. Those actions were a great social danger in the multiple cases in which such citizens were seriously wounded. Police often witnessed passive and tolerant the aggressive acts committed by groups of miners. The persons who perpetrated those acts and who, to this day have not been traced, which is the fault of the competent bodies, are responsible for those acts.

12. The guidance of groups of miners and their penetration into districts and houses of the Romani by pretext of economic controls, the Romani's apprehension and manhandling, abusive searches and confiscations were as many violations of the penal law and of the international convention of March 7, 1966 on the elimination of all

forms of racial discrimination, ratified also by Romania. The responsibilities are similar to those stated in the previous point.

13. The Romanian president's address on the miners' departure from the capital, whereby he thanked and encouraged the miners for their "civic attitude" also comprised some untruths, but it had the air of approving the illegal acts committed. Also, the address did not rule out the possibility to apply in future as well to the miners' intervention. Romania's president is the only responsible for that.

14. The abusive detention of over 1,000 persons in improper places, other than those meant for detention, for several days, with no legal procedure, underaged and grown-ups together, often men and women in the same rooms, the manhandling, inhuman, degrading treatment, the deprivation of the right to defense, of any contact with the families, account for grave violations of the Romanian penal law, of the universal declaration of human rights and of the international pact on civil and political rights. The responsibility is incumbent upon the bodies of penal prosecution and investigation and the prosecutor's office bodies.

Listing in a final chapter the consequences of the events, the document mentions among them the splitting of the Romanian society into antagonic groups by social, professional and ethnical criteria, which it terms a genuine social disaster.

In the end,the documents reads inter alia:

Although the University Square demonstration was nonviolent and the political parties were not at all involved in the aggressions of June 13, 1990, civil battalions of correction pursued and managed to browbeat and harm profoundly the opposition.

The labelling of the opposition as "destabilizing" all while the culprits for the devastation of the political parties' headquarters and the suppression of some newspapers are left unpunished, leads to the inference that the ruling party keeps the exclusive monopoly of power all to itself, which is characteristic of the single party, and that is an attempt at the principles of democracy.

(...) on an external plane, the June 13-15, 1990 events were responsible for the desisting of economic relief aid, foreign enterprisers' turning away and a reserve of the European Community toward Romania with consequences hard to assess.

PNT-cd Condemns Police Acts Against Journalists

AU2301124591 Bucharest Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 17 Jan 91 p 3

[National Peasant Christian Democratic Party Press Department note: "In Connection With the Police's Acts of Brutality"]

[Text] The Press Department of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd] is authorized to declare the following:

The acts of brutality committed by Bucharest policemen against Romanian and foreign journalists on 11, 12, and 13 January 1991 expose once more the communist regime in our country.

The police repression specific to this regime acquires a most serious aspect, particularly since the journalists were savagely molested after they had been identified as such and because they were journalists.

We point out that DREPTATEA daily photographer-reporter Petter Gheorghe was among the victims of that police aggression.

The PNT-cd, deeply attached to the principle of press freedom, strongly protests the brutality shown by the Bucharest police and asks the government to officially announce:

1. What sanctions were applied to those guilty of these serious abuses and

2. What measures were taken to avoid a repetition of such incidents and to ensure that the overall freedom of press is truly guaranteed in Romania.

The seriousness of the deeds of 11, 12, and 13 January is aggravated by the fact that police barbarism is a repeated, hence a systematic, phenomenon.

Romania's current government is thus responsible for am evolution toward the repression of civic freedoms, hence toward our country's isolation from democratic and civilized Europe.

Interior Minister Issues Apology

AU2301124891 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 17 Jan 91 p 1

[Gheorghe Ionita article: "Mr. Minister Apologizes"]

[Text] The news conference organized yesterday by the press bureau of the Ministry of Interior had several moments of suspense. Almost the entire leadership of that important ministry participated in the news conference. First, Mr. Minister Doru Viorel Ursu said: "I suggested this meeting to clarify the circumstances in which a number of Romanian and foreign journalists were beaten up during the latest events in University Square. At the same time, I believe that this news conference can also clarify many other problems, that is why I insisted that my main aides should attend it. From the very beginning, I would like to emphasize that the mere suspicion that someone from the ministry's leadership or from the command of the gendarme or police forces ordered the attack on or humiliation of journalists is something that should have never crossed anyone's mind, let alone imply it, as was done by some people."

It is a fact that 13 journalists were assaulted. The minister promised that all aspects of their molestation will be investigated in detail, in order to find the truth. In passing, Mr. Doru Viorel Ursu said that, in many instances, the police force is attacked and slandered in the press, without corroboration. Of course, there is no connection between these instances and the events of 11, 12, and 13 January 1991. The questions put by the journalists mainly referred to three aspects: How come such incidents could occur and what guarantees can be given that they will not happen again? How will a repetition of these incidents be prevented in the future? The minister was asked to apologize to the journalists, which he did, "because I observe certain principles that guide me." He was also asked to make public the newspapers and the names of the journalists who requested police protection last Sunday [13 January].

In conclusion, Mr. Doru Viorel Ursu apologized for something he did not order, but which, unfortunately, his subordinates committed. It seems that the guilty ones are the journalists, who have chosen a rather dangerous profession for themselves.

January 1990 Anticommunist Demonstration Marked

AU2301124291 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 17 Jan 91 p 3

[Romulus-Vasile Cristea article: "12 January 1990—A Date Which Should Not Be Forgotten"]

[Text] A year has passed since the anticommunist demonstration in Victory Square—the first big demonstration after 21 December, the first and, we hope, not the last one either.

"We want guarantees that our dignity will not be abused by the current leadership which claims to be democratic. We express our distrust in the possibility of transition to a normalization of our life as long as there is no objective information about the realities facing us.

"We insistently demand moral and social purification at all levels of our society's leadership"—how topical are these demands included in the appeal of a group of students to the masses gathered in the square on 12 January.

Indeed, 12 January was a day of dignity, when people demanded the "disappearance of any trace of the undemocratic system of the Romanian Communist Party [PCR]." People did want and demand all this, but to no avail. This seems to be the case. Those who had the courage then to raise their head and say the truth were disparaged in all possible ways.

Those who knew that they were guilty claimed that a demonstration of force had forced the hand of the then provisional government. The request to ban the PCR and condemn the guilty ones did not suit some people. Then came the decision about a referendum. However....

One year after those events, the struggle for democracy and freedom continues. The same requests are made, but to no avail. "Original democracy," [quoting Iliescu phrase referring to unique Romanian form of democracy] is all we have got. We should not let forgetfulness fall upon reality. There were quite a few people who realized then what kind of danger was in store for us. Proof of this is the great anticommunist demonstration of 12 January 1990, a day when our destinies might have taken another turn if...

Locally Supplied Weapons Involved in Gulf War

AU2101155591 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 91 p 7

[D. Zadravec report: "Yugoslav Arms in the Gulf War"]

[Text] Zagreb, 17 Jan—Among all the world's most modern armament involved in the war between Iraq and the multinational forces in the Gulf, there are some weapons produced in our country that happen to be mostly in Iraq's possession. Before the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, our country sold Iraq a certain quantity of "Orkan" rocket launchers and several war ships. At the same time, Kuwait received a contingent of M-84 tanks (which, by the way, caused quite an interest on the world arms market) that were mostly taken over by the Iraqi Army after the occupation. If we add here that some weapons were sold to some other countries now directly involved in the war (including ammunition for NATO), we can then "boast" that some Yugoslav arms are also having a certain influence at the moment on the outcome of the war that started last night.

Army Daily on Republican Armies

AU2301144591 Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jan 91 p 4

[Commentary by Ivan Matovic, chief editor of NARODNA ARMIJA: "Weapons Must Be Turned In"]

[Text] There is one day until the deadline, which, according to the SFRY Presidency order, all armed formations formed outside constitutionally established unified armed forces or internal affairs services must be dissolved and their arms and equipment given to the units of the Yugoslav People's Army. In conformity with his obligations ensuing from the SFRY Presidency order, the Federal Secretary for National Defense has timely appointed commands that will receive weapons and allocated detailed tasks to them, so there are no dilemmas there. Whoever fails to act in conformity with the order by the deadline, will be held criminally responsible according to the law. No room has been left for dilemmas there, either.

Army General Veljko Kadijevic expressed this issue in his interview on 3 December. On the occasion of the interview, Kadijevic received words of approval and support by more than 10,000 citizens from throughout Yugoslavia who see the disarmament and dissolution of unlawful military organizations as a reduction of the danger of very certain interethnic conflicts and an increase in the possibility of preserving peace and order and particularly of finding a way out of the crisis in a peaceful, democratic, and dignified way.

These thousands of Yugoslavs were recently joined by all these institutions and individuals who, confronted with danger to peace and the security of citizens and to the unity of the country threatened by units formed and armed exclusively according to national principle, are voicing their support for the order, well aware of the fact that threats and saber rattling by party and mononational units are completely muffling the words of agreement and tolerance, even threatening with inevitable blood-shedding.

Nation-centered [naciokratski] top leaderships and "those chosen by the people" have hurriedly made statements against the contents and messages of the SFRY Presidency's order. The statements range from denying any need for the order and pointing to the danger of it being interpreted by the "military lobby" as a green light to the "legalization of military terror," all to threatening that they will oppose its realization—allegedly aimed at endangering their nations—with all available means. They will also involve their compatriots in the diaspora and the entire democratic public. Instead of words of criticism or a possible explanation, here are a few questions:

How is it that the regime of the much criticized "orthodox bolsheviks" in Croatia were for several decades guarded by about 16,000 policemen, and there are at least four times as many constables and members of special forces guarding the "young democracy" now? Moreover, its leaders continue to arm their own party guards and units, the main principle of selecting them being national affiliation. How is one to coordinate this with their own demand that the creators of the "Knin rebellion" should return the weapons they had taken to protect themselves from those very people who have been unlawfully and dangerously arming themselves?

By what laws, in the name of what democracy, and, finally, with whose funds do defense ministers in the governments of DEMOS and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] import and distribute throughout towns and villages tens of thousands of "Kalashnikovs," SAR 80's, MGV 176's, and other dangerous weapons through foreign trade organizations and well-known transporters, when it is known that their leaders are the most vociferous advocates of the rule of law. Also, armament imports are exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Federation—and now the firms that used to be economic giants in that part of the country not so long ago are collapsing because political oligarchies have been interfering in the economy and workers are barely making ends meet on the minimum wage?

How is one to coordinate our own demands for the "demilitarization of society" and for the depolitization of the Yugoslav People's Army with the hurried creation and armament of officially proclaimed people's armies—15,000 soldiers and 6,000 officers in Slovenia and 22,700 soldiers and 12,200 professional officers in Croatia—something that confirms some people's claims that the "winners of democracy" are trained for interethnic wars and ready to meet the demand to put their cards on the table by showing their trump, that is, their own army, completely oriented toward rightist totalitarianism?

In the name of what principles are the proponents of "new democracy" trained to carry out assaults at military facilities, in making "black lists" of unsuitable officers and their families, training their subversionist-terrorist units for "silent liquidation," making plans to blackmail people and to deny garrisons of basic needs, etc.?

There are many such questions. We are convinced that the public will not long for answers to them.

Committee Delays LCY's 14th Congress Tasks

LD2201204191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 22 January (TANJUG)—The committee for the preparation of the congress of democratic and program renewal of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] held a session today, during which it was decided that—in keeping with the evaluations of the leader of the parties that had emerged from the parts of the former LCY now taking part in the work of the committee—that no conditions exist for implementing the task established at the 14th special congress of the LCY. Namely, that the committee should carry out the preparations for the democratic and program renewal of the LCY.

As reported, the committee decided to cease operations and to transfer all rights and commitments to the League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia, until the criteria have been established and the property has been distributed among the legal successors—the parties that emerged from the former LCY. The committee has appointed a working group headed by the committee chairman who will carry out this task.

Belgrade TV Journalists Oppose Editorial Policy

AU2201102791 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 91 p 4

[B.D. report: "Mitevic Is Neither Changing His Appearance Nor Character"]

[Text] Belgrade—The Executive Committee of the Independent Union of Belgrade Radio and Television Workers held a news conference yesterday. Considering that the Editorial Board of the Belgrade Radio and Television, headed by Dusan Mitevic, is announcing unaltered editorial policy, which solely serves the needs of the party currently in power (the Socialist Party of Serbia), and harassment of the "unsuitable" and stimulation of the "obedient" ones, the Executive Committee of this union regards its struggle to defend the profession this year as absolutely necessary. The Board of Directors of Belgrade Radio and Television continue to ignore this union despite the fact that they have been duly registered with the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs. The Independent Union decided to join three other European unions of the same profession. In the meantime the Committee for the Freedom of Public Expression will also be established in Belgrade.

There was also discussion about financial premiums given to "meritorious" journalists according to their political suitability and obedience. Even the directors themselves, as stated, are awarding these premiums amongst themselves. For instance, Sergej Sestakov, director of television, received 20,500 dinars as a premium for the previous month.

Serbia, Bosnia Agree on Federal Concept

LD2201220191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1926 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 22 January (TANJUG)—Talks were held in Belgrade today between the leaderships of Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, and of Bosnia- Hercegovina, led by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina. [passage omitted]

During a lengthy and frank conversation, the top officials of Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina discussed issues of importance for the future of Yugoslavia, the current political and economic situation in the country, and mutual relations and cooperation between the two republics.

Full agreement was expressed regarding the commitment that Yugoslavia should be preserved as a joint state of equal Yugoslav peoples.

It was stressed that the collapse of Yugoslavia is not in the interest of any of its nations and that the republics of Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina will cooperate mutually and with other republics on an equal footing on the future of Yugoslavia as a joint and democratic state of equal nations and republics.

Both parties presented the stance during the talks that the problems in Yugoslavia must be resolved peacefully, by consent and by democratic means, and that changes must be carried out in a legal manner and through legal Yugoslav constitutions.

The two delegations also agreed that the development of democracy and national equality, as a prerequisite for our life together in Yugoslavia, should form the basis for the future system in the country.

During the talks it was stated that only the development of democracy, which implies national equality, will secure the protection of universal human and national rights, human freedoms, and market economy for a free flow of ideas, work, goods, capital, and services, as well as economic independence and equality of economic factors.

The top officials of Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina agreed on the stance that Yugoslavia, as a single state, must have a single army.

The concept was put forward of a Yugoslavia which in addition to a single defense, will also have a single foreign policy; single economic functions that guarantee

economic operations on market principles; a single monetary policy basis with a central bank; a single taxation and custom system basis; a free and single Yugoslav market; and an efficient control of the monetary and credit system.

In the view of the delegation of the Socialist Republic [SR] of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the army must be reformed, depoliticized, and have a nationaly balanced cadre structure. It is also the stance of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina that the republics should also have territorial defense.

The delegation of the Republic of Serbia believes that the Yugoslav People's Army as a whole is already organized in keeping with the principles of national equality and protection of the integrity of Yugoslavia, says the statement issued for the public.

Jansa on Presidency's Order To Submit Weapons

AU2301164791 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19-20 Jan 91 p 15

[D. Draskovic report: "Paramilitary Forces - Unknown"]

[Text] Ljubljana—Since the SFRY Presidency deadline ordering all paramilitary units to turn in their weapons expired yesterday, a question was posed to Janez Jansa, republican secretary for national defense of the Republic of Slovenia:

What can we expect after this deadline?

"I believe nothing, as neither the Presidency nor the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] has yet defined paramilitary forces. With reference to this and to the rather generalized content of the Presidency's order, we could only consider as paramilitary groups the paramilitary groups in Knin that had already handed in weapons," Jansa said.

Moreover, Jansa said that his secretariat only received a vague notification from the headquarters—i.e. the Commander of the Fifth Military District—advising the public that those holding arms without permission should submit them to the army barracks, which are ready to accept them.

"Upon our request to specify to whom this order referred we received no reply from Zagreb. We received a reply from one of the bigger garrisons in Slovenia that the order does not apply to the internal affairs organizations and the Slovene territorial defense units. Hence, we expect no particular tensions after the expiration date. It is possible though, that in the point concerning the protection of citizens, this order can also be used against those same citizens," Janez Jansa replied.

Yesterday we also received a reply from the Secretariat of National Defense, headed by Janez Jansa, answering the question by delegate Milan Aksentijevic, member of the Chamber of Associated Labor of the Assembly of Slovenia. The question was posed because, as he said on 27 November, allegedly, the military installations, the headquarters, and the units of the JNA have often been watched, and services guarding them provoked. The same happened to the JNA members, especially in October. Aksentijevic claimed that he had information about secret tapping of telephone lines and telephone lines of the JNA officers stationed in Slovenia. He also stated that the officials of the Secretariat for National Defense of Slovenia at its meeting in Kocevska Reka and Kranj described the JNA as an occupying army.

The answer dismisses those claims as unsubstantiated, biased, and without a clear purpose. In reply to statements that helicopters had observed the work of JNA Headquarters and its units it was said: "Obviously, there is a desire to show that the regular activities of the organizations of the internal affairs of Slovenia are aimed against the JNA, which is nonsense. According to the regulations on the protection of certain persons and installations, the organs of internal affairs are obliged to protect, among other things, military and other installations important for national defense, but in an agreement with the security service of the JNA."

In its reply through the republican executive council, the republican secretariat "dismisses malicious remarks that any member of the republican organs or the republican secretariat for national defense publicly described the JNA as a foreign armed force or an occupying army. According to the existing Constitution we consider the JNA a joint armed force."

The republican secretariat for national defense also dismisses as unsubstantiated and malicious statements about tapping JNA officers' telephone lines and search for allies among the JNA officers.

Drnovsek on Presidency Order; Slovene-Serb Talks

AU2301171291 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Dragoslav Kosaric report from Ljubljana; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] Dr. Janez Drnovsek, member of the SFRY Presidency from Slovenia, held a news conference in Ljubljana today at which he expressed his views on yesterday's session of the Federal Presidency, as well as on the order to return weapons. Here is Dragoslav Kosaric reporting from Ljubljana:

[Kosaric] Dr. Janez Drnovsek believes yesterday's session of the SFRY Presidency has calmed the tension in the country. At the same time, Drnovsek says, it has shown that there are speculations about moves after the deadline for pardons for people who turn in their weapons. Drnovsek warned that no one, including the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], has been given additional powers. The SFRY Presidency has not considered introducing the state of emergency and no kind of

intervention by the JNA is involved. So, as far as that is concerned, in Drnovsek's opinion, the situation is normal.

He also presented his reasons for failing to support the adoption of the Presidency's order. The first reason is the possibility of abuse and of an inappropriate implementation of the decision; the second is the fact that interrepublican talks have begun, so, according to Drnovsek, it would be unproductive to make such a decision and turn the solution of the problem away from reaching an agreement to other methods and forms.

Drnovsek particularly pointed out that the decision cannot apply to territorial defense and to republican and provincial internal affairs organs. In reply to the question whether the order applies to the weapons Slovenia and Croatia bought contrary to valid regulations and laws, Drnovsek said that the Presidency does not have the power to amend valid laws. It has the power to pronounce a pardon. He said that the Presidency cannot discuss the issue of which laws are valid and which are not, because that is in the jurisdiction of legislative organs.

In reply to the question whether the expression used in the order that concerns the jurisdiction of the military courts means that they in fact are taking over the jurisdiction of the civil courts, Drnovsek said that the Presidency cannot transfer jurisdiction from military courts to civil courts and vice versa; acts directed against the JNA are in the jurisdiction of the military courts and all other cases are in the jurisdiction of the civil courts, he said.

According to Drnovsek, the meeting between Serbian and Slovene leaders that is to be held in Belgrade tomorrow is very important. It is one of the key talks which will involve different concepts. After these talks, he says, it will be clearer whether it is possible to find common points or whether it is necessary to seek other ways to solve the Yugoslav crisis.

Changes in Armed Forces Regulations Approved

LD2301134391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1110 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—During its session yesterday, the SFRY Presidency, chaired by President Dr. Borisav Jovic, discussed and approved certain changes and addenda to the armed forces service rules.

As reported, the regulation on flying the flag at military facilities during state, republican, and military holidays was changed in the sense that in future only the flag of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can be hoisted at these facilities.

When they leave the barracks precinct or when they are absent or are on sick leave, the men and the cadets can wear civilian clothes.

Military personnel who are believers are allowed to visit religious buildings and attend religious rites, but only in civilian clothes and during their time off. Religous rites are not permitted at military installations.

A new instruction has been introduced whereby military honors are accorded only when wreaths or floral tributes are laid by the president, the vice president and members of the SFRY Presidency, the president of the SFRY Assembly and the president of the Federal Executive Council, or when a wreath or floral tributes are laid at the unknown soldier's tomb on Mt. Avala by respresentatives of the organizations of authority of the Federation, of the republics, of the city of Belgrade, and of foreign states. The possibility has been provided whereby the people entitled to it can be interred with a religious rite in addition to being accorded military honors.

In keeping with changes in our society, some changes have been affected in the service rules regarding the use of some expressions: the expression "morale" [moral] has been introduced to replace "morale-political unity (state)" [moralno-politicko jedinstvo (stanje)] and the expression "morale-conducive education" [moralno vaspitanje] has been introduced to replace the expression "political education" [politicko obrazovanje]. Concepts such as "ideo-political awareness" [idejno-politicka izgradjenost], "socio-political organizations" [drustveno-politicke organizacije] and "LCY policy" [politika SKJ—League of Communists of Yugoslavia] have been abaondoned.

More complex changes and addenda and the compilation of new armed forces service rules will be made after the new SFRY Constituion, the law on all-people's defense, the law on service in the armed forces, and other regulations regulating the service in the SFRY Armed Forces have been adopted.

Presidency Member: No Army Intervention Planned

LD2301180991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—During his news conference in Ljubljana today, SFRY Presidency member Dr. Janes Drnovsek stressed that "no one, including the Army, has received authority for behavior different from behavior that is applicable under normal circumstances." A special decision by the state Presidency—in other words, a state of emergency—would be required for that to happen. During the sessions, however, no one has discussed the possibility of a state of emergency being introduced. The state Presidency informed the public about this yesterday after its session. The particular point the statement wanted to make, Drnovsek believes, is that "no Yugoslav National Army intervention is involved."

Dr. Drnovsek also said that he personally is against the idea that any such decision should be passed, precisely at this point when the talks between the republics have

started. His fear that different speculations and different interpretations will occur has been confirmed. Dr. Drnovsek considers such an order unproductive, because it generates conflicts. Within the next few days, however, reciprocal meetings will be "restored."

Dr. Drnovsek described the talks tomorrow between the Slovene and Serbian leaderships as very important and of "key" significance. He expects that differing concepts by one side or the other will clearly be presented, including the Serbian idea about a "firm" federation and the Slovene idea about a "looser" form of ties. After these talks, Dr. Drnovsek expects it will become "clearer whether it is still possible to seek a common language between these two different concepts."

Federal Court Annuls Serbian, Croatian Laws

LD2301214991 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2032 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, January 23 (TANJUG)—The Federal Constitutional Court on Wednesday passed provisional measures annulling certain laws of Yugoslavia's two biggest republics. The court believes the laws are contrary to federal regulations and their application would result in damaging consequences.

The Constitutional Court has ruled that the law on the basis of which Serbia took a loan of 18 billion dinars (over 1.3 billion dollars) from the primary issue with its National Bank was a gross violation of the right of the Federation to establish the monetary system. By this act late last year, Serbia secured nearly half of all the loans envisaged for the whole country in 1991.

The Constitutional Court also annulled the Serbian Assembly decision on granting consumer credits only for goods made in the Republic.

The Constitutional Court has also cancelled the Croatian Assembly's decision under which its citizens did not have to pay the whole amount of the sales tax on imported cars in the past 15 days.

The court ruled that the decision not only brought into question the financing of the Federation, which gets 75 per cent of the income of the basic sales tax, but also equality on the market of Yugoslav automobile manufacturers and their sub-contractors.

The Constitutional Court also cancelled the Croatian regulation that firms in the Republic cannot sell social capital used in business operations, acquire additional capital or issue internal bills without agreement from the Agency For Development in Zagreb and the republican Ministry for Justice and Administration.

Federal, Croatian Leaders on Disarming Order

LD1701204891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0919 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Zagreb, January 17 (TANJUG)—The government of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia set out during a meeting with Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic yesterday that the most urgent task of the federal government was to tally the 45 years of life together in Yugoslavia.

The meeting between federal government representatives and representatives of the Croatian Government was held as part of the federal prime minister's consultations with the governments of all Yugoslav republics. The consultations are aimed at reaching a minimum of accord necessary for the country to function until a definite accord on the solution of the Yugoslav crisis is reached.

Croatian representatives, as the republican information ministry has reported, used Prime Minister Markovic to request of the Yugoslav State Presidency to withdraw the part of its order on the disarming of illegal para-military formations in the country which gives to the Yugoslav People's Army powers in the area of the maintenance of public law and order, powers which the Croatian Government feels are strictly in the jurisdiction of internal affairs authorities.

The Yugoslav State Presidency on January 9 ordered that all illegal para-military units in the country be disarmed, and specified, among other things, that the Yugoslav People's Army would protect all citizens of Yugoslavia "if the other competent organs are not able to do so."

Jovic Calls for Prevention of 'Fratricidal War'

AU2001195891 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 91 p 1

[TANJUG report: "Using All Forces Against Interethnic Conflicts"]

[Excerpts] Bujanovac, Vranje—In talks yesterday with Bujanovac businessmen, Dr. Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, put forward the assessment that Bujanovac is one of those regions that has in its development enjoyed above average support from the wider community. [passage omitted]

In the afternoon, the president of the SFRY Presidency spoke to the economic-political group of Vranje about the current political situation in the country.

The conditions in the country are having an exceptionally serious effect on the economy because foreign partners are restrained by the political situation in our country. We will be in such a situation until we solve our own internal political problems. We have successfully concluded the first step with the multiparty elections, Jovic said.

Speaking about the domestic political situation, the SFRY Presidency president said: "Let us endeavor to create conditions for successful agreements within Yugoslavia and to realize mutual interests through agreement. There is no solution to the future of Yugoslavia if federal laws are not respected. This is the critical point that we have now come face to face, or if you like, at which we are coming into conflict. The federation-confederation question is also important for our partners abroad, as well as for our own people. There is no state in the world that is resolving this issue in such a democratic way, but in this respect there is then no room for intransigence. Of course, the people should be objectively informed about all of this."

"The creation of new states is the fundamental right of peoples and only they can decide on secession. Precisely because of this nationalities have been arming themselves, but this leads to fratricidal war. We must prevent this. If the place of the Yugoslav People's Army is discussed in this context, then it is, to put it mildly, not a well-intentioned thing to speak about its dictatorship. Nobody is interested in bloodshed. It is crucial that citizens have equal rights, united borders, and a currency that is the same for everyone. They can also reach agreement over the function of the state in a democratic dialogue. I am convinced that we will succeed in these endeavors, even though much understanding and tolerance is needed," Borisav Jovic said at the end of his speech during his visit to Vranje.

Mitrovic on Expanding Federation Functions

LD2201221291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2122 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 22 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government is to propose enlargement in the minimum competences of the federation until a new accord is reached by the federal units about the future order of the state—Vice-Prime Minister Aleksandar Mitrovic told TANJUG in an interview today.

This was, Mitrovic explained, what the government decided after Prime Minister Ante Markovic's talk with ministers of the six republican governments.

Most of the republics, according to Mitrovic, agreed that the federal government should prepare a legal document for "the transition period" to enlarge the functions of the federation until the promulgation of a new constitution and statute.

Thus, a transitional document would add a few more to the already proposed eleven functions, said Mitrovic but without specifying what functions were involved. The republics would adopt such a document by consensus, obliging themselves to keep enforcing it consistently, Mitrovic said.

Markovic's government, on coming to power two years ago, had begun radical economic and political changes intended to introduce a market economy and multiparty parliamentary democracy in all of Yugoslavia.

In the interest of reforms the government had also proposed amendments to the federal Constitution towards regulating the relations between the republics and the federation upon a fresh foundation, but the federal units have so far failed to reach relevant accord.

A political battle is being fought around whether Yugoslavia will be a confederation or a federation, the subject on which the republics are holding bilateral negotiations. And it is upon their accord that the very survival of Yugoslavia depends.

Presidency Session Participants on Future Talks

AU2201215491 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 91 p 3

[Unattributed report: "What Should Be Discussed and How"]

[Excerpts] Many meetings, talks, and great and small summits were held throughout the world last week but without, so to speak, any real agreement being reached. Definitely included among these meetings was the Yugoslav meeting, or YU summit, which was held on Thursday 10 January at the highest federal level.

Apart from members of the SFRY Presidency, the session of the country's highest collective leadership was also attended by all republican and provincial senior leaders, as well as representatives of the highest federal organizations, including the president of the Federal Executive Council [FEC].

Because the public has already been informed of the course of the discussion at this session, which was more reminiscent of negotiations on how talks should be conducted and on what, BORBA is recalling some of the most important parts of the speeches that could be heard at this meeting. [passage omitted]

Momir Bulatovic: We Are a Long Way From Agreement

The citizens of Montenegro are committed to a federation and are expressing the willingness to conduct a constructive dialogue on these issues. This, among other things, was stressed by Montenegro Presidency President Momir Bulatovic at the session in the SFRY Presidency.

This commitment, Bulatovic stressed, implies a willingness to conduct a constructive dialogue about all modalities and issues and seek constructive solutions. The course of the talks so far shows that we are a long way from the possibility of agreement. This is my personal assessment, because it seems to me that two and more worlds are clashing.

My contributions, therefore, cannot be the least bit constructive. Some time is needed for us to try to perceive how the contradictions that are present in some approaches can be surmounted. In this sense, I like Mr.

Izetbegovic's approach. We must be prepared for compromise, because the viewpoints that are thus so distant from each other impose a great responsibility on us; that is to say, I believe that both you and I are bothered by the media hullabaloo surrounding this agreement of ours. I would ask everyone to face the consequences of certain options. We in Yugoslavia are on the edge of civil war and—if we want to and I hope that we will all want to make an effort to avoid these consequences—we should see what has produced this state of affairs. At this moment, those of us who are sitting in this room are, in historical terms, the most responsible people in Yugoslavia and for Yugoslavia. Rigid stands on one side or another will not be any help. Of course, we are not in a position to decide on any particulars, but we have the duty to present explanatory views to our parliamentary organizations of authority and offer a harmonized approach. I think that it is our exceptional duty to take this gradual step, but not to prejudge; to be able to find new rules of behavior, we have to respect the present ones. In this sense, I have been encouraged by Mr. Tudjman's speech, when he demonstrated a willingness to respect the existing laws in the transitional period. Nevertheless, the president of the Presidency of Montenegro stressed, the deadline of six months is not enough. A year would be more realistic. [passage omitted]

According to the shorthand notes, a very lively discussion was held on the subject of where talks should take place. Milan Kucan insisted that "the republics must be the partners," but Franjo Tudjman thought that "there was no point whatsoever in everyone meeting together again until bilateral talks had been held." Kucan explained his stand with the personal opinion that Slovenia and Serbia have completely different views and that this was a question of "talks on our concept and theirs."

Milan Kucan: Let Us See the Arguments

This is how this part of the session progressed according to the shorthand notes:

Milan Kucan: There are two approaches. I will not elaborate on them. Regarding the actual way to hold talks, I see that matters can be combined, if, of course, the approach on which Mr. Tudjman spoke is accepted, whereby bilateral talks are a prerequisite for our next such meeting to produce any results.

I would propose that you take notes and send them to us because it is not only our preparations that are important. For me it is important—and I think this goes for all of us—who the partners are. Only the republics can be partners. I have to hold talks on these issues with everyone—of course, if they accept this—or with those who do accept this. I agree—talks should not be on a single concept because I assume that we and Serbia have completely different views. This would be a discussion on our concept and theirs, if talks are held, to see what the arguments are and to see if something can be brought together with the others. For me, however, it is important who the partners are.

There is one matter that is a key matter for me, and this is why I said that there are two approaches: According to one approach, to simplify matters, a joint state, regardless of what it is like, is something that is assumed. I think that if we really understand that we are in a situation where we have to verify whether the possibility exists for a new historical agreement to set up any community, then this joint state cannot be an assumed entity or quality [kvalitat]. One should first establish whether there is interest in and an opportunity for establishing such a community, who has such interests, on what foundations a community would be established, and how it would function. I do not know whether I am being sufficiently clear.

You went more or less this far (he addresses Borisav Jovic) when you said that all matters are legitimate, that nothing is a matter of dogma, and so on. Finally, I ask myself, we have all sworn allegiance to the Constitution, to some kind of setup, and we have the duty to preserve Yugoslavia. I ask: In whose interest—if the republics do not have any interest in preserving Yugoslavia? This is not the separatist movement of the IRA or ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] or whatever. It is perhaps, although I am not claiming this, the stand of certain republics that they will not be in any kind of community. This does not include Slovenia, so do not interpret me thus. Theoretically, however, this assumption in such talks, in approach, must be allowed. Otherwise we again get into discussions which for years have led us nowhere because we have not been willing to face the real situation in which we are living....

In response to the comment by Borisav Jovic that, if he had understood them properly, Mr. Tudjman and Comrade Kucan were not agreeing to further discussions within the framework of federal organizations, Milan Kucan said: "No, you did not understand. When I spoke for the first time, I clearly said that talks that are connected with delineating our rights and duties based on cohabitation should be carried out in the federal organizations; that the FEC is the only organization that can prepare this, that has all the data. Regardless of whether Yugoslavia remains and whether there is the most centralistic and most unitaristic federation, we cannot get into this without clean slates; therefore, I did not discount this at all. I described the function that I see the federal organizations as having in connection with this other problem, which we call, let us say, discussion or agreement on a future life together or apart. I do not, however, see that this is possible until talks are carried out.

Slobodan Milosevic: On Both Tracks

Slobodan Milosevic: Regarding future work, I do not think—I am not talking about the content—this is a question of "either or," either bilateral talks or talks in

the SFRY Presidency. No one is bothered by anyone else; nor could they be bothered by others conducting bilateral talks; nor has anyone so far been bothered because someone else has conducted bilateral talks. Everyone here is free to conduct bilateral talks and these certainly have the aim of thrashing out positions among ourselves. I can say that we will talk very willingly with everyone about our, and their, stands, and this not in dispute. Dialogue must be conducted.

It is not an issue for me whether there are bilateral talks or there is work in the SFRY Presidency. I would advocate that we do not break the thread of talks in the SFRY Presidency, where, between ourselves and with SFRY Presidency members who have their constitutional functions, we can explain some matters, analyze possible consequences, and "develop this film" of possible solutions that are being proposed in whatever approaches, along with the participation of the president of the FEC, the president of the Assembly. I would propose that, in the meantime, the appropriate meetings be organized among participants agreed upon by the representatives of the leaderships of the different republics.

It seems to me that the most appropriate thing would be to walk on both tracks—without adjournments and without stopping these discussions, but also on a track for explaining matters in joint meetings.

Finally, I understand that Jovic has proposed that we meet in a week and comment on the possible reactions to certain approaches. This cannot hinder bilateral talks; on the contrary, it could explain some things and could speed up some things. In the meantime, we can likewise conduct some meetings between ourselves.

This means that I would be in favor of the "one and other" solution and not only the "one" or "other" solution, because one cannot be a replacement for the other.

Parts of Slovene Sovereignty Decree Annulled

AU2201094791 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 91 p 7

[TANJUG report: "Articles of the Declaration of Sovereignty of Slovenia Annulled"]

[Text] The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia has annulled the provisions of three articles of the Declaration of Sovereignty of Slovenia issued in July last year, which essentially declared the republic's sovereignty and confirmed the presedence of its legal system over the federal one.

During yesterday's annual meeting between journalists and members of the court it was stated that the court had issued a provisional order prohibiting the further execution of certain acts or activities undertaken on the basis of the decree of the Serbian Executive Council about mandatory deposits being paid on Croat and Slovene goods.

Until the relevant legal procedures have been brought to an end, the court temporarily suspended acts or activities passed earlier in accordance with Serbian Law on the collective pay agreements contained in the section that permits the payment of personal incomes in excess of those set by the federal law on incomes. The same applies to the Serbian decree on the introduction of anti-dumping measures and the mandatory tariffs on imported goods, and to the Slovene decree on duties on cattle, meat, meat products, milk, and dairy products purchased outside the republic itself.

In the middle of this week the Court will discuss the Croat decree on taxing the holiday villas owned by people from Serbia and it is expected that the debate that has been going on in the Court for months regarding the constitutional and legal situation in the country will soon be completed.

Bogicevic Views Country's Future; Agreements

AU2201095391 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 91 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Equal Treatment for All Peoples"]

[Text] Belgrade—Bogic Bogicevic, member of the SFRY Presidency, made a speech at the expanded session of the Presidency on 10 January. TANJUG has obtained the text of Bogicevic' speech from a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina and we are publishing a part of it:

"I think," Bogicevic said, " that in trying to solve this constitutional crisis it is more realistic to go step by step, and it is necessary to concentrate on designing, drafting, and adopting a document with the constitutional or legal power that would be obligatory for all of us. Until the new constitutional act of the country is passed, this document should establish the principles and rules of the mutual relations that we all have to obey. In my opinion, this is also very important for economic, political, and if you like, even psychological reasons. This way, the citizens and peoples of this country will finally feel relieved, realizing that we have assumed political responsibility and are seriously set to attain the new agreement."

To Keep Republics Together

"Of course, by saying this, I refer to my own belief, which, I think, is shared by a large number of people in this country, and that is that living together in this country is not only possible but inevitable and, therefore, we must find the kind of forms and elements of a future life that would hold us together. I do not want to specify now all the particulars of this possible new document. Some elements for the development of this document already exist in earlier initiatives coming from our republics, in the Draft Declaration prepared by SFRY Assembly Constitutional Commission, as well as in the program of the Federal Executive Council. I believe that

experts, professional, and scientists should also participate in the preparation of the above document.

"In my opinion, it is most important that such document should, among other things, contain the following:

First, that we agree the current constitutional crisis should be resolved in a peaceful and democratic way, and through agreement to preserve the normal functioning of the state and federal bodies until a final consensus on the future setup of the country is reached.

"Second, that all republics assume the obligation to refrain from adopting unilateral acts. I think, this is not a big sacrifice for them, as they are, in effect, all constituted as independent states, although some of them have already adopted their constitutions and some have not. It is important at this stage that the republics fulfill their obligations toward the Federation and vice versa, so Yugoslavia can function as a state and an international legal subject. I would remind everybody that our country has signed around 8,000 international agreements and conventions (2,000 multilateral and circa 6,000 bilateral) and this should be kept in mind.

"Third, it is necessary that all participants in the agreement have an equal position—I would particularly insist upon this. Despite the fact that we are beginning these talks in the atmosphere of new relations in the country , and that the republics independently and directly make initiatives and seek solutions and modalities for life together, I personally believe we cannot neglect and ignore the role of the federal institutions in the present talks about the future of the country."

Feeling in Yugoslavia One's Own

"Federal bodies of this country are legal bodies, regardless of how they were elected and their legitimate right to exist and survive is, among other things, drawn from the very fact that Yugoslavia exists as a state and an international legal subject. Therefore, as long as this country remains as such, this factor should be taken into account and each of its aspects respected.

"The key element of the agreement about the political future of the country should be the equality of all peoples and republics, without majoritarianism or coalitions of some against the others. This is the basic condition for the new future community of Yugoslav peoples to go down in history as a real new community, accepted by all its peoples; they should feel it to be their own territory and none of their historical rights should be denied to them. In other words, if Yugoslavia was not entirely acceptable to the people, and if some peoples did not feel it to be entirely their own, is now our historic responsibility to correct all the injustices and national discontent and enable them to live in harmony and peace with other peoples, nationalities, and republics.

"That is why it is important that not a single one of our peoples is left out of the agreement. Otherwise, this could only cause new divisions and conflicts.

"There have been examples, not only in our history but also in the gloomy present, of divisions, haggling about borders and territories, questioning certain peoples' right to exist, national homogenization, and of dividing peoples into state-forming ones [drzavotvoran] and those who are not, as well as into majority and minority peoples. In my opinion, it is human and civilizational that even in the case where there is only one member of the other nation, he must have all civil rights and liberties, so he does not feel threatened at all," Bogic Bogicevic, member of the SFRY Presidency, concluded.

Official: Slovenia Exempt From Presidency Order

AU2101155291 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Jan 91

[Text] The deadline to return weapons to the Yugoslav People's Army according to the SFRY Presidency order expires at midnight today. As is known, this does not apply to Slovenia, because there are no paramilitary formations in our republic. According to the highest state services in our republic, the territorial defense is legal and therefore the SFRY Presidency order does not apply to it. Let us hear what Dr. Dusan Plut, member of the Slovene Presidency, thinks about this question.

[Plut] According to the Presidency and all services of the authorities, we in Slovenia do not have paramilitary institutions and organs—according to the constitutional amendments, the territorial defense is under the command of the Presidency of the Republic.

There are no other kind of weapons in our republic and, in our opinion, there are no reasons for the Yugoslav People's Army to interfere.

Finally, I would say that this has been in fact the third year that Slovenia has been confronted with problems connected with the Yugoslav People's Army and that in our opinion there are much more important problems to be solved than these ones. We would like the Yugoslav People's Army to really become depoliticized and simply not to interfere with these questions, particularly in Slovenia, which voted in the plebiscite for independence and autonomy.

Slovenia at 'Decisive Stage' of Autonomy

LD2301203691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2007 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Ljubljana, Jan 23 (TANJUG)—The government of Slovenia has decided to gradually introduce its own currency, and as soon as possible adopt a new constitution which will define the northwestern Yugoslav republic as a sovereign state and a full international legal subject, as speakers at Wednesday's session of the republican assembly said.

The Slovene Government set out that technically everything was prepared for the introduction of one currency, which would have an initial 100-percent coverage, whose exchange rate would stimulate exports and discourage

imports, and improve the liquidity of the economy. Only in this way can the new currency's stability be ensured, since Slovenia does not have adequate foreign exchange reserves, as stated at the session.

At a news conference in Belgrade on Tuesday, a National Bank of Yugoslavia official stated categorically that "until a certain republic officially secedes, until a split-up balance is drawn up, the introduction of a new currency is out of the question, since the dinar is the official currency on the territory of Yugoslavia."

The Slovene Government proposed to the republican assembly that the new constitution be adopted by July 2 at the latest, as the basis for a new legal system.

Under the new constitution, the Slovene state would have all the attributes of a genuine authority on its own territory.

The republican government said that Slovenia was at a decisive stage of becoming autonomous.

The Slovene Government said that spontaneous developments in Yugoslavia would overtake the dragged-out consultations among the republics. It also observed that, apart from the economic and political disintegration of the Yugoslav state, "dangerous concepts of the organization of mutual relations by means of force" were emerging.

Slovene Assembly Adopts Government Memorandum

AU1801154191 Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovene 12 Jan 91 p 1

[A. B. report: The Only Aim of the Monetary Policy—Hard Currency Along With Fall of Wages"]

[Text] At the joint session of the Assembly chambers devoted exclusively to the measures of the Republic of Slovenia concerning the establishment of economic relations in Yugoslavia, after much debate the assembly deputies endorsed the Republican Executive Council's memorandum. By 23 January, the Government must prepare an assessment of the situation following the plebiscite and a proposal on the program of activities for the realization of the aims of the plebiscite.

What some people expected to be adopted at this session was a specific program of measures, above all concerning the financial sphere, and a law according to which one would immediately secede from the unified monetary system of the SFRY.

The only thing endorsed was the system of turnover taxes, duties, and customs that was taken over, so Slovenia will not completely renounce markets in other parts of Yugoslavia. Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene Executive Council, informed the deputies that the basics of the economic policy will remain unchanged, such as had been put down in program guidelines and in the statement on the independence of Slovenia. The Government has already prepared laws that will make the immediate establishment of institutions possible. The National Bank of Slovenia plans to introduce its money gradually and exclusively through transactions with foreign money. The government is of the opinion that to have hard currency, it would have to reduce purchase power abroad by about 30 percent, and the standard of living will also have to fall by this percent.

According to Peterle, with the present level of productivity, one can join the world economic trends only with much lower real incomes. The future monetary policy will have only one aim—hard currency.

Slovenia, Croatia Agree on Security, Defense

LD1701203591 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1328 GMT 17 Jan 91

[Text] Ljubljana, Jan 17 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia, which want Yugoslavia to become a confederation, have agreed on mutual cooperation in the area of security and defense. The agreement was reached yesterday, bearing in mind the situation in the Gulf and the Soviet Union, and also the conditions created after the Yugoslav State Presidency issued the order on the disbanding and disarming of all para-military formations in the country, as a statement released by the Slovene Govenment today said. The statement said that the defense and interior ministers and the security service chiefs of the two republics took part in yesterday's meeting, held in Slovenia.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman stated to Croatian television today that he was being approached by people who fear that those who "would like to impose the idea of a centralist Yugoslavia may use the world's preoccupation with the war crisis and war in the Gulf and attempt a military intervention in Croatia and Yugoslavia."

The Yugoslav State Presidency has ordered the paramilitary units to disband and return arms by January 19, and specified that, should they fail to act accordingly, the carrying out of its order would be ensured by the Yugoslav People's Army.

Slovenia and Croatia, which have taken over command of the territorial defense units, which fall under federal command, have announced that they do not consider that the State Presidency order pertains to them.

Slovenia Opposes Federal Bank Centralization

LD2201195291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1729 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Ljubljana, Jan 22 (TANJUG)—The government of the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia today informed the federal government that it "most categorically opposes the centralization of Narodna Banka Jugoslavije (National Bank of Yugoslavia)."

The federal government had recently proposed, among other things, that the federal central bank be given greater influence.

The Slovene Government set out today that, now that the republic of Serbia had illegally taken 18.3 billion dinars (2.4 billion dollars) from the primary issue, the federal central bank "cannot be the one to reconstruct the financial and banking systems in Yugoslavia."

The Slovene Government rejected the hitherto system of providing funds for the federal budget, and set out that it would further refuse to make its contribution to the fund for the underdeveloped part of the country.

The Slovene Government, feeling that it is necessary to ensure the functioning of the federation in the area of defense, said it would provide part of the funds for that purpose.

Slovenia requested the federation to defend its borders until it [word indistinct] up its own defense system, as it did also that "one-third of the military facilities" on its territory be vacated by August 1.

The Republic of Slovenia is ready to cover also a part of the foreign service expenditures, but on condition it has a representative in those Yugoslav diplomatic missions that are of interest to it.

New Slovene Currency Reportedly Introduced

AU2301145391 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jan 91 p 12

[S. F. report: "Dinar, Coupon, (Lipa), Triglav"]

[Text] Maribor—Dr. Joze Mencinger, the vice president of the Slovene government allegedly showed the new banknote, the triglav, to his closest colleagues during the closed meeting of DEMOS at Poljce in Gorenjska region on Sunday, and it is expected that Lojze Peterle, president of the Executive Council of Slovenia, will reveal it to the public. According to the unofficial reports this month 10 percent of personal income in Slovenia would already be paid out in triglavs, while the remaining part would be paid in dinars. The triglav's value is pegged to the German mark at a ratio of 13 to 14 triglavs to one mark.

Because the dinar is overvalued in relation to the German mark the exporters are hoping the triglav would initially be introduced in the economy to help cover the losses incurred through exporting.

The gold reserves of Slovenia are not large enough for Slovenia to proceed with its faster and "more daring" introduction. Allegedly, there are plans to abolish foreign currency giro accounts, and in the future citizens should be able to buy and pay for goods and services with triglavs in the same way as hard currency is used in developed European countries. It has been learned that the purchase of Slovene triglav's would only be possible for hard currency and not for dinars.

To what extent this information is accurate will be seen in the following days.

Croatian Assembly To Discuss Disarmament Order

LD2401133491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1308 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Zagreb, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—An emergency session of the Croatian Assembly has been convened for tomorrow, 25 January.

A special statement issued today by the president of the Croatian Assembly, Zarko Domljan, says that the session is convened at the initiative of the president of the Croatian Republic.

The reason for the convocation of the emergency session of the Croatian Assembly is, as stated, the statement of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense issued on 23 January 1991.

The invitation to the session states that the statement of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense "contains an open threat to the sovereignty of the Croatian Republic and, thereby, jeopardizes its democratic and constitutional order, independence, and territorial integrity."

Slovene, Croatian Soldiers Moved From Croatia

LD2401145591 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] It is reported by competent sources that the transfer of Croatian soldiers from some Yugoslav People's Army garrisons in Croatia to other parts of the country has started. All Croats serving their military term in the Petrinja garrison have been transferred to Serbia. Croatian and Slovene soldiers have been transfered from the Bjelovar barracks to other parts of the country.

Dalmation Action Party Registered in Split

AU2301220491 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jan 91 p 12

[Text] Split— More than a month after its founding assembly the ministry of justice and administration of Croatia registered the Dalmatian Action Party. This regional party was entered in the register of political organizations of the Republic of Croatia under the register number 54. The Dalmatian Action Party has, therefore, finally attained full legitimacy and acquired the status of a civil legal subject that will enable it to act as yet another party on the Croatian political scene.

Sibenik Official Assails Serbian Radio Knin

AU2301175491 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jan 91 p 2

[Jadranka Klisovic report: "Spreading Fear Through Media"]

[Excerpts] Sibenik—The Serbian Radio Knin broadcasts messages inviting the Serb national population to defend the town from attacks by Croatian special militia forces,

which are, according to the information of Radio Knin, concentrating in the surrounding area to attack Knin. Citizens are being invited to local communes to discuss the security of the town. Such untruths and unchecked information instill additional fear and nervousness among both the Serb and Croat populations, whose relations have been disturbed so much that contacts are almost non-existent. By continuously repeating the alarming messages and lies on this local radio, which opted for the great Serbian policies a long time ago, the Serbian Radio is at the very top of the pile of those who, through their behavior, are making the situation in Croatia worse, especially in the communes with a mixed population. [passage omitted]

Pure Disinformation

Nikola Vukosic, acting secretary of the Sibenik Secretariat for Internal Affairs, confirmed that everything heard on Radio Knin in the last few days was ridiculous. There was no massing of special militia units in the area, Vukosic said. The traffic police carried out checks on the roads and in a short period of time achieved good results. We put more cars out of action recently than in the last two years for various traffic offenses, Vukosic said. [passage omitted]

Mesic Denies Accusations About Army Arrests

AU2301121991 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 91 p 15

[Interview with Stipe Mesic, SFRY Presidency vice president, by Jelena Lovric; date and place not given: "The Game of Double Standards"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Lovric] Is the fact that the Presidency has different criteria regarding political events inside Yugoslavia the reason why there is now insistence on bilateral meetings?

[Mesic] It is obvious that double standards are often applied, although no one would admit this. That was why I walked out of the Presidency session when the vote was taken on the disarmament order. I proposed that the documentation that had been presented to the Presidency members and related to the situation in Croatia be the subject of consultations with this republic's official services because the old rule is that the other side is always listened to. When it comes to Croatia, however, it is as if the other side does not have to be heard. When it comes to Kosovo and not the flagrant violation, but the flagrant crushing of human rights, the same people who used outvoting to force this order on disarmament think that they should not interfere in this because this is Serbia and a Serbian problem. If the others are never discussed without them being there, I do not see why Croatia would be an exception. Particularly because General Adzic made some claims that were not one side of the truth but complete untruths. He claimed that the official services of the Republic of Croatia have been mistreating some officers when in fact this involved a civilian vehicle being intercepted when it was obviously following Minister Boljkovac. A certain time ago, the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs informed us that some terrorist groups were preparing to kidnap members of the families of individuals in the government of Croatia— Boljkovac's name, among others, was mentioned in this respect—to use them to force the release of Arkan and the others in his group. Thus, Boljkovac's protection was stepped up. The civilian car, however, had military license plates in the trunk. As soon as the civilians who had been detained were identified as officers, the military police were called. A scandal should not have been made out of this, and, even less, can this be used as justification to say that an open attack has already begun in Croatia on military services that are, according to Adzic's claims, supposedly being prevented from performing their tasks. The chief of the General Staff has not only put forward claims that are not true but has done this in such a way as to insult the symbols of the Republic of Croatia, so we were forced to officially request that he be replaced. [passage omitted]

Knin Assembly President Notes Faith in Army

LD2301134691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1142 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Knin, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—Dr. Milan Babic, one of the leaders of the Serbian movement in Croatia and president of the Knin Municipal Assembly, at a press conference today in Knin, tried to mitigate the indignation that Knin and the majority of the municipalities within the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" reacted with to yesterday's session of the SFRY Presidency and its interpretation by Croat television and radio.

We are in contact with the top federal bodies. The people of the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" must have confidence in the Yugoslav People's Army and its role and in the promise that all paramilitary armed formations on Yugoslav territory will be disarmed. The Serbian people must not be taken in by provocations and disinformation served by Croat radio and television and designed to cast doubt on SFRY Presidency decisions, Babic stressed.

We believe in the Yugoslav People's Army and in its role to safeguard the peace of all citizens despite efforts by individual SFRY Presidency members to create confusion by interpreting the SFRY Presidency decisions arbitrarily. We expect further specific steps in implementing the SFRY Presidency order and preventing provocations, Dr. Babic said.

Explosion Reported at Zagreb Municipal Building

LD2401121491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1132 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] Zagreb, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—A powerful explosion last night at 2030 shook the municipal assembly building in Velika Gorica about 20 kilometers southeast

of Zagreb. One person was killed and eight were seriously or lightly injured in the explosion.

There has been no official information about the explosion, but according to the Zagreb press this morning, the accident happened "most likely in the premises housing the municipal national defense secretariat." It has been learned from unofficial sources that the blast was caused by negligence in handling explosives.

The identity of the person killed has not yet been revealed. Bozidar Lackovic (21) received serious injuries, while Zdenko Bandic (29), Stanko Saric (29), Rozalto Strsan (37), Ivica Prnjak (24), Vlado Grbavac (23), Branimir Tacarovic (42), and Milan Grbavac (25) were slightly injured.

No serious damage is in evidence on the municipal assembly building except a broken window. An investigation is underway.

Defense Secretariat Orders Croatia To Disarm

LD2301182491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1704 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—The information service of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense has been tasked with publishing the following statement:

Having assessed the current situation in the SFRY, especially its defense aspect, the Federal Secretariat for National Defense states that only two ways exist regarding further events in Yugoslav society. One is a constructive, argued, and democratic dialogue about possible solutions for overcoming the crisis and regulating relations in Yugoslavia. The other consists of conducting a policy of fait accompli in the development of a federal state, as well as one-sidedly imposing partial interest and the will of the leaderships of some constituent parts of the Yugoslav Federation.

The first choice—as the only correct one—presupposes, in the sphere of defense, the preservation of the integrity and unity of the SFRY Armed Forces and the invovlement of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] in defending external—and in this case also internal—borders, unless an agreement on a future Yugoslav system is reached.

The other way—the policy of fait accompli and unconstitutional and illegal behavior—would unavoidably lead to the formation of national and other illegal formations in all parts of Yugoslavia. It can be said with certainty that this will happen in a few days if this process is not immediately halted on Croatian territory.

In view of the fact that the existence of illegal armed groups throughout our country s territory would lead to reciprocal settling of accounts and conflicts and concerning internal borders in Yugoslavia, as well as to fratricidal war with catastrophic consequences, no one willing to follow the voice of reason can accept a policy of fait accompli and a unilateral and forceful attempt to undermine the SFRY Constitution and federal laws. The JNA cannot and must not act like that either in terms of its social role or in terms of its constitutional responsibilites.

It is clear today that secessionist-separatist forces that not only want the secession of individual peoples from the framework of the SFRY—which, as a right, no one is disputing—but the complete destruction of Yugoslavia and its being dragged into a bloody fratricidal war are operating in Yugoslav society. These forces are continually acting illegally and are resorting to force whereby, to justify their actions, they accuse others, especially the JNA, of allegedly behaving violently. It is increasingly obvious that their actions are in the direct service of some foreign elements.

It is common knowledge that on 9 January this year the SFRY Presidency—accepting the proposal and the stance of the Federal Secretariat of National Defense that, in these specific conditions, such behavior is a politically unacceptable way of acting—adopted the decision on disbanding and disarming illegal armed groups. On 19 January the Presidency approved an extension of the original deadline by 48 hours, but the promises which motivated this decision have not been fulfilled. In this way, in the assessment of the SFRY Presidency dated 22 January, an opportunity was missed to disarm the illegal military formations by abolishing them. In view of the fact that the order has been only partially carried out, the Presidency also pointed out the duty of military judicial and other appropriate organs to carry out their commitments and powers sanctioned by legislation.

Acting in accordance with the tasks laid down by law and demands of the SFRY Presidency, military judicial bodies have set criminal proceedings in motion and are filing criminal charges against those who organized the arming of illegal armed groups. The proceedings will be carried out publicly and strictly in line with the law.

In conducting proceedings based on law, the Army will neither take over anyone else's powers, nor undermine legal system institutions. It will, however, ensure that the proceedings are carried through to the end and that court rulings are enforced.

Groups of various but essentially military formations have been mobilized in the Republic of Croatia. In the name of alleged defense against military intervention, intensive monitoring of JNA members and military units, armed defense of specific facilities, blockade of communications, and preparation of assorted terrorist actions directed against the Army and its members have been organized. Parallel with this, a psychosis of fear is being unreasonably and groundlessly fueled and an extensive anti-army campaign is underway.

Proceeding from the fact that the measures undertaken in the Republic of Croatia could entail a variety of misunderstandings and undesirable confrontations, it is essential that all mobilized groups should be disbanded immediately. Then the JNA will not have to take special

measures to secure the conditions for unhampered work by its judicial and other organs. If all mobilized armed groups in the Republic of Croatia fail to be disbanded immediately, the JNA, acting in accordance with the stipulations in point four and seven of the SFRY Presidency order, will enhance the combat-readiness of its units to a level which will guarantee the implementation of criminal procedure and of court decisions as provided by our legislation.

Collection of Illegal Arms Completed in Serbia

LD2201142991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1038 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—The action to collect arms and ammunition on the basis of the SFRY Presidency's decree has been completed in the Republic of Serbia.

It has been announced in the Republican Secretariat for National Defense that certain quantities of arms have been collected. In Kosovo, citizens of the Albanian nationality have been predominant in handing in weapons kept without authorization. In Vojvodina, too, individuals handed in weapons that they did not have a legal right to keep. In this action weapons were confiscated from individuals because, as has already been said, there are no paramilitary formations in Serbia.

Milosevic, Bulatovic Hold Talks in Belgrade

AU2201200391 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed Report: "Serbs and Montenegrins Want To Live Together]

[Text] Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, and Momir Bulatovic, president of the Presidency of Montenegro, met in Belgrade yesterday.

In a fairly long and friendly conversation they exchanged views on the current matters relating to the cooperation between the two republics and to the current economic and political situation in the country. They fully agreed that problems in Yugoslavia should be resolved peacefully and democratically and that changes should be carried out in a legal way through the federal institutions.

During the conversation it was stressed that Serbia and Montenegro share the view that Yugoslavia should be preserved as a unified, federal state of equal peoples.

The two sides expressed the joint opinion that only the Yugoslav peoples, who created Yugoslavia as a common state, can decide on its future. Serbs and Montenegrins wish to live together in one state organized as a democratic federation. At the same time they respect the right of all individual Yugoslav peoples to self-determination, that is, the right of every nation to independently decide on its future. Only on the basis of equal use of the peoples' right to self-determination can the new, federal Yugoslav state be constituted as a community who want to live together in peace and harmony. This is why the existing administrative borders between republics in Yugoslavia cannot be accepted as state borders since our republics have never been areas populated by only one nation.

They also discussed the realization of the economic policies in the previous year and concluded that their failure resulted in serious consequences in terms of a drop in production and the standard of living. Therefore, we should reexamine the model offered for this year, especially the restrictions of the credit-monetary policies, and balance anti-inflationary measures to create the necessary conditions for reviving economic activities and a new development cycle. The leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro believe the way out of the crisis is to boost production and create a new economic structure that would correspond to the existing opportunities and to the trends in modern technology.

The two sides stressed the need for: expanding the cooperation between economic and other entities of the two republics, ensuring their integration, the modernization of production programs, as well as the realization of other integrational projects of mutual economic interest.

In addition to the information about the Milosevic-Bulatovic meeting, we were also informed by the cabinet of the president of Republic of Serbia that next week the president of Serbia and the top republican officials will hold talks with the presidents and top officials of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia. These meetings are scheduled for the 22nd, 24th, and 25th of January in Belgrade.

Bosnia Serbian Party Encouraged by Talks

LD2301193891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1340 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—The Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Bosnia-Hercegovina is greatly encouraged by the talks that a delegation from the republic had with Croatia and Serbia because they clearly indicate that Bosnia-Hercegovina favors Yugoslavia and its survival. This was stated today at a press conference given by the SDS.

One of the points common to the talks with both Croat and Serbian delegations was that all future changes should be carried out in a peaceful, democratic, and civilized manner. This excludes the possibility of using force.

Asked about reports that Serbia has imposed a condition on Bosnia-Hercegovina's sovereignty—that it should stay within Yugoslavia—SDS President Radovan Karadzic, said that Bosnia-Hercegovina is in favor of being an equal federal unit within Yugoslavia. Any attempt to separate this republic from Yugoslavia will be met with resistance from all Serbs, and from a large number of Muslims and Croats, he stressed.

In any case, Karadzic continued, there is great interest in Yugoslavia among the Muslim nation, as that is the only framework in which it can survive. This means that if there are just four federal units Bosnia-Hercegovina will be able to survive.

It was also said today that there is anxiety among the Serbian population in some municipalities bordering Croatia, for instance in areas around Metkovic, where there is evidence of [Serbian] women and children from Croatia crossing over into Bosnia-Hercegovina. The SDS has issued instructions for accepting potential refugees.

Izetbegovic Calls for Preservation of Federation

AU2401101591 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 91 p 5

[M. Lucic report: ""Let Us Preserve Our State"]

[Text] Sarajevo—It is only in theory that the possibility exists of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman being able to conclude a new Cvetkovic-Macek agreement, which would bring into question Bosnia-Hercegovina's survival as a state and would then lead to the Muslim people and all the peoples who live here defending themselves. If this were to happen, any army that would attack Bosnia-Hercegovina would be considered an army of occupation and any action for us to defend ourselves from it and from those who would collaborate with it would be legitimate, because it is our interest to preserve Bosnia-Hercegovina as a state. This was said by Alija Izetbegovic, leader of the Party of Democratic Action and president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina, at a news conference held the day before yesterday.

Asked to comment on reports by world agencies that there could be army intervention in Yugoslavia on 19 January—if the SFRY Presidency decision on disarmament is not honored—Izetbegovic stated that "there will certainly be no military coup." He thought that a military coup was possible in the extreme case, if there were to be real chaos. He added, however, we in Yugoslavia know how to drag things out and finally resolve something, but armies have never solved anything. He stressed that the disarmament of all paramilitary units should be supported, but as regards Bosnia-Hercegovina, he said "we do not need any units whatsoever, neither Muslim, nor Serbian, nor Croatian since this would provoke an incident."

He also explained his proposal regarding a group of foreign observers who would help to disentangle the Yugoslav crisis, and said that he meant a group of a dozen well-known public figures who as objective and unbiased outside observers would give advice to help whenever negotiations on Yugoslavia's future faltered. A handful of intelligent people cannot harm us, Izetbegovic said. He stressed that Bosnia-Hercegovina is interested in the appropriate outcome for these negotiations, and Yugoslav integration suited it.

One of the journalist's questions was how he viewed Yugoslavia's foreign policy in the context of the situation in the Gulf, and Izetbegovic stated that our country had taken the only possible stand and the invasion of Kuwait could not be justified at all.

In response to a journalist's comment that negotiations between the victorious parties on setting up the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina are not exactly going smoothly, Izetbegovic said that the government team would be known some time next week and that the delay was not caused by disagreements among parties but by quandaries within the parties over choosing the new people. As he stressed, this is because there was a desire to create a government of expert and capable people. He added that Jure Pelivan, the prime minister-designate, would have the right to veto ministerial candidates who were endorsed by the Party of Democratic Action, the Serbian Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Party.

Bosnian Serb Leader on Bogicevic Replacement

AU1801194491 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jan 91 p 12

[M. Caric report: "Games About Bogicevic"]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, 9 Jan—Because of the ever-frequent speculation about the possible replacement of Bogic Bogicevic as Bosnia-Hercegovina's member of the SFRY Presidency, we turned to the most appropriate person in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, to answer this. As is well known, in the distribution of posts in the new government, the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina was allocated a post on the SFRY Presidency; the Party of Democratic Action received the post of president of the Presidency of Bosnia- Hercegovina; the Serbian Democratic Party, the post of president of the Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina; and the Croatian Democratic Community, the head of the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina. After the "Serbian term of office," the post of member of the SFRY Presidency should belong to a Muslim, probably from the ranks of the Party of Democratic Action. [passage omitted]

Dr. Radovan Karadzic's stand is clear and straightforward.

"We did not want to behave like Franjo Tudjman and replace Bogicevic in record time, as the president of Croatia did with Stipe Suvar. Stjepan Mesic was appointed without the Serbian people in Croatia being asked, not to mention the opposition in this republic."

Bogicevic's replacement was not a priority, but voices are increasingly being heard, particularly from the membership of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, that Bogicevic should be replaced by some "more energetic Serb." Therefore, Dr. Karadzic added, we publicly put forward some names that the Serbian

people had proposed (Vojislav Lubarda, Rajko Petrov Nogo, Gojko Djogo, Dr. Slavko Leovac, Dr. Milorad Ekmecic, Mirko Ostojic....)

We think that in the federation, Bogicevic should represent all the three peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina equally, as Alija Izetbegovic should do as "the president of all Bosnians and Hercegovinians." Bogicevic, however, is in the federal leadership as a Serb and should behave accordingly.

The president of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina went on to recall that the Serbian party had not yet held a meeting of the Main Committee on the question of the SFRY Presidency member since they were waiting for all reports to arrive from the field. The party's executive committee was concerned with this.

We will probably have a precise answer in several weeks but until that time there will probably be an official demand from the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community concerning the post that is the responsibility of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina. We will discover later, most probably by March, how Bogicevic acts in the SFRY Presidency and how he represents Serbian interests. [passage omitted]

Gligorov Proposed for Macedonian Presidency

LD2301214291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1955 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] Skopje, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—The presidium of the Central Committee of the Macedonian League of Communists [LC] Party for Democratic Transformation today has once more put forward Kiro Gligorov as candidate for the post of the president of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The decision was reached in line with the established party position, which has received substantial and unreserved support from the Macedonian public in past few days.

The Macedonian LC-Party for Democratic Transformation positively supports the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] action for Kiro Gligorov's candidacy for Macedonian president. The party also positively supported the decision that the VMRO-DPMNE should put forward candidates for the post of Macedonian vice president and president of the Macedonian government.

Macedonian Leader Explains Meeting With Tudjman

AU2401100991 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 91 p 5

[D. Nikolic report: "Confederation—The Ideal Solution"]

[Excerpt] Skopje—I did not ask any other party president in Macedonia for permission. Nor did I ask the permission of the leading state figures in the republic. I simply gave myself permission, in agreement with members of my party's leadership, Ljupco Georgievski, president of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity [VMRO-DPMNE], said in reply to a question from journalists on why he went at his own request to visit Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia. This visit provoked a wave of unfavorable reactions in Macedonia because this leader talked about a confederation before the Macedonian parliament had adopted its platform on Yugoslavia's fate, on which it is now working, and before it had agreed not to support any of the concepts that had been proposed in other communities on the country's future setup, because they foment confrontations and do not express the Macedonian interest.

This was a meeting that had been arranged for a long time beforehand. There could have been a visit even earlier but it simply happened that both Mister Tudjman and I had the time so we met now. The party secretary G. Zmejkovski and I had the honor of being guests in Mr. Tudjman's family home. The meeting was also attended by Mr. Stipe Mesic, vice president of the SFRY Presidency, and Mr. Josip Manolic, head of the Croatian government. As early as at our founding meeting we clearly and openly said that our party would work to establish as many links as possible between Macedonia, Slovenia, and Croatia. This visit was only the fulfillment of what we had promised. After the talks, we came to the conclusion that there are no great or important differences between the VMRO-DPMNE and the Croatian Democratic Community in their programmatic aims and view of the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. We both are firmly decided on building an agreement on Yugoslavia's new setup on confederal bases. This is the ideal solution for resolving the crisis and also the one that is closest to the centuries-old dreams of the Croatian and Macedonian peoples regarding their own sovereign states, Georgievski said. Otherwise, Georgievski had made his stand known earlier that a future Yugoslav confederation should also be open to other neighboring states and even, in this context, Bulgaria, whose official politicians, as is well-known, deny the existence of Macedonians and thereby the existence of the Macedonian ethnic minority in Bulgaria. This leader stresses that it is time for Bulgaria to return Pirin Macedonia to Macedonia. [passage omitted]

New Macedonian Weekly Publication Appears

LD2401111991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0925 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Summary] Skopje, 24 Jan (TANJUG)— -The first independent weekly to be published in Macedonia appeared on newsstands today. The weekly 'PULS' [THE PULSE] will come out on Thursdays covering topics and events from Macedonia, Yugoslavia, and the world. Slobodan Petrovic, a prominent journalist, has been appointed the weekly's editor-in-chief.

No Illegal Groups, Weapons in Montenegro

LD2201143891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0832 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Titograd, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—There are no paramilitary or other armed illegal formations in Montenegro, nor are there illegally acquired weapons. This was stated today to TANJUG by Colonel Vlado Boljevic, Montenegro's minister of national defense. Boljevic also stressed that the competent services have hitherto confiscated illegally held arms from individuals, and will continue to do, adhering strictly to the regulations on the possession and bearing of arms and to the order of the SFRY Presidency.

Daily Interviews Montenegrin President

AU2201100991 Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 91 pp 4, 5

[Interview with Momir Bulatovic, president of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro, by Vidoje Konatar and Momcilo Popovic; place and date not given: "For Tudjman and Kucan Yugoslavia Does not Exist"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [POBJEDA] The Montenegrin Assembly and Presidency have been set up. When will our republic get a new government?

[Bulatovic] The one-house multiparty assembly sits, as a rule, only a few times a year, but its sessions will last up to ten days. For this reason the second session of the assembly is being thoroughly prepared and will be held in the first ten days of next month. The agenda will be exceptionally rich. Regarding your question, I would like to stress that it is necessary first to adopt the law on government and the law on state administration. Only then will the conditions be created for the mandator of the government to propose a program, and a few days later, but still within the same sitting of the Assembly, announce members of the new government.

According to the Constitution, the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro will organize in the course of next few days a meeting between members of the parties represented in the assembly and offer the mandate for the new government to the representatives of one of these parties. Considering that the League of Communists have the majority, it would be logical for the mandator to be a member of that party. I expect that the government will mainly or entirely consist of the Communists. [passage omitted]

[POBJEDA] You are also announcing significant cadre changes.

[Bulatovic] Of course, they are expected after elections. This is a very simple logic that is used in the countries with a long tradition of parliamentary democracy. Elections are won by policies and these policies are carried out by the people who support and promote the stands of these policies. A great number of leading people in the services of state administration supported policies different to those of the League of Communists and it is understandable that they will be replaced. The opposition will, of course, make a great fuss about it and declare it a Stalinist act. [passage omitted]

[POBJEDA] How do you assess the results of the SFRY Presidency's session of 10 January that was also attended by the presidents of all republics and provinces?

[Bulatovic] The course and results of the session are already known to the public since a series of the shorthand notes of the statements made by the participants in the session have been published. At the first glance one can conclude that there were differences in approaches, because some participants opted for monologues while others tried to initiate dialogues.

The results are obviously and understandably being interpreted in different ways. I think that it was useful to sit down and hold a sensible dialogue and finally learn about the positions from which we individually approach the political future of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, I am now clear that Yugoslavia definitely no longer exists for the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia, and that they are in fact ready for the division of the present assets and obligations. My impression is that other republics believe in the need for and the existence of a possibility for a new, better Yugoslav integration. [passage omitted]

Montenegro and Serbia

[POBJEDA] Could you comment on elections in Serbia and say how the convincing victory of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and Slobodan Milosevic, on the one hand, and the outcome of the election, on the other, will influence cooperation between Montenegro and Serbia?

[Bulatovic] I am sincerely happy with the victory of the SPS and Slobodan Milosevic. Considering that the citizens of the two republics voted for a special kind of political continuity, we will be in position to conclude a number of incipient projects and intensify cooperation primarily in the energy generating industry, transportation, and various branches of the economy, as well as in the spheres of science, education, and culture.

If we rid ourselves of the nonsensical fear that Serbia will occupy us and declare Montenegro its "third province," we will see that cooperation with Serbia is necessary, natural, and sensible, and that it should go beyond the economy of Montenegro. [passage omitted]

Djukanovic To Form New Montenegrin Government

AU2301160291 Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jan 91 p 1

[D. Garic report: "Milo Djukanovic—To Form the Government"]

[Excerpt] Titograd, 16 Jan—Accepting the proposal of the League of Communists, the Presidency of the

Socialist Republic of Montenegro decided to ask Milo Djukanovic to form the next Montenegrin government. This once again confirms the will of the Montenegrin people that the responsibility for the development of the republic and the organization of authority be entrusted to the League of Communists, the party to which the adult population extended support at the first multiparty elections by giving it 83 out of 125 deputy seats in the multiparty assembly. [passage omitted]

Envoy Discusses Macedonian Issue in Belgrade

AU1801150191 Sofia BTA in English 1331 GMT 18 Jan 91

["Bulgaria's Concern Over the Bulgarians in Yugoslavia Is Justified"—BTA headline]

[Text] Belgrade, January 18 (BTA)—Mr. Petur Nichkov, charge d'affaires of the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade, yesterday was summoned to the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in connection with the declaration of the secretariat on the joint news conference given in Sofia on January 12, 1990, by Bulgaria's Prime Minister Dimitur Popov and Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis of Greece.

In the declaration of the Federal Secretariat published yesterday by the Yugoslav press the two prime ministers are accused of having denied the existence of a Macedonian nation.

At the meeting held at the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry the Bulgarian diplomat stated that the two prime ministers had only confirmed the fact that there is no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria or Greece, that is why the problem of a Macedonian minority is practically non-existent in Bulgaria.

The diplomat pointed out that Bulgaria's position on the matter is well known from the declaration of the Grand National Assembly passed on March 6, 1990, and the declaration the Bulgarian Parliament approved on August 8, 1990. This position was stated by President Zhelyu Zhelev at the meeting he had with his Yugoslav counterpart, Mr. Borislav Jovic, in New York. It is well known that people in Bulgaria are no longer persecuted because of their ethnic identity and that everybody's right to self-determination is guaranteed. On the other hand nobody can force the Bulgarians to identify themselves as Macedonians any more, as it was the case at the end of the 1940's.

As to the rights of the Bulgarians in the Pirin area over which Yugoslavia is concerned, the people there enjoy the same rights all other people in the other parts of Bulgaria do. However, Bulgaria is legally justified to raise the question of the human rights and freedoms of the Bulgarians in Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian diplomat stated.